VZCZCXRO7084
PP RUEHBI RUEHCI
DE RUEHCI #0104/01 0880915
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 280915Z MAR 08
FM AMCONSUL KOLKATA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1939
INFO RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 1821
RUEHCG/AMCONSUL CHENNAI 0842
RUEHBI/AMCONSUL MUMBAI 0847
RUEHGO/AMEMBASSY RANGOON 0421
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU 0559
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0444
RUEIDN/DNI WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEILB/NCTC WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEHCI/AMCONSUL KOLKATA 2370

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KOLKATA 000104 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER PHUM PINR ASEC IN
SUBJECT: MAOISTS SEEK TO EXPAND PRESENCE IN WEST BENGAL 
 
REF: A) 07 KOLKATA 345   B) 07 KOLKATA 340 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary.  On March 4 and 14, Econoff met separately 
with a journalist who reports on and interacts with Maoist 
insurgents, and the former GOWB Home Secretary, who was 
responsible for overall state security and for the state 
government's response to the Maoist threat.  Both acknowledged 
that the Maoists have expanded their influence within West 
Bengal and discussed how the ultra-left Communist Party of 
India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) has entered urban areas and has 
leveraged political unrest and anti-government protests to 
further its growth in the state.  The GWOB has failed to respond 
effectively to the Maoist threat and unless the GOWB begins to 
implement some counter-measures, the Maoists will expand their 
violent activities in rural areas and into urban centers in the 
near future.  End Summary. 
 
------------------- 
Expanding Influence 
------------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) In an effort to better understand the Maoist situation 
in West Bengal, Econoff met separately with journalist Aloke 
Banerjee, who covers Maoist issues, and with former GOWB Home 
Secretary Prasad Ranjan Ray, who was responsible for security 
 
SIPDIS 
affairs in the state until last month. Both Banerjee and Ray 
agreed that the Maoist presence in West Bengal is growing. 
According to Banerjee, the Maoists are making inroads into urban 
areas with an interest in recruiting students and workers. 
Behind this shift is the implied benefit of concentrating the 
law enforcement focus on the cities, leaving the rural region 
open to for the Maoists to increase their presence in the 
villages, said Banerjee.  Ray also highlighted the Maoists' 
increased focus on youth recruitment and their greater 
visibility in cities like Kolkata.  (Note:  In recent months, 
the media has reported an increase in Maoist propaganda 
appearing on walls in the city.  On March 24, Kolkata's leading 
English daily, The Telegraph, reported the arrest of five women 
with suspected Maoist links for putting up posters "inciting 
people to wage war against the state."  End Note.)  Ray added 
that West Bengal provides financial resources, safe houses, and 
acts as a transit point for Maoists in the northeastern region 
(Note:  In March 2004 Communist Party of Nepal - Maoist (CPN-M) 
Politburo Member Mahon Baidya (aka Kiran) was arrested in 
northern West Bengal town of Siliguri.  In November 2006 Baidya 
was released with fellow CPN-M Politburo Member C.P. Gajurel, 
also detained in WB's Jaipalguri prison, to support CPM 
Politburo Member Sitaram Yechury's diplomatic efforts in Nepal. 
End Note.)  According to Ray, there is little actionable 
intelligence available on the plans and movements of Maoists 
before attacks occur and the GOWB is unsure of where the group 
has obtained funding and weapons.  (Comment:  Maoists have 
recently been obtaining many weapons by attacking more remote 
armories and police stations and obtain funds through extortion. 
 End Comment.) 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Emphasizing that the principle of armed struggle and 
overthrow of the existing government is central to Maoist 
precepts, Banerjee explained that the Maoists have become 
interested in new methods through which to expand their 
influence in West Bengal.  Maoist interest traditionally has 
been in anti-feudal movements aimed at fomenting dissent and 
struggle amongst India's landless rural workers and 
sharecroppers, according to Banerjee.  However, the Maoists, who 
predominantly reside in the less developed, forested regions 
within states, are now experimenting with ways to introduce 
conflict in West Bengal outside of their normal areas of 
influence. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) One of the "experiments" Banerjee described was the 
Maoist incursion into Nandigram, West Bengal where land 
acquisition issues stirred up protests and violent clashes 
(reftels).  According to Banerjee, who maintains contacts within 
the CPI-Maoist apparatus, the Maoists were interested in the 
potential to transform political resistance over land 
acquisition policy into armed agitation.  Looking to Nandigram 
as a proving ground of their potential strength outside of the 
forest areas, the Maoists entered Nandigram for a short period 
of time and left by early November of last year. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) According to Banerjee, the Maoist evaluation of the 
Nandigram experience was positive and the group believes that it 
can operate outside of its traditional forest bases for a 
 
KOLKATA 00000104  002 OF 003 
 
 
limited amount of time.  The CPI-Maoists remain wary of 
paramilitary forces, however, which they believe are capable of 
pushing them out of areas like Nandigram.  The Maoists may 
employ tactics used in Nandigram in other regions scheduled for 
development projects with similar environments of political 
protest, believes Banerjee. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Echoing Banerjee's sentiments, former Home Secretary 
Ray acknowledged that the Maoist presence in West Bengal is a 
concern for the GOWB as a threat to security in the state.  Ray 
differed with Banerjee on his prediction of future Maoist 
attacks, claiming that the Maoists were still at this point 
content to maintain a relatively low profile and avoid 
full-scale confrontations with government.  Ray emphasized that 
the GOWB must address the issue through initiatives in the 
public sector in addition to law and order efforts. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Ray refuted claims that Maoists were definitely 
present in Nandigram, and offered a nuanced view of the 
situation.  He believed that some ultra-left groups were part of 
the struggle in Nandigram because they saw it as an opportunity 
to exploit the tense situation for political means.  Ray was 
emphatic, however, that there was not a Maoist presence in the 
village, saying "I can tell you for sure that there are no 
hardcore Maoists in Nandigram."  (Comment:  Differing reports 
from government leaders, journalists and eyewitnesses on the 
presence of Maoists in Nandigram have played out extensively in 
the press.  Ray's differing assessment from that of some senior 
CPM leaders may have played a part in his removal from the Home 
Secretary post.  Regardless of the truth of the situation, 
 
SIPDIS 
ultimately any rumor or hint that the militant group has a 
presence and capacity to undermine governance in areas as 
sensitive as Nandigram will have some impact on the public 
impression of the group's relative strength.  End Comment.) 
 
---------------------- 
Targeting the Marxists 
---------------------- 
 
¶8.  (SBU) As has been the case for some time, Ray explained that 
Maoists were continuing to target grassroots CPM party 
officials.  The tactics appear to be working.  Ray surmised that 
block level officials in West Bengal are now probably afraid of 
entering certain areas known for their Maoist presence, much as 
is the case in neighboring Jharkhand state.  In addition to 
physical attacks on party workers, Ray said that he believes the 
Maoists have allied with legally recognized political parties in 
order to undermine the ruling CPM. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Both Ray and Banerjee think that the Maoist's ultimate 
strategic goal is to wrest power from the CPM government, but 
Ray's impression is that the more immediate concern is to slowly 
but surely expand areas of Maoist influence in the state.  Ray 
expects that violence in Maoist areas will increase during the 
run-up to May's village-level panchayat election as the group 
attempts to help allies gain toe-holds in local government.  Ray 
did not anticipate a Maoist imposed boycott of the elections, 
which he took as further evidence that the Maoists have an 
interest in seeing the political process bring its allies into 
power. 
 
------------------------- 
A Multi-Pronged Approach 
------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (SBU) The GOWB recently conducted a survey of 1,400 
villages and found that 900 of them had direct or marginal 
Maoist activity.  Banerjee said the GOWB generally has been 
dismissive of the Maoist influence and movements in the state in 
the past.  Ray acknowledged that the state government had been 
tardy in its response to the Maoists in West Bengal, but said 
that the bureaucracy and government officials were now committed 
to addressing the problem.  The GOWB, acting an a tip, recently 
arrested CPI-Maoist state secretary Himadri Sen Ray (aka Soumen) 
last month on multiple murder charges. 
 
¶11.  (SBU) The GOWB is looking to tackle the problem not just 
with law enforcement, but also through public sector 
initiatives.  According to Ray, the GOWB is trying to address 
the underlying problems that create the social breeding ground 
for Maoists in the state.  Ray was emphatic that improvements in 
water, health, education, and employment must be made available 
 
KOLKATA 00000104  003 OF 003 
 
 
to families living in areas susceptible to Maoist incursions and 
recruitment.  However, these efforts to stabilize Maoist 
hotspots were not progressing as quickly as Ray would have 
liked.  He also complained that recruitment of police and 
security forces in the Maoist impacted areas has been inadequate 
thus far.  Of the four thousand new recruits last year, only 
three hundred were from the Maoist identified areas.  He worried 
that the current plans for security during the upcoming May 
local panchayat elections were inadequate.  According to Ray, 
there will not be enough security forces to monitor election 
sites if the polls are held during a three-day period as 
currently planned and he thought rather that if the polls were 
over four days, adequate security could be provided. 
 
 
¶12.   (SBU) Though there have been recent indications that 
cooperation is improving, inter-state coordination against the 
Maoists generally has been limited.  In fact, Ray pointed out 
that the Maoists have not presented as great a threat to 
governance in West Bengal as they have in Chhattisgarh. 
However, Ray was relatively sanguine about the impact joint 
security efforts with other states could have, and believed that 
the GOWB will attempt to address the problem with other states 
in a more coordinated manner. 
 
¶13.  (SBU) Comment:  Getting GOWB officials to discuss the 
Maoist problem is generally a difficult proposition.  Although 
it's tempting to conclude that officials are close-lipped on 
security grounds, what becomes apparent is that for a number of 
reasons the GOWB really has little handle on the Maoist problem. 
 First, the manpower to sufficiently investigate, identify, and 
conduct operations against Maoists is lacking.  Second, the 
police, are often afraid to enter Maoist-dominated territories 
and the Maoists know this, giving them tremendous influence in 
underdeveloped areas of the state.  So far, the GOWB appears 
content to let the Maoists operate in rural areas.  But as 
Nandigram-like confrontations over land acquisition make 
headlines and increasing signs of Maoist urban presence 
continue, the GOWB may not have the luxury to ignore the problem 
in the near future. 
JARDINE