VZCZCXRO3669
OO RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #0293/01 0851049
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 251049Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7723
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000293 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV EAID PREL MARR CG
SUBJECT: ABBE MALUMALU REVIEWS KEY AMANI PROGRAM CHALLENGES 
AND ELEMENTS 
 
REF: A. KINSHASA 240 AND PREVIOUS 
     ¶B. KINSHASA 238 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary.  National Coordinator Abbe Malumalu 
discussed challenges to and key elements of the Amani Program 
with the Ambassador March 18.  Its chief current challenges 
are armed group participation, planning and program 
infrastructure.  Malumalu envisions a program focused on 
military reforms, humanitarian issues and roads and 
infrastructure.  Once the program is up and running, he plans 
to divide his time in Goma and Bukavu with frequent visits 
outside the capitals to raise public awareness of and support 
for it.  It appears that he aims for the program to do 
nothing less than to re-establish state authority and 
services after the government's failure so far to do so.  End 
summary. 
 
¶2. (U) National Coordinator Abbe Muhongulu Malumalu discussed 
his plans for implementing the January 23 Goma accords with 
the Ambassador March 18.  Abbe Malumalu focused on three 
major challenges to and three key elements of what is 
officially called the National Program for Security, Peace, 
Stabilization and Reconstruction for North Kivu and South 
Kivu, but generally referred to as the "Amani" (Swahili for 
peace) program.  He and the Ambassador also reviewed issues 
relating to the expected structure of the program.  Malumalu 
aide Flavion Misoni, PolCouns and PolOff sat in. 
 
Three major challenges 
---------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) Participation:  For Abbe Malumalu, keeping all the 
armed groups that signed the Goma accords involved in the 
process has been the major challenge to date.  He was clearly 
referring to the dynamics of recent negotiations with CNDP 
and Pareco as well as the smaller Mai-Mai groups (ref A).  He 
noted that all did not have the same importance but all had 
to be included.  He said that leaving the smaller groups 
outside the process would leave them susceptible to 
recruitment by the FDLR.  By contrast, treating all groups 
equally detracts from players whose participation is crucial. 
 He emphasized in particular the importance of keeping CNDP 
and the South Kivu Banyamulenge FRF inside the process, and 
cited U.S. involvement as a key factor in ensuring that CNDP 
in particular remained involved. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Planning:  Abbe Malumalu described planning for the 
program as perhaps the most important issue it currently 
faces.  He hoped by early April at the latest to have in 
place a team of Congolese and international experts working 
together on a plan to address solutions for specific 
challenges and problems.  He said it was not clear if the 
government currently had the interest or financial resources 
to provide experts.  He expressed hope that donors could help 
out in this area, citing USAID's funding of technical experts 
for the electoral commission. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Program infrastructure:  Abbe Malumalu cited program 
infrastructure and equipment as the program's third current 
challenge.  He is aiming to have the program operational from 
the beginning of April in Kinshasa, Goma and Bukavu.  He said 
he had finalized arrangements to rent buildings in Goma and 
Bukavu, and was looking for office space in Kinshasa.  He 
said the program had already begun using equipment and 
supplies provided by USAID contractor DAI from the January 
conference in Goma.  He called for a tour d'horizon with 
donors in the near future to determine contributions in 
specific areas. 
 
Three key elements 
------------------ 
 
¶6. (SBU) Abbe Malumulu indicated the Amani program would 
incorporate a wide range of elements, including military 
reform, police training, roads and infrastructure, a public 
awareness ("sensibilization") campaign, and leadership 
training such as that conducted by Woodrow Wilson Institute 
partner ILLCE.  He cited the importance of specific projects 
to focus common efforts.  He described MONUC as a key 
partner, and its stabilization plan as the program's 
strongest support. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Military:  Abbe Malumalu cited the limited window of 
opportunity for military reform provided by MONUC's presence 
in the country.  He stressed the importance of installing the 
 
KINSHASA 00000293  002 OF 002 
 
 
FARDC in permanent camps, and said it could not be done 
without MONUC support.  He also emphasized the importance of 
de-tribalizing the army in North and South Kivu.  He said no 
more than 30 per cent of each battalion should be drawn from 
troops from the province in which they are stationed. 
 
¶8. (SBU) He said he would present a plan for permanent camps 
by the end of the year encompassing North Kivu, South Kivu, 
Maniema and northern Katanga.  The plan would include 
microprojects in agriculture and stock raising, primary 
schools and military canteens as secondary benefits aimed at 
supplementing soldiers' salaries and accommodating their 
families.  He described the process in two stages:  first, 
obtaining tents for temporary accommodation and facilities; 
second, providing the means and materials for soldiers to 
construct their own camps. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Humanitarian issues:  Abbe Malumalu said that 
prospects for the return of refugees and IDPs would depend on 
the success of the plan's military element.  In short, IDPs 
will return when police replace the FARDC.  He said at that 
point the program could begin focusing on such humanitarian 
and rehabilitation issues as schools, agriculture and 
services. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Roads and infrastructure:  Abbe Malumalu cited the 
importance of restoring the region's damaged and neglected 
infrastructure.  He had previously discussed with CNDP's 
Nkunda a plan put together by his experts for North Kivu 
roads (ref B).  He cited USAID's experience in this area.  In 
Butembo, for example, DAI provided small stipends for 
engineers and materials for a project enabling Congolese 
workers to construct six bridges and 42 fish ponds in three 
months. 
 
New structures 
-------------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) Abbe Malumalu and the Ambassador exchanged views on 
the structure and functions of the various commissions 
expected to be established in a series of forthcoming 
presidential decrees.  Abbe Malumalu noted that two earlier 
decrees had established the program's national and 
interprovincial structures, and the new text would do the 
same at on the provincial level.  (Note:  On March 24, the 
government issued six decrees signed March 20 by President 
Kabila and Prime Minister Gizenga finalizing the structure of 
the Amani program and naming members to fill national, 
interprovincial and provincial positions.  End note.) 
 
¶12. (SBU) He told the Ambassador he had presented his 
proposals to Kabila chief of staff Raymond Tshibanda, who was 
responsible for drafting the text.  Once the program was up 
and running, he said he would be dividing his time between 
meetings in Goma and Bukavu and missions in the provinces to 
raise public awareness of the program with the population and 
hear their opinions.  He noted that his ongoing 
responsibilities as head of the Independent Electoral 
Commission would also require him to make periodic visits to 
Kinshasa. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶13. (SBU) Abbe Malumalu's plan appears to aim at nothing less 
than the re-establishment of state presence and services in 
North and South Kivu.  Ironically, this is the same task that 
the government has failed so far to achieve in the 17 months 
since elections.  End comment. 
GARVELINK