VZCZCXRO2493
OO RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #0287/01 0840743
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 240743Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7716
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KINSHASA 000287 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL MOPS MARR PGOV KPKO CG RW SF UN EUN
SUBJECT: GOMA NOTES - NAIROBI PROCESS: 14TH MEETING OF JMG TASK 
FORCE, MARCH 21, 2008 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary.  The March 21 Joint Monitoring Group Task Force 
session in Goma went reasonably smoothly, with little wrangling. 
Congo characterized its post-March 15 military plans against the 
ex-FAR/Interahamwe as a "progressive operation," not "classical 
war."  Rwanda characterized as "positive" Congolese response to its 
request for, and cooperation at, a March 16 meeting of army chiefs 
of staff.  Rwanda's demobilization chief said its program has 
processed 6,423 adult returnees and 669 children since 2001, and has 
plenty of capacity remaining.  Task Force members remain divided 
about a proposed meeting with the Congo-Rwanda Joint Verification 
Teams in the absence of instructions from JMG Envoys.  End summary. 
 
 
¶2. (SBU) The 14th meeting of the Nairobi process Joint Monitoring 
Group (JMG) Task Force March 21 in Goma was a reasonably smooth 
session that once again ended on time, at 1430.  There was some 
wrangling, albeit brief and decorous.  MONUC-Goma Head of Office 
Alpha Sow chaired in the absence of the incoming political chief. 
The U.S., EU (Belgian Consul General Hughes Chantry of Bukavu in the 
absence of Jean-Michel Dumont), South Africa, AU, and MONUC DDRRR 
and Political also attended.  Colonel Augustin Mamba was again at 
the head of the DRC delegation. 
 
¶3. (SBU) The Rwandan delegation (headed as usual by Major Franco 
Rutangengwa and augmented by Jean Sanyizoga, Director of the 
National Demobilization Commission) went out of its way to say that 
"there has been an improvement in bilateral relations in the past 
three weeks," which, in view of the acrimony that has often 
prevailed at Task Force meetings since its start-up in December, 
represents a big step forward.  The minutes were approved with only 
a minor change by the Rwandan delegation, which congratulated the 
chair and the secretariat for even-handed reporting (for a change, 
they implied). 
 
Update on DRC post-March 15 plans 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) Mamba reiterated that the FARDC was now engaged in a 
"progressive operation," "not a classical war" against the 
ex-FAR/Interahamwe (ex-FAR/IH).  Specific points: 
 
--  Units have been moved from Goma into Masisi and Walikale, with 
the aim of limiting access to mining areas.  Further units are being 
brought to Goma from Kitona. 
 
--  The emphasis on limiting access to mineral resources will be 
pursued in both North and South Kivu.  Aircraft known to have been 
transporting product from these areas have been grounded by the 
civil aviation authorities, and vehicles moving in and out are being 
stopped and searched.  "Clashes" will start in "identified areas" 
very shortly. 
 
--  Political and diplomatic efforts are continuing in parallel with 
the military campaign. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Rwanda made a few comments/queries: 
 
Q:  What was DRC doing to implement the provisions in UNSC 
Resolution 1804 on limiting movement and freezing assets of 
ex-FAR/IH? 
A:  As we said, we are focusing for now on limiting access to mining 
areas; other operations will begin in due course. 
 
Q:  We want to know everything you can tell us about the two FDLR 
divisions known to be in North and South Kivu:  where are they 
operating, with what equipment? 
A:  For now, we are focusing on mining areas, as described, and this 
is not the place to discuss such matters. 
 
Q:  We know that ex-FAR/IH units are blended into the civilian 
population.  What steps are you taking to protect the latter? 
A:  We have given you our full operational program, but the Task 
Force is not the forum in which to discuss operational details.  We 
have been running "sensibilisation" activities in all affected 
communities and have advised all traditional chiefs to ensure that 
their populations move away from ex-FAR/IH units. 
 
Q:  You are supposed to move captured ex-FAR/IH to reception centers 
and cantonment areas.  Where are these?  Who is in them? 
A: This is a DDRRR/DDR question, something we handle jointly with 
MONUC, let's put this on the agenda for the next meeting.  (Comment: 
 This was clearly a maneuver to put MONUC on the spot, since it is 
believed that plans and preparations are not well advanced for 
DDRRR, and especially for DDR of FDLR elements electing to remain in 
 
KINSHASA 00000287  002 OF 003 
 
 
DRC.  End comment.) 
 
DRC-Rwanda chiefs of staff meeting 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) The Rwandan delegation used its opening presentation to 
highlight concerns about joint threats by FARDC and ex-FAR/IH on its 
border.  It said that it had requested the March 16 emergency 
meeting between the Rwandan and Congolese chiefs of staff in Goma, 
facilitated by MONUC Acting Force Commander General Bikram Singh, to 
deal with these.  (Note:  Others on the Task Force thought the 
meeting had been called by the DRC, to discuss post-March 15 
planning.  However, the Rwandan characterization substantially 
tracks with information presented by SRSG Doss to P3+2 Ambassadors 
March 17 in Kinshasa.  End note.)  It said the Congolese response 
and their cooperation at the meeting were "positive." 
 
¶7. (SBU) Specific agreements reached at that meeting: 
 
--  DRC would begin immediately to launch attacks against 
ex-FAR/IH. 
--  There will be an increase in intelligence cooperation and 
exchange. 
--  MONUC has agreed to facilitate immediate investigations by the 
bilateral Joint Verification Teams (JVT) into the Rwandan 
allegations. 
--  Local commanders in border areas will be instructed to cooperate 
and share information. 
--  The two chiefs of staff will continue to meet on a regular 
basis 
 
¶8. (SBU) Rutagengwa referred repeatedly to what he called a "press 
release" of the meeting, but when a U.S. delegate asked for a copy 
following conclusion of the Task Force session, Rutagengwa said that 
in fact it was "still unofficial," as it "had not been signed."  He 
said he would try to get copies for next week's meeting.  MONUC has 
not seen the "press release" either. 
 
Rwandan demobilization activities 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) Sanyizoga, the demobilization chief, presented an overview 
of Rwandan demobilization activities as a special agenda item.  He 
said the program is based on overarching strategic principles of 
"unity" and "national security."  All Rwandans, including rebels and 
authors of genocide, are encouraged to come home and participate in 
the program, confessing their crimes if necessary.  "The door is 
open to all who wish to return.  We do not want a diaspora." 
 
¶10. (SBU) But Rwandans who have settled in other countries and wish 
to remain there are also encouraged to do so:  Rwanda has no problem 
with their taking dual nationality if this suits their purposes, and 
Rwandan nationality is inalienable, even if the host country 
requires a renunciation of it in order to achieve local nationality. 
 (Comment:  These are hot-button issues for the Congolese, who 
specifically forbid dual nationality and for whom the concept of an 
inalienable second nationality held by Congolese raises fears of 
fifth columns.  End comment.) 
 
¶11. (SBU) Sanyizoga described the program in terms of its 
administrative details, the kinds of orientation ("not 
brainwashing") given at the reception camps, the various 
resettlement packages on offer, etc.  The program has processed 
6,423 adult returnees and 669 children since 2001.  There is plenty 
of capacity:  Rwanda has the physical resources and the budget to 
receive as many DDRRR returnees as DRC and MONUC can generate.  The 
program, which was originally scheduled to close at the end of 2008, 
has been extended through 2011. 
 
Envoys meeting 
-------------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) In "Other Business," Mamba suggested that, as the JMG 
Envoys would be meeting in New York on April 16, and since many of 
the Task Force regulars also attend the Envoys' meeting, it would be 
a good idea to skip the Task Force meeting that week, all the more 
so since TF meetings held at such times in the past have been 
particularly dismal and unproductive. 
 
¶13. (SBU) This sounded like a splendid idea to many of the other 
participants (smiles and nods around the table), but the Rwandan 
delegation objected strenuously, saying that it was important to 
continue to show commitment to the Nairobi process by meeting no 
matter what:  while some delegations (i.e., the DRC's) might be a 
 
KINSHASA 00000287  003 OF 003 
 
 
little thin at such times, others (i.e., Rwanda's) were more solidly 
structured and were ready to meet under all circumstances.  The 
matter was left undecided. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶14. (SBU) The Rwandan delegation remains robustly focused on the 
allegations it has previously put forward of collusion between FARDC 
and ex-FAR/Interahamwe, ex-FAR/IH build-ups along the Rwandan 
border, incursions by the latter into Rwanda, and confirmation of 
all of the above by arrested infiltrators.  When they requested that 
a full presentation of this be made to the Task Force by the JVT, 
the U.S. and South Africa pointed out that this was not possible 
because the JVT cannot brief the JMG on its work without specific 
instructions from the JMG Envoys. 
 
¶15. (SBU) This permission has not formally been sought because the 
Rwandan delegation had at previous meetings blocked making an 
official Task Force recommendation to this effect to the Envoys.  We 
would welcome, we said, a full presentation by the JVT of the 
results of all its allegation investigations as soon as possible -- 
i.e. (unless the JVT have a change of heart), as soon as the Envoys 
can be persuaded to issue the appropriate instructions.  End 
comment. 
 
GARVELINK