VZCZCXRO1978
OO RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #0285/01 0821350
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 221350Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7712
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KINSHASA 000285 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL MOPS KPKO CG UN
SUBJECT: GOMA NOTES 03/21/08 - GOMA PROCESS: TWO OF THREE "EXCLUSION 
ZONES" NOW ESTABLISHED 
 
REF:  A. Kinshasa 170  B. Kinshasa 278 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary.  Goma process International Facilitation, CNDP and 
PARECO established two of three planned exclusion zones (where no 
armed men or men in uniforms are allowed, with the exception of 
MONUC patrols) in North Kivu during the week of March 15-21.  This 
includes the sensitive zone of Moheto, located northeast of Nkunda's 
Kirolirwe headquarters in an area hotly contested by CNDP and PARECO 
and with a strong FDLR position within striking distance.  CNDP and 
to a lesser extent PARECO exhibited a spirit of compromise and 
collaboration that allowed difficult negotiations to achieve a 
disengagement agreement.  End summary. 
 
Background 
---------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) The majority of the approximately 55 cease-fire violations 
registered by MONUC since the January 23 Acte d'Engagement have 
occurred in North Kivu, with over 50 per cent involving CNDP-PARECO 
clashes.  International Facilitators (MONUC, U.S. and EU) reached 
agreement in mid-March with CNDP and PARECO to delineate and 
establish three "exclusion zones" in areas with high violation 
counts, with the objective of physically separating CNDP and PARECO 
forces to reduce the likelihood of violations and permit freer and 
more secure population movements and economic activity. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Technically, setting up the zones is the responsibility of 
the Joint Technical Commission for Peace and Security (JC) but, as 
the JC remains to be established, the parties agreed to proceed in 
this somewhat ad-hoc but nonetheless official process.  The zones 
define demilitarized areas where armed men or men in uniforms -- 
other than MONUC forces who are to patrol the area -- are "excluded" 
from entering. 
 
Mgungu exclusion zone 
--------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) The Mgungu zone is located west of Sake near the South Kivu 
border.  CNDP, PARECO and International Facilitation (MONUC and EU) 
traveled to the area and established the zone on March 15.  It is 
two-kilometer wide strip, centered on the river Nubulu.  Its 
northern extremity is on the river between the villages of Kibabi 
and Kininzi.  From there, it extends south to the town of Nyabizamo, 
then to the town of Mgungu and then farther to the west, north of 
the road. 
 
¶5. (SBU) CNDP and PARECO agreed to immediate and simultaneous 
evacuation of their troops from the area.  All parties signed a 
memorandum to this effect.  In addition to regular patrols, MONUC is 
to establish a helicopter operating base (a mobile operating base 
that will be airlifted to the area) in the town of Gasake within the 
exclusion zone.  U.S. facilitators were unable to participate in 
this effort, so we have no direct information on the tone of the 
negotiations. 
 
Tongo exclusion zone 
-------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) Tongo is the town where MONUC South African peacekeepers 
from the nearby mobile operating base (MOB) exchanged fire with and 
captured (then released) eight CNDP troops engaged in brutalizing 
and looting from the population in early March (ref A).  It lies on 
the edge of the hills rising out of the Rutshuru plain and the 
Virunga National Park, across the valley from Rutshuru town. 
 
¶7. (SBU) CNDP, PARECO and International Facilitation traveled to 
Tongo on March 17 (ref B).  This was a poorly planned and muddled 
exercise that produced nothing positive while eroding the 
credibility of MONUC and the rest of the International Facilitation. 
 The South African detachment was not prepared for this visit, and 
the maps they had available did not permit identification of a zone 
to be demilitarized.  CNDP and PARECO got along extremely well, as 
the only important discussions concerned the locations of cardinal 
compass points. 
 
¶8. (SBU) By mutual agreement -- as there was no way to determine 
where anything was much less who was occupying which positions -- 
the group agreed to cut the mission short and return to Goma, with 
the understanding that it would determine another methodology for 
establishing this zone in the near future. 
 
Moheto exclusion zone 
--------------------- 
 
 
KINSHASA 00000285  002 OF 003 
 
 
¶9. (SBU) CNDP, PARECO and Facilitation (MONUC, U.S. and EU) traveled 
March 20 to Moheto, located northeast of Kirolirwe in Masisi 
territory, or a three-and-one-half-hour road trip in MONUC convoy at 
12 miles per hour the whole way.  Kirolirwe is a CNDP stronghold 
which includes Chairman Laurent Nkunda's residence.  The Indian 
contingent based in the area was well-prepared for the exercise, 
with accurate maps and a clear understanding of where CNDP, PARECO 
and FDLR positions were located.  It was thus possible to discuss 
the exclusion zone with a reasonable mastery of the terrain, 
topography, villages and markets, and the positions of the forces. 
 
 
¶10. (SBU) Right from the beginning, negotiations with PARECO and 
CNDP were very difficult, with both sides trading accusations. 
PARECO's General Theophile Museveni said repeatedly that MONUC is 
not responsive or neutral, CNDP is duplicitous and has taken 
positions in violation of the Acte d'Engagment, and that PARECO 
would leave the Goma process and go back to war with CNDP.  CNDP 
returned fire with a number of barbed comments indicating that 
PARECO did not control anything, had never controlled anything, and 
never would, and so on. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Facilitators, citing all the reasons that the two sides 
were morally obligated to reach agreement and implement the 
cease-fire, were able to push them into delineating an exclusion 
zone.  They reached initial agreement on a northern limit at the 
town of Bushenge; eastern and western limits, respectively one 
kilometer to the west and two kilometers to the east of the river; a 
special provision to include the entire town of Moheto in the zone; 
but not on a southern limit, with PARECO wanting it to extend 
considerably farther than CNDP wanted. 
 
¶12. (SBU) During these negotiations, CNDP showed a welcome spirit of 
cooperation, collaboration and compromise, repeatedly accepting to 
cede more territory and access to the main north-south road and 
hill-tops in comparison to PARECO's concessions.  PARECO took a 
relatively hard position on most issues.  It argued that the zone 
should include all the various positions that, they claimed, CNDP 
had taken over since the beginning of the cease-fire.  CNDP said 
that it was willing to give up Moheto town, and the northern reaches 
of the river, but were opposed to having the zone extend further 
south than Mumba, as this would weaken their defenses of the 
Kirolirwe area at a time it was expecting a PARECO/FLDR attack. 
 
¶13. (SBU) Facilitators recognized that things had reached an impasse 
and, as it was getting late in the day, departed to drop off the 
CNDP officers in Kirolirwe and continue on back to Goma.  U.S. and 
EU facilitators (Jenks from USAID and Covolan from EUSEC) pulled 
CNDP Colonel Antoine into their car for the hour's ride.  During the 
trip they told him in very strong terms that the Facilitation needed 
the agreement, and more importantly that CNDP needed it.  They 
argued that CNDP was viewed negatively by the outside world, that it 
needed to be seen collaborating and working for peaceful solutions 
and that agreeing to this exclusion zone was vital. 
 
¶14. (SBU) Colonel Antoine said that military considerations limited 
CNDP's ability to make more concessions.  Jenks and Covolan 
countered that military issues were only part of the equation, that 
optics and political issues were also in play and needed to be 
addressed.  Following this intensive browbeating, Colonel Antoine 
said he would consult with Nkunda and get guidance for a follow-on 
meeting in Goma on scheduled for the following day. 
 
¶15. (SBU) International facilitators met as scheduled with CNDP and 
PARECO on March 21.  CNDP had modified its position to accommodate 
PARECO's on the southern limit of the exclusion zone.  This enabled 
to group to reach agreement and sign a memorandum establishing the 
zone.  The final agreement differed somewhat from the terms outlined 
in para. 10:  it extends the zone south to Kasenge (what PARECO 
wanted) and two kilometers west of the river (CNDP's quid pro quo.) 
and includes the demilitarization of Kalonge (already agreed to but 
PARECO insisted it be included in the memorandum). 
 
¶16. (SBU) Colonel Antoine told us that CNDP delegates had had a long 
discussion the previous evening with Nkunda, and ultimately agreed 
with the logic that it had to make visible commitments to the peace 
process, and that establishing this exclusion zone, even if it 
disadvantaged them militarily, was part of that commitment.  A/F 
Special Adviser Tim Shortley had spoken with Nkunda on this and 
other subjects the day before, enabling CNDP to hear the same line 
from both Washington and the Goma-based U.S. Facilitation. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
KINSHASA 00000285  003 OF 003 
 
 
 
¶17. (SBU) CNDP made significant concessions and ceded significant 
territory in a sensitive area during the Moheto negotiations.  Even 
if it is ultimately in their best interests overall, CNDP 
willingness to make concessions disproportionate to those made by 
PARECO needs to be recognized.  PARECO also deserves credit for 
participating in establishment of the zone.  Whatever the 
motivations of both parties, we now have two of the planned three 
exclusion zones established, with a third in process, a small 
victory for the Goma peace process.  End comment.