VZCZCXRO1098
OO RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #0278/01 0810759
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 210759Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7703
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000278 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL MOPS KPKO CG UN
SUBJECT: GOMA NOTES 03/17/08 - VISIT TO COB TONGO (MASISI 
TERRITORY) 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  Lack of reliable cartography doomed an effort 
March 17 to delineate an "exclusion" (buffer) zone between PARECO 
and CNDP at Tongo in Masisi Territory.  MONUC committed to following 
up with a proper meeting in Goma, with maps at hand.  Tongo is a 
sensitive point at the intersection of CNDP, FARDC, PARECO and FDLR 
zones of control; FDLR and/or PARECO conduct raids into CNDP-held 
areas.  The village of Bambo (N/NE of Tongo) is a flashpoint.  MONUC 
has established a Company Operating Base (COB) at Tongo and intends 
to do the same at Bambo.  CNDP delegates expressed considerable 
indignation at being told that their plans to attack FDLR positions 
to the east and south-east of Tongo would be a cease-fire violation. 
 COB Tongo has received ten CNDP or FDLR surrenders since February 
¶10.  None seems to know much about what is going on.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) As part of the International Facilitation's ongoing effort 
to assist in the creation of "exclusion zones" in areas with high 
incidence of cease-fire violations, Jean-Michel Dumont and EUSEC Lt. 
Colonels Pecheux and Corvalan for the EU, USAID's Nicholas Jenks and 
Willet Weeks and MONUC's Colonel Narayan and Lt. Colonel Legendre 
traveled March 17 with representatives of PARECO and CNDP to MONUC 
Company Operational Base (COB) Tongo in Masisi Territory, manned by 
a South African company, Major Keso commanding. 
 
¶3. (SBU) The effort to identify a workable exclusion area was 
considerably complicated by the COB's lack of usable maps showing 
key locations in their operational area, a situation that especially 
the EUSEC officers and Legendre found little short of astonishing. 
The South Africans had GPS coordinates for most -- but not all -- 
the locations they patrol, but had not yet plotted these.  After 
over an hour of hard work and discussion with Major Keso and his 
staff sergeant in charge of intelligence, the group was able to come 
up with a rough sketch, but certainly nothing that would be adequate 
for the purpose at hand.  Given the absence of reliable cartography, 
it was impossible to delineate, even on a preliminary basis, any 
kind of possible exclusion zone during the visit. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Any effort to visit the nearby village was cut off by CNDP, 
which urged the Facilitation to go and interview the director of a 
school from which, according to UNICEF reports, children had been 
abducted to serve as child soldiers.  The team could, CNDP said, 
speak to the school director and "determine the truth" for 
themselves.  The Facilitation quickly pointed out that such 
investigations can only be done by professional organizations with 
proper mandates, and that anything of the sort was out of the remit 
of the Facilitation.  Fear of further such bushwhacking kept them at 
the COB. 
 
Key points made or reiterated during the visit 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶5. (SBU) Tongo is a sensitive point.  The COB is located in a 
farmhouse on the edge of the Masisi escarpment.  CNDP is in control 
of the immediate surrounding highlands, FARDC holds territory 
downhill to the east, beginning at a point west of the town of 
Kalengera (location of another South African base).  FDLR and/or 
PARECO are present to the northeast and conduct raids into CNDP-held 
areas within the COB's operational area.  They have raided the 
localities of Murindi and Musereka repeatedly, apparently in 
connection with cattle theft. 
 
¶6. (SBU) The village of Bambo (N/NE of Tongo), where there is a 
Thursday market attended by members of CNDP, FDLR, PARECO and FARDC, 
is a flashpoint.  The COB patrols the area, and the plan is to place 
a COB there and demilitarize the market.  The COB will be manned by 
a Senegalese unit which has yet to arrive in-country. 
 
¶7. (SBU) CNDP has informed Kose that it intends to attack and take 
control of FDLR positions at Gagandu and Kibumba, to the east and 
southeast of Tongo.  They claim that such an attack would be within 
the mandate of the recent UNSC resolution and would be justifiable 
following the expiration of the March 15 deadline for FDLR 
surrender.  Kose says he has been very clear in telling CNDP that 
any such action would be a cease-fire violation and would be 
strictly prohibited.  CNDP has no grounds for taking offensive 
action against FDLR, which is solely within the purview of joint 
FARDC-MONUC operations. 
 
¶8. (SBU) CNDP delegates present expressed considerable indignation: 
how is it that even though the FDLR is not a signatory to the Goma 
accords, these somehow preclude CNDP action against FDLR?  Although 
MONUC and the rest of the Facilitation insisted that this was indeed 
the case, the CNDP delegates were clearly unwilling to accept this 
interpretation.  It is unclear whether the CNDP is actually planning 
offensive operations against FDLR or is simply trying to make the 
 
KINSHASA 00000278  002 OF 002 
 
 
point that it ought to be allowed to do so, a position it had also 
taken in a March 16 meeting with FARDC Deputy Chief of Staff General 
Gustave Amuli arranged by MONUC (septel). 
 
¶9. (SBU) There have been ten surrenders to the COB since February 
10, some with weapons:  seven from CNDP requesting protection and 
DDR and three from FDLR requesting DDRRR.  COB staff questions the 
surrendering troops (none of them, in either group, seems to know 
much about what is going on), then transfers them to Rutshuru and 
eventually to Goma for DDRRR or DDR.  Surrenders usually occur over 
weekends, when the groups' vigilance is lowered.  Surrendering 
personnel speak of others being caught, tortured and in some cases 
executed. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Appropriately, the trip, which had begun with a short 
helicopter ride from Goma, ended (because bad weather made it 
impossible for a helicopter to return) in a long (three-hour), 
rattling, and wet drive back to Goma.  There was no evidence of any 
armed presence (though the area is said to be under tight CNDP 
control) until a point four or five km outside of Kalengera, where 
the first FARDC patrols appeared.  Villages on the CNDP side 
appeared mostly deserted.  As the team was in a MONUC convoy, it was 
waved easily through all checkpoints (one reportedly CNDP, though 
operated as a civilian toll collection point, the others all FARDC). 
 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) Further discussions will be held within the next week in 
Goma, where detailed maps are supposedly available.  An exclusion 
zone stretching from the present COB at Tongo and the proposed 
Senegalese base at Bambo would, along with the demilitarization of 
the Bambo market, be a good thing, everybody agreed -- in principle. 
 End comment. 
 
GARVELINK