VZCZCXYZ5995
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKI #0215/01 0641249
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 041249Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7618
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC

UNCLAS KINSHASA 000215 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS KPKO CG RW
SUBJECT: Task force held hostage 
 
REF:  Kinshasa 196 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary. Predictions that Joint Monitoring Group Task Force 
(JMG-TF) meetings would be short and productive were overly 
optimistic.  The February 23 meeting led off with a fascinating 
four-hour briefing on DDRRR, then endured five-and-a-half hours of 
Rwandan-led wrangling over minutes.  Congo again failed to provide 
information on its FDLR sensitization program.  The Task Force 
agreed to ask JMG Envoys for guidance regarding provision of 
order-of-battle information on Congo's FDLR military plan.  Other 
members left the meeting demoralized, hungry and highly annoyed at 
the Rwandans.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Nitpicking and intransigence by the Rwandan delegation 
again dominated the weekly meeting of the Joint Monitoring Group 
Task Force for the Nairobi communique February 29 in Goma.  The 
group's 11th session, chaired by MONUC-Goma political chief Gernot 
Sauer, featured an informative four-hour DDRRR briefing by MONUC and 
the World Bank (septel), followed by a five-and-a-half hour 
discussion of minutes totaling a record nine-and-a-half hour 
meeting.  Other participants left the meeting demoralized, hungry 
and annoyed at the time wasted by the Rwandans' insistence on again 
rehashing the now-familiar litany of old concerns and diatribes. 
 
¶3. (SBU) The Rwandans showed their willingness to argue over the 
slightest deviation from "the norm" right from the beginning when 
they questioned Sauer's decision to place briefings ahead of minutes 
on the agenda, reversing the usual order.  An extensive discussion 
while the briefers waited patiently for things to be sorted out was 
necessary before the Rwandans reluctantly agreed to the change "on 
an exceptional basis." 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
Congolese again fail to brief on sensitization program 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) The Congolese delegation again failed to provide a briefing 
on the FDLR sensitization program.  Acting delegation head Major 
Ambroise Nanga apologized and claimed the "technical team" was 
unable to brief the group.  Sauer pressed him to provide some 
details on the program.  Nanga cited visits of Ambassador-at-Large 
Seraphin Ngwej to Bukavu, the National Assembly President Vital 
Kamerhe to Rutshuru, and North Kivu Provincial Assembly President 
Leon Bariyanga to Walikale.  He also noted a proposed visit to 
Mpinga. 
 
¶5. (SBU) The Rwandan delegation was predictably furious.  Its 
members returned several times during the meeting to Congolese 
inability or unwillingness to provide information.  Other Task Force 
members were also annoyed.  The group agreed to "strongly urge" the 
government to make its presentation next week, and note the 
recommendation in its report. 
 
------------------------------ 
Rwandans swing into full force 
------------------------------ 
 
¶6. (SBU) Briefings by MONUC DDRRR chief Phil Lancaster and the World 
Bank MDRP's Harold Henkel was followed by the five-and-a-half hour 
review of minutes -- about one-half of a page of text -- of the 
February 22 meeting.  Efforts by Sauer and other international 
members to implement the streamlined, action-oriented proposal made 
by MONUC's Acting Political Adviser Christian Manahl (reftel) were 
stymied by longwinded rhetoric and extensive posturing by the 
Rwandan delegation.  Adding to the confusion was the circulation of 
various drafts:  one from MONUC, one from Congo and one from Rwanda, 
which was predictably longer and included the points its delegation 
raises each week. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Sauer's efforts to remind the group that it had agreed to 
use the new format and to shorten the process were blocked at each 
step the Rwandans.  Their threats not to sign because "the Task 
Force was proposing things that we cannot accept in the minutes" 
held the group virtually hostage to their demands.  They insisted on 
making arguments raised in previous meetings, although it was not 
clear whether they did so to convince other members or to ensure the 
points would be included in the meetings of this meeting.  Three of 
the four Rwandan delegates often took turns making essentially the 
same points. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Sauer vainly attempted to shorten their presentations, or 
not call on them individually.  The Rwandans protested:  "the 
delegation from Rwanda would not allow Rwandan's sovereignty to be 
questioned;" and "Rwanda would never allow others to dictate its 
political positions." 
 
¶9. (SBU) The Rwandans also questioned Manahl's interpretation and 
authority.  In the absence of a report of the JMG Envoys' meeting, 
they insisted Manahl's views were his own and did not represent 
official guidance.  Members' attempts to remind them that the Task 
Force had agreed to changes the week before were equally 
unsuccessful, as Rwandan delegations used "agreements" listed in the 
minutes as a basis for further harangues. 
 
¶10. (SBU) The group agreed to ask the JMG envoys for guidance on the 
only substantive issue discussed:  did the requirement to provide 
the order of battle mentioned in the Congolese military plan flow 
from the Nairobi communique or the Tripartite-Plus Mechanism?  After 
consulting with other international members in an effort to break a 
deadlock, Sauer agreed to Rwandan-proposed language in the "summary 
of issues discussed," and request guidance in absence of consensus. 
At this point, the Rwandans agreed to sign the document. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) The Rwandans' behavior is winning them no new friends. 
Despite Manahl's clear message the previous week that too much time 
was being spent on the minutes and his candid recommendation that 
the Task Force change its ways, they yet again used the discussion 
of minutes to raise their usual talking points.  The contrast 
between the first and second halves of the meeting was surreal:  a 
fascinating brief with follow-up questions followed by a ceaseless 
wrangling over minutes dominated by the Rwandan need to hammer home 
the same points and control the meeting.  One international member 
commented afterward that by the end he would have signed anything to 
get out.  End comment. 
 
GARVELINK