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Viewing cable 08KHARTOUM463, NORTH DARFUR'S ARABS: PLAYING THE VICTIM, WANTING A SEAT AT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KHARTOUM463 2008-03-30 13:56 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO8396
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0463/01 0901356
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 301356Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0334
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0121
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000463 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: NORTH DARFUR'S ARABS: PLAYING THE VICTIM, WANTING A SEAT AT 
THE TABLE, AND HEDGING THEIR BETS 
 
REF: A.  KHARTOUM 80 
 
B.  KHARTOUM 267 
 
1.  (SBU)  SUMMARY:  On March 27, Darfur's northern Arab tribal 
leaders told emboff that they are victims that should be included in 
any negotiations on Darfur's future.  In separate meetings the week 
of March 23, UN staff, local NGOS, and leaders from other ethnic 
groups emphasized that many of Darfur's Arabs continue to "hedge 
their bets," with some traditional leaders and former militiamen 
(such as Musa Hilal and Mohammed Hamdan) accepting government 
positions and others keeping the government at an arm's length.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
VICTIMIZATION 
- - - - - - - 
2.   (SBU) On March 27, four Arab leaders of North Darfur told 
emboff that they, like other ethnic groups, have suffered in the 
Darfur crisis.  Hammad Abdalla Gibriel (from the Ireiqat tribe,) 
Ahmed Abdalla Judalla (of the Etafat,) Abdalla Safi Al-Nur, and 
Abdulrahman Mohamed Eisa (of the Mahariya) emphasized that Darfur's 
Arabs are victims of insecurity, marginalization, and rebel attacks. 
 Gibriel named specific instances, some as recent as last week, 
where rebels attacked Arabs, stole their livestock, and killed their 
Arab brethren.  Gibriel stated that some actions of the rebels, such 
as stealing a water drilling rig, show that they do not truly care 
about the development of the region, but only about themselves. 
 
NEGOTIATIONS 
- - - - - - - 
3.  (SBU)  Gibriel and the other Arab tribal leaders emphasized that 
they have been marginalized in the political process by many rebel 
groups and other ethnic groups.  He added that the AU, the UN, and 
any other body that engages in Darfur should include the Arabs in 
negotiations.  According to these leaders, the large number of Arabs 
in Darfur make them an integral part of any discussion.  According 
to Gibriel, the Arabs are the majority in Darfur, comprising 62% of 
the total population of Darfur, and between 30-55% of the population 
in North Darfur.  (COMMENT:  These estimates appear very high, as 
most analysts assert that the Fur comprise the majority of Darfur's 
population but no one knows for sure. END COMMENT.) 
 
4.  (SBU)  On March 22, Gerard McHugh, an officer for the African 
Union-United Nations Joint Mediation Support Team in El-Fasher, also 
told emboffs that the Arab leaders should be given a place at 
negotiations.  "If we [the UN] do not give the Arabs a voice, it is 
going to come back to haunt us," stated McHugh. 
 
RELATIONSHIP WITH GOVERNMENT 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
5.  (SBU)  In working with the Government of Sudan, Gibriel and the 
other Arab leaders emphasized that their relationship with the GoS 
is similar to other groups, where local and tribal leaders are 
incorporated into the central government.  They acknowledged that 
the appointment of controversial figures to government positions 
(such as Musa Hilal, see reftel A) may be perceived as an affront to 
the international community.  Nonetheless, these leaders said that 
Hilal comes from a leading Arab family, and that tribal leaders have 
always been incorporated into the government.  Gibriel also 
downplayed Hilal's involvement in Darfur's atrocities, stating that 
"if you compare his crimes to others, it is nothing."  The Arab 
leaders also dismissed the idea that the government was trying to 
buy off Musa Hilal's important (but internally divided) Mahamid 
tribe, saying, "The only one that this affects is Musa." 
 
6.  (SBU)  Discussing another prominent leader Arab militia leader, 
Mohamed Hamdan (aka Hamati, reftel B), UNAMID's McHugh stated that 
although Hamati is currently aligned with the government, he could 
switch loyalties at any time.  "Hamati is a tactical thinker, not 
much of a strategist," said McHugh.  McHugh said that one of the 
UN's local employees and former Sudanese intelligence operative told 
him that he knows Hamati quite well and that he is never loyal to 
anyone but himself. 
 
7.  (SBU)  Ahmed Bahr, of the North Darfur Legislative Council and a 
supporter of SLM-Minnawi, claimed to emboff on March 27 that despite 
representing "only five percent" of Darfur's population, the Arabs 
have an incredible influence on the region and the state and 
national governments.  (Note: Although precise statistics are not 
available, the five percent figure is far too low.  The actual 
figure is probably closer to forty percent in all of Darfur, and as 
much as fifty percent in South Darfur where there is a large 
concentration of Baggara Rizeigat. End note.)  Bahr stated that the 
Arabs are more heavily armed than any other group, and that the 
government must therefore continue to cooperate with them in a very 
cautious and pragmatic manner. 
 
 
KHARTOUM 00000463  002 OF 002 
 
 
8. (SBU)  After naming a litany of rebel aggressions against their 
tribes, Arab tribal leader Gibriel stated that the government needs 
to come in with a stronger hand "to stop this chaos."  All the Arab 
tribal leaders strongly criticized the rebel movements, saying 
"these so-called movements have more satellite phones than weapons." 
 They added that if the international community only let the GoS act 
as it wishes, it could put an end to all of Darfur's problems once 
and for all. 
 
"HEDGING THEIR BETS" 
- - - - - - - - - - 
9.  (SBU)  UNAMID's McHugh emphasized to emboff that the Arab tribes 
continue to "hedge their bets, as they are not sure whether they 
will align with the government or join a devil's alliance with the 
rebels."  McHugh stated that the most natural ally for the Arabs are 
the Fur, given their historical and cultural relationship with this 
group.  McHugh stated that many of the Arab tribes have very 
informal alliances with other rebel groups, some of which are as 
simple as "we will live in proximity and not attack one another." 
 
10.  (SBU)  McHugh gave numerous examples of how Arab groups are 
starting to assert themselves politically.  He stated that in 
El-Geneina a committee representing dozens of Arab tribes from the 
region recently formed.  In McHugh's analysis the creation of this 
group signals that the Arabs of this region feel the pressure to 
unite and put forth one voice.  McHugh also said that the Habaniya 
leadership in South Darfur, the Arab IDPs in Zalingi, and the North 
Darfur Arab tribal council have all started to have a growing public 
presence. 
 
11. (SBU)  Ahmed Adam Yousif, Manager of the Ajaweed Oraganization 
for Peace and Reconciliation in El-Fasher, told emboff on March 19 
that most of the Arabs who have turned against the GoS have migrated 
to JEM or SLM-Nur.  Like McHugh, Yousif stated that the Fur have had 
close interaction with the Arab tribes and these cultural and 
traditional affiliations may have attracted some disaffected Arabs 
to the predominantly Fur SLM-Nur.  Yousif claimed that all of the 
Arab Rizeigat tribes hate Musa Hilal except for his own Mahamid 
tribe.  Yousif also asserted that the Arab tribes are not united and 
have longstanding rivalries and grievances against one another. 
 
COMMENT 
- - - - 
12.  (SBU) The Arab leaders' call for a "stronger government hand" 
in the region is perhaps the most telling indicator of their 
relationship with the regime.  Although North Darfur's Arabs fear 
being made the ultimate scapegoats for Darfur's recent past and may 
not be entirely satisfied with their situation, unlike many ethnic 
groups they see a stronger government military presence in the 
region as directly benefiting them.  Although it is necessary to 
include some Arab leaders in the peace process, giving them a seat 
at the negotiating table will be a delicate endeavor.  Although not 
all Arabs were involved in Darfur's atrocities, some were, albeit at 
the behest of their masters in Khartoum.  However, Arab tribal 
leaders need to be part of an overall solution, and we will continue 
to urge the JMST and UNAMID to include the Arabs in their planned 
(though as yet nascent) outreach to civil society groups in Darfur. 
 
FERNANDEZ