VZCZCXRO2414
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0434/01 0840544
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 240544Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0296
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000434 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: UNAMID IS ITS OWN WORST ENEMY ON DEPLOYMENT 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: For at least the second time in four months, 
UNAMID leadership in El Fasher has attempted to use logistical 
considerations as an excuse for delaying deployment of the 
peacekeeping force in Darfur.  The latest attempt, articulated by 
the Chief of Planning, was in direct response to Special Envoy 
Williamson's March 5 declaration that the United States intended to 
see deployed 3,600 troops by the end of May 2008.  While UNAMID 
officials in El Fasher insist they share the U.S. goal of expediting 
deployment of the peacekeeping operation (which has seen not even 
300 new troops brought in since the January 1 Transfer of 
Authority), they advocate a go-slow approach to avoid stretching its 
already-strained infrastructure even thinner.  The debate 
illustrates the perennial disconnect between UNAMID leadership on 
the ground and that at New York Headquarters, and the USG seems 
caught in the middle.  However, our plans to push ahead with 
obtaining inventory lists from reluctant Sector Commanders for 
battalions to be augmented seem to have sparked progress, as both 
DPKO and UNAMID now appear amenable to a deployment compromise 
reconciling UN, UNAMID and USG priorities.  Still, there is no 
reason to believe that this instance will be the last time UNMAID 
tries to cut off its nose to spite its face on troop deployment. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
"THIS BLASTED DEADLINE IS GOING TO SCREW US" 
-------------------------------------------- 
¶2. (SBU)  On March 20 UNAMID Planning Chief summoned EmbOffs in El 
Fasher to Force Headquarters to present an e-mail based on a 
PowerPoint presentation that the Planning Chief had given the day 
before to UNAMID Senior Management.  The e-mail had been sent to the 
UN Department of Peacekeeping Operation (DPKO) on March 19 by the 
Planning Chief in an attempt to stave off the U.S. move to equip and 
deploy all Rwandan battalions according to UN standards and to 
rotate them by the end of May, per Special Envoy Williamson's March 
5 remarks at the UN Security Council stakeout.  "If these intentions 
are right as I heard them," the Chief warned, "it's going to screw 
us."  He went on to say that while UNAMID shares the U.S. intention 
to expedite UNAMID deployment, it thinks the U.S. emphasis on 
bringing in four Rwandan battalions by May will undermine the 
overall mission. 
 
¶3. (SBU) The Planning Chief first outlined UANMID's priorities to 
show the divergence with those of the USG.  First was deployment of 
the Egyptian and Ethiopian battalions not to where they are 
"logistically easy" - Nyala and El Fasher, respectively - but rather 
to where they are "operationally sound" - Umm Kadada and 
Kulbus/Silea, respectively.  [NOTE: On the sidelines of this 
discussion, the Planning Chief noted that if the Egyptians brought 
in a third battalion, their troop numbers would exceed those of the 
Senegalese, which could lead the Egyptians to seek a Sector 
Commander (SC) appointment.  The Chief expressed concern over this 
possibility, citing the Deputy SC in El Geneina, an Egyptian, as a 
poor example to follow.  END NOTE].  Despite the priority UNAMID 
places on this adjustment in deployment plans, however, the Planning 
Chief said the UN has not yet secured formal agreement with either 
the Egyptian Defense Ministry or the Ethiopian Government to request 
the change of venue for those countries' incoming battalions. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Next among UNAMID's priorities, which the Planning Chief 
claims the Force Commander (FC) shares, are expanding the existing 
base camp at Kulbus to accommodate a half battalion; building new 
base camps at Silea and Korma (the latter of which he claimed was 
all the more important as Korma is in a JEM-held area); expanding 
the camps at Tine and Umm Barru; and expanding the camp at Umm 
Kadada to accommodate the Egyptian battalion. 
 
¶5. (SBU) According to the Planning Chief, UNAMID sees U.S. 
intentions for the Rwandans as potentially undermining the 
operation.  Carrying out the U.S. priority of equipping and rotating 
four Rwandan battalions by "this blasted deadline" of end May, for 
example, would require creation of 120 extra bedspaces in each 
location to accommodate the additional forces, which in turn would 
require additional land procurement to accommodate bed expansion - 
in short, such tasks would usurp the attention and resources UNAMID 
engineers would have otherwise spent focusing on the FC's stated 
priorities over the next two to three months.  The Chief continued 
that rotating the four Rwandan battalions would further stretch 
UNAMID's already taxed helicopter assets and would potentially 
jeopardize ration re-supply schedules.  Furthermore, the Planning 
Chief argued, the Rwandans had indicated they do not plan to rotate 
until fall, vice May, 2008.  Finally, the Planning Chief reiterated 
the sentiment expressed by the Deputy Force Commander that simply 
equipping these Rwandan battalions would not by default render them 
self-sustaining, something that the UN was neither able nor willing 
to do. 
 
¶6. (SBU) The Acting CISS articulated his own list of impediments to 
expedited deployment, despite eventually admitting that preparing 
for the arrival of only one plused-up Rwandan battalion would likely 
 
KHARTOUM 00000434  002 OF 002 
 
 
be doable.  He reiterated the Deputy FC's stance on the need to 
guarantee self-sustainment among the incoming troops, mentioning in 
particular the areas of tentage, generators, water distillers and 
kitchens.  He worried about the lack of engineers to prepare the 
ground for this influx of new troops and about deQQE; Package) still sitting in Port Sudan.  Lastly, the Acting 
CISS reminded that the incoming battalions would be deploying during 
the rainy season, which would necessitate the use of UN aircraft 
since roads would be largely impassable.  In addition to repeating 
the Planning Chief's concerns about the strain such a situation 
would present for UN air operations scheduling, he also worried 
about UN air capacity: "You can't put everything into an Mi-26." 
 
UN HQ-UNAMID DISCONNECT PERSISTS 
-------------------------------- 
¶7. (SBU) The Planning Chief acknowledged that UN Headquarters in New 
York and UNAMID Headquarters in El Fasher disagreed over how to deal 
with the U.S. stated intention to equip and deploy four Rwandan 
battalions and rotate them in May.  He scoffed that the UN "did not 
have the balls to tell the Special Envoy 'no'," and he berated UN HQ 
for its insiQQ+3 into Nyala and 
the Ethiopian battalion into El Fasher, instead of putting them in 
more mission-critical areas elsewhere in Darfur.  The Planning Chief 
said that New York needed to approach the Government of Ethiopia as 
soon as possible about the venue change to discourage the GOE from 
first waiting for an Egyptian response to the proposed switch.  In a 
statement that hinted at a disconnect within UNAMID leadership 
itself, the Chief acknowledged that his recommendation against the 
U.S. plan could be overruled by the FC, should such a directive come 
from New York. In a subsequent meeting on March 22, the Acting Chief 
of Integrated Support Services (CISS) shared the Planning Chief's 
sense of frustration with New York's inactivity on the 
Egyptian/Ethiopian front. 
 
"I DON'T WANT TO LOOK A GIFTHORSE IN THE MOUTH" 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
¶8. (SBU) The Planning Chief requested a meeting several hours later 
with EmbOffs, in which he elaborated on possible ways forward, 
something he had been unwilling or unable to provide to EmbOffs in 
the earlier discussion.  Initially the Planning Chief suggested that 
bringing in and accommodating all four Rwandan battalions would be 
feasible if they were each reduced by one company.  Later he said 
that he had spoken with DPKO and come to the conclusion that to 
bring in one 800-man Rwandan battalion by end May, along with 
deploying the Egyptian and Ethiopian battalions, could satisfy both 
UNAMID and U.S. needs.  The Acting CISS inquired about USG plans for 
equipping battalions beyond just the Rwandans, reminding that if 
that were the case, "$100 million won't go very far." 
 
¶9. (SBU) The Planning Chief acknowledged that New York shared our 
concern that the FC's priorities seemed to be shifting, but he 
assured that the FC and UNAMID were on the same page [NOTE: The FC 
will return to El Fasher March 23, at which time we can better 
assess his perspective on the Rwandan issue].  The Planning Chief 
was supportive of the U.S. plan to conduct spot-checks of existing 
Rwandan equipment during the week of March 24, blaming the lack of a 
complete and detailed response from the sectors to the FC's request 
to provide inventory lists on "immature communications." 
 
¶10. (SBU) COMMENT:  Earlier this year DPKO Under-Secretary-General 
Guehenno warned that full UNAMID deployment would take the better 
part of 12 months.  Given the problems that UNAMID has faced so far 
in the realms of contracting, procuring, recruiting, accommodating 
and feeding, just to name a few, Guehenno's prophecy seems to be 
self-fulfilling.  While these logistical challenges are real, it is 
important for us to keep UNAMID's feet to the fire with regard to 
expediting deployment.  It is just as important to maintain pressure 
on UN HQ to overcome its political indecisiveness on issues 
affecting UNAMID progress, namely the Egyptian and Ethiopian 
deployments.  The March 23 arrival in El Fasher of a team from New 
York tasked with working on an overdue Integrated Deployment Plan 
for UNAMID could do much to improve communication and cooperation 
between the two sides of the Darfur peacekeeping coin.  In the 
meantime it is also important for us to bear in mind that it will 
very shortly be our turn to deliver on the "compromise" reached with 
UNAMID.  Once the contract for outfitting the Rwandan battalion is 
awarded by the end of March, the pressure will be on to ensure that 
deadlines are met to keep this deployment on track for 3,600 by May 
¶31.  Given that so few deadlines are met in Darfur, this will be a 
challenge. 
 
¶11. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. 
 
FERNANDEZ