VZCZCXRO1284
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0423/01 0811052
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 211052Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0275
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000423 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF S/E WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
ADIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL SU
SUBJECT: HASSAN AL-TURABI ON NCP DYNAMICS 
 
REFTELS: A) KHARTOUM 410 
B) 07 KHARTOUM 2007 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary:  According to PCP leader Hassan al-Turabi, the 
ruling National Congress Party lacks any base of popular support and 
is under stress as it tries to deal with multiple challenges (most 
of its own creation).  Al-Turabi said that President al-Bashir's 
indecisive leadership compounds these problems. The NCP is both 
duplicitous and afraid that a critical mass of problems in Darfur, 
in South Sudan, and economic pressures and corruption coupled with 
the possibility of greater hostility from the United States could 
rattle its hold on power. End summary. 
 
¶2.  (U) On March 17, CDA Fernandez called on Dr. Hassan Abdalla 
al-Turabi, founder and leader of Peoples' Congress Party (PCP).  Dr. 
Al-Turabi was a founding member of the National Islamic Front (NIF), 
which led to the current regime, until he was forced out in the late 
1990s when he tried to consolidate his own power in the regime. 
Many of his former proteges are now senior leaders in the NCP 
regime.  When Turabi left the party he formed his own rival PCP 
party, which may not have much support, but is viewed with great 
suspicion by a nervous NCP regime. 
 
The Unloved NCP 
--------------- 
¶3.  (SBU) CDA Fernandez remarked that while the National Congress 
Party (NCP) appears to be going into the 2009 national elections 
wielding a preponderance of power based on its long-established 
control of the government in Khartoum, with the resulting access to 
patronage and control of the security forces, the NCP lately appears 
weak, indecisive and not in full control of events.  Recently, it 
has faced strong popular discontent stemming from increases in the 
prices of bread, sugar, and electricity.  The NCP often seems to 
resemble the biblical "giant, with feet of clay." 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Dr. al-Turabi agreed, saying that the NCP is fundamentally 
weak.  It has no base of popular support.  "No one loves the NCP," 
he remarked.  While people continue to join the NCP, it is for 
cynical motives of advancing their own personal interests or 
ambitions, not for idealistic or ideological reasons. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Turabi said that all Northern opposition parties, including 
his own (which is the most anti-NCP party in the North), do talk and 
negotiate with the NCP, because there are no better options. The PCP 
is trying to get 28 activists released from prison, "perhaps in the 
next few days," and to push for - at the very least - greater press 
freedom. He noted that targeted censorship on anything related to 
Chad (and Sudan's support for Chadian rebels) is "particularly 
fierce right now." He also laughed about the regime's recent 
hysterical reaction to the Charge's bland comment on democratic 
elections in Sudan.  He urged CDA to be even more aggressive, "they 
are unlikely to expel you despite their threats." 
 
Under Stress 
------------ 
¶6.  (SBU) Turabi continued that the NCP is being stressed by 
multiple, simultaneous challenges and is frightened about a 
potentially dangerous future.  First, it is facing the first 
competitive elections in its history.  Second, it is dealing with 
multiple problems within the Government of National Unity.  After 
sidelining the SPLM and taking it for granted since the GNU was 
created, the NCP was shaken by the SPLM's walkout from the Council 
of Ministers in October.  The NCP is worried that this could happen 
again.  Third, it is faced with the ongoing conflict in Darfur and 
the international pressures that has created. "Darfur and the South 
have not worked out as they planned," he noted. Al-Bashir is also 
made nervous by events such as in Pakistan, where Musharraf is 
ceding power, because he sees himself as a similar figure. Finally, 
the regime recently has had to contend with popular discontent 
stemming from rising prices, despite having the richest budget in 
Sudanese history as a result of oil revenues. 
 
Real power but Indecisive Leadership 
------------------------------------ 
¶7.  (SBU) Turabi remarked that the NCP's problems are compounded by 
weak leadership.  President al-Bashir has real power but is 
indecisive and his decisions reflect the views of the last person he 
talked to, rather than any ordered analysis of the problem.  The 
competing NCP power centers, although appearing powerful, are thus 
reduced to acting as errand boys carrying out instructions over 
whose drafting they had no real say.  Senior officials prepare 
documents and meticulously set the stage for policies only to have 
their careful plans sidelined by a whisper in the President's ear at 
the last moment. "This is the military mentality at work, which 
we've never been able to get away from." 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Comment: It is interesting that Turabi's remarks do not 
fully track with comments made by his own son (Ref A) last week. 
 
KHARTOUM 00000423  002 OF 002 
 
 
While the bitter Hassan al-Turabi sees President Bashir as 
indecisive (many observers have told us the same thing), his own son 
and many other observers see President Bashir as having greatly 
consolidated his power over the last several years with the NCP 
operating as a well-oil machine.  Perhaps the difference between the 
two generations in analyzing the regime is less deep than it 
appears: both see a regime which is fragile but much more powerful 
than any rival in the country, which is somewhat disciplined but 
less so than it appears, which is both ruthless but insecure. 
However both of them are correct in identifying the many external 
pressures with which the regime is confronted and which could 
actually worsen over the next two years.  The regime is constantly 
in a state of crisis-control as it seeks to manage its various 
relationships (both internal and external) and retain control of 
Sudan and its booming economic interests. 
 
 
FERNANDEZ