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Viewing cable 08KHARTOUM346, AS UN REACHES JEBEL MOON, SPLINTER EMERGES WITHIN JEM

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KHARTOUM346 2008-03-10 07:48 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO9985
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0346/01 0700748
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 100748Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0149
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000346 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E WILLIAMSON, AND AF/SPG 
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS KPKO UN AU SU CD
SUBJECT: AS UN REACHES JEBEL MOON, SPLINTER EMERGES WITHIN JEM 
 
REFS: A) KHARTOUM 320 
KHARTOUM 266 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (SBU) After an earlier dispute between the UN Coordinator for 
Humanitarian Affairs and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) 
over access to Jebel Moon, West Darfur, a UN team reached the area 
for a brief yet inconclusive visit to assess the humanitarian 
situation.  UN sources report that the bulk of JEM is "holed up" in 
Jebel Moon and that the defection of a breakaway faction of the 
movement, JEM/National Unity, has cut mainstream JEM off from a JEM 
formation north of El Geneina, West Darfur.  While some in the UN 
predict that Sudan will take advantage of this fissure and launch a 
renewed bombing campaign on Jebel Moon, MINURCAT anticipated a 
ground offensive by Khartoum-backed Chadian rebels into Jebel Moon 
and Chad "within one week."  End summary. 
 
----------------------------------- 
UN Team Reaches Jebel Moon, Briefly 
----------------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) After an earlier dispute between UN Coordinator for 
Humanitarian Affairs Ameerah Haq and JEM over access to Jebel Moon, 
West Darfur, a UN team reached the base of the mountain on March 9, 
Haq told CDA Fernandez.  The UN team remained on the ground for only 
40 minutes, according to a senior OCHA official, and a battle 
between JEM and the Sudanese Government was ensuing five kilometers 
from the UN's landing.  While a JEM representative told the UN team 
there were no internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the area, the 
official commented that the UN is aware of 7,000 civilians living on 
Jebel Moon.  The OCHA official suggested that the UN needed a 
"second effort" to investigate the situation in Jebel Moon before 
making a conclusive assessment.  In a March 3 press conference, Haq 
criticized JEM for obstructing humanitarian access to Jebel Moon. 
JEM later denied this accusation, claiming the UN never requested 
permission to enter the area. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
AFTER NEW FISSURE, JEM CORE IN JEBEL MOON 
----------------------------------------- 
 
3. (SBU) The UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) in West 
Darfur reported on March 9 that the bulk of JEM forces remain "holed 
up" in Jebel Moon.  An internal fissure within JEM has emerged in 
recent days, minimizing the movement's reach.  A faction composed of 
the Massaleit and Eringa tribes broke from the mainstream movement 
and signed a ceasefire agreement with the Sudanese Government, 
according to UN sources and a JEM representative in El Fasher. 
 
4. (SBU) UNDSS estimated that this faction, JEM/National Unity, 
consisted of 300 to 400 Eringa fighters from Sirba, Silea, and Abu 
Sorouj, areas afflicted by an intense Sudanese bombing campaign in 
February.  (Note: The majority of JEM fighters are from the Zaghawa 
tribe.  End note.)  Senior UN-AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) 
officials speculate that Khartoum's success in fomenting divisions 
within JEM has left the movement "split in half."  The defection of 
JEM/National Unity created a buffer between a minor JEM force north 
of El Geneina and a force of 80 vehicles isolated in Jebel Moon. 
 
5. (SBU) UNAMID Sector West confirmed in early March that 
JEM/National Unity leaders Abdulhaleem Daoud and Mubushan Hajjar 
Abdallah requested UN mediation with the Sudanese Government. 
JEM/National Unity articulated five political-military objectives: 
implementation of an immediate and enforceable ceasefire, equitable 
development, cessation of human rights abuses, power and resource 
sharing, and withdrawal of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) from 
JEM/National Unity-controlled areas.  According to Sector West, 
which cross-checked information with the head of SAF military 
intelligence in El Geneina, Sudan agreed to all of the 
conditions--with the exception of SAF withdrawal. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
Aerial Bombardment or Ground Offensive? 
--------------------------------------- 
 
6. (SBU) One UNDSS officer in El Fasher predicted that the Sudanese 
airforce will take advantage of JEM's isolation in Jebel Moon to 
launch a bombing campaign in the coming days.  "They're hunkered 
down, and the Government will want to have a good crack at them," he 
said.  Another UNAMID officer asserted, however, that since a March 
7 letter from UNSYG Ban Ki Moon to President Bashir cautioning 
against further aerial bombardment, Government air strikes have 
ceased.  (Note: There is no independent confirmation of this 
information.  End note.)  Positing that a ground offensive is more 
 
KHARTOUM 00000346  002 OF 002 
 
 
likely, the same officer said that he had read a "code cable" from 
MINURCAT dated March 8 that anticipated a new surge of 
Khartoum-backed Chadian rebels into Chad and Jebel Moon "within one 
week."  The cable also indicated that these operations would be 
coordinated with the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). 
 
--------------------------------- 
Repercussions of February Bombing 
--------------------------------- 
 
7. (SBU) Haq told CDA Fernandez that 90-percent of the residents of 
Sirba and Bir Degeeg had returned since the February bombing, as the 
towns had not been heavily damaged and civilian police from Khartoum 
are deployed - and local authorities had allowed daily humanitarian 
access by NGOs and the UN.  However, Haq said that Silea remains 
empty due to destroyed infrastructure and lack of security.  Haq 
also noted that UNAMID has been slow to respond and needs to step up 
its patrols in the area. She noted that both NGOs and Sudanese 
police are "doing their part to restore order but UNAMID remains the 
weakest link." It is not clear where the 11,000 residents of Silea 
who did not enter Chad are now located, they may be the IDPs reputed 
to still be on Jenel Moon or they may have moved further South 
toward El Geneina. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
8. (SBU) No sooner had the GOS deployed civilian police to Sirba and 
Bir Degeeg (as we and the UN had requested on February 24) and 
allowed the UN and NGO access to these areas, than it (allegedly) 
began another apparent attack on Jebel Moon.  The SAF clearly wants 
to gain the upper hand in West Darfur by attacking a weakened and 
divided JEM.  In this particular case it appears that civilians were 
not affected, with JEM positions being the primary targets.  The 
return of some IDPs to some villages in West Darfur is good news. 
It shows that sometimes the GOS can do the right thing, even though 
it is correcting a wrong which it caused in the first place. The 
returns also confirm what many in the humanitarian community believe 
- that it doesn't take a lot to restore a minimum level of security; 
in this case some Sudanese police and aggressive follow-up by 
unarmed and courageous NGO workers.  One can only imagine what a 
well-equipped, mobile and empowered UNAMID could do. 
 
FERNANDEZ