VZCZCXRO9648
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0339/01 0690813
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 090813Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0139
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000339 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E WILLIAMSON, AND AF/SPG 
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF SU
SUBJECT: DARFUR REBELS WON'T RUSH TO PEACE AT EXPENSE OF POLITICAL 
AGENDA 
 
Reftel: Khartoum 00267 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1. (SBU) The factions of the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) must 
re-unite across tribal lines before any negotiations can begin with 
the Sudanese Government, a commander allied with SLA/Abdulshafie 
told Poloff in El Fasher.  Discussions among the field commanders 
allied with SLA/Abdulshafie, SLA/Unity, SLA/Abdulwahid, and the 
United Revolutionary Front (URF) are ongoing, according to the 
commander, and aim at building unification from the bottom up to 
pressure leaders like Abdulwahid al Nur to set aside their personal 
ambitions and cooperate with other factions to achieve their 
political goals vis-a-vis Khartoum.  Any alliance with Arab militias 
is unlikely, the commander predicted, given these militias' shifting 
loyalties and attempts to renew a military pact with the Sudanese 
Government.  End summary. 
 
---------------------------- 
SLA Unification Before Peace 
---------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) Recognizing that their factionalism has weakened their 
position vis-a-vis the Sudanese Government, the factions of the SLA 
must unite in order to achieve their political goals, Abdullah 
Ismail, a commander affiliated with the SLA led by Ahmed 
Abdulshafie, told Poloff on March 6.  While the movements are split 
by personal rivalries rather than over disagreements on the 
political agenda, Ismail claimed that there is universal recognition 
that any re-unification of the SLA across tribal lines (i.e. an 
agreement between Zaghawa and Fur rebel elements) is essential for 
achieving their political objectives.  Until inter-movement and 
inter-tribal negotiations result in a united front to challenge 
Khartoum, negotiations will not be possible. 
 
------------------------------ 
Unification from the Bottom Up 
------------------------------ 
 
¶3. (SBU) According to Ismail, discussions among the field commanders 
allied with SLA/Abdulshafie, SLA/Unity, SLA/Abdulwahid, and the URF 
continue.  "The problem is with the political leadership, not the 
fighters," he explained, suggesting that unification can be built 
from the bottom up to pressure leaders like Abdulwahid to set aside 
their personal ambitions and cooperate with other factions.  The 
mid-ranking segments of the movements need time to complete their 
consultations, asserted Ismail.  "If people (i.e. the top tier of 
rebel leadership) don't want to unify, no one--not the UN, not the 
AU, not the U.S.--can help," he said.  "It's like someone who is ill 
and doesn't want to see the doctor."  (Note: An NGO with close ties 
to the rebel movements confirmed that intense "negotiations" are 
occurring between key rebel factions, including SLA/Abdulwahid and 
SLA/Unity.  End note.) 
 
-------------- 
Not in a Hurry 
-------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) Ismail predicted that international pressure on the 
movements to participate in a peace process would be ineffective. 
"We want to achieve our goals," he said, "and we're not in a hurry. 
We cannot create a weak structure that falls apart during 
negotiations."  Though all sides are "fed up with fighting," the 
movements will not relent in their struggle to obtain political 
rights for the people of Darfur.  "When we're strong, we can expand 
the fight outside Darfur" in order to gain concessions from 
Khartoum, Ismail threatened, mentioning Kordofan specifically. 
 
-------------------------------- 
Unification Conference in Darfur 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) Asked how the international community could support the 
hoped-for unification efforts, Ismail responded that after the 
completion of consultations among the field commanders, the U.S. 
should press Khartoum to allow a conference of the SLA factions to 
occur in Darfur so that "five to six" leaders from each faction 
could finalize a unified political structure.  Any meeting of SLA 
factions outside Darfur would exclude influential rebel 
representatives and be focused on the diaspora, which is detached 
from the reality on the ground, said Ismail.  He also rejected the 
possibility of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) holding 
the conference in Southern Sudan, lamenting that many members of 
SLA/Abdulshafie were still stuck in Juba because the Sudanese 
 
KHARTOUM 00000339  002 OF 002 
 
 
Government will not grant the UN/AU flight clearances to return them 
to Darfur.  Other factions are reticent to be in the same position. 
(Note: SLA/Abdulshafie has traditionally had the strongest ties to 
the SPLM among any of the SLA factions.  End note.) 
 
¶6. (SBU) Pressed to explain why such a leadership conference would 
differ from a similar effort held in Um Rai, North Darfur in January 
2007, Ismail explained that the AU, which was responsible for 
airlifting rebel leaders to site, had initially neglected to 
transport key figures.  The Sudanese military then later attacked 
the location, disrupting the discussions. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Force Versus Political Legitimacy 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) Poloff noted that some of the militarily strong movements 
(which, like SLA/Unity, tend to be dominated by the Zaghawa tribe) 
believe they should hold claim to a greater number of leadership 
positions in a unified movement.  The militarily weak but 
politically strong Fur factions, such as SLA/Abdulwahid, dispute 
this claim, which often derails unification discussion.  Ismail 
dismissed this analysis, saying that military power has fluctuated 
throughout the conflict and should not be a determining factor.  "No 
one can claim he is stronger that the others," he said.  "One day 
you're strong; one day you're weak.  Everything is possible under 
the sun.  In 2003, the rebels took El Fasher with just 400 fighters. 
 In 2004, the forces of Minni Minawi (who commanded the most 
powerful military force at that time and later became the sole--and 
now marginalized--signatory of the Darfur Peace Agreement) were 
destroyed in North Darfur and fled to (the Fur stronghold of) Jebel 
Marra to regroup.  It's not a matter of force.  It's a matter of 
political legitimacy in the towns."  (Note: SLA/Abdulshafie, with 
which Ismail is affiliated, commands little military force and lacks 
political support even among Abdulshafie's Fur tribe.  End note.) 
 
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Arab Militias Untrustworthy 
--------------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) An alliance with Arab militias that have distanced 
themselves from the Sudanese Government are a dubious venture, said 
Ismail.  During meetings in late 2007 with Mahariya militia leader 
Hamati, Ismail said that the SLA demanded that Hamati's forces 
attack Government areas in order to prove that "they're really 
fighting for the people of Darfur."  These attacks did not 
materialize, and instead, Hamati is engaging in discussions with 
Khartoum to renew their military pact, alleged Ismail.  (Note: Per 
Reftel, this information has been corroborated by three UN and NGO 
sources.  End note.) 
 
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Comment 
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¶9. (SBU) Ismail's emphasis on SLA unification prior to negotiations 
with the Sudanese Government echoes comments widespread across all 
the factions of the SLA, including Abdulwahid's.  The movements have 
little faith in the international community's ability to wrest 
political concessions from Khartoum and are therefore concentrating 
on reconsolidating a credible military threat to pressure the 
Government.  While the UN-AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) deploys, the 
UN/AU mediation can support--though not interfere in--the 
inter-rebel dialogue and focus its efforts in Darfur.  These dual 
processes may then lay the foundation for constructive negotiations 
over the next six to 12 months.  End comment. 
 
FERNANDEZ