VZCZCXYZ5742
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKH #0333/01 0661333
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 061333Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0131
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS KHARTOUM 000333 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UN US SU
SUBJECT: UNMAMID CIVIL AFFAIRS ATTEMPTING TO LAY GRASSROOTS 
FOUNDATION FOR PEACE IN DARFUR UNAMID UNABLE TO STOP FIGHTING IN 
WEST DARFUR BUT WILLING TO TRY TO SUPPORT HUMANITARIAN EFFORT 
 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1. (SBU) UNAMID Head of Civil Affairs provided an overview of 
incipient efforts to strengthen civil society in North Darfur and 
its influence in an eventual peace process.  UNAMID will hold a 
broad civil society workshop on land issues in mid-March, the first 
in a series that will focus on various topics related to the Darfur 
conflict.  Helping to build internal Civil Affairs staff capacity 
and fortifying the nascent institutions of the TDRA are two critical 
areas of potential (and requested) USG assistance.  END SUMMARY. 
 
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STRENGTHENING CIVIL SOCIETY IN NORTH DARFUR 
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¶2. (SBU) Poloffs met March 5 with UN-AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) 
Head of Civil Affairs and acting civilian Chief of Staff Wariara 
Mbugua to discuss ongoing efforts to organize and strengthen civil 
society in North Darfur to more effectively participate in an 
eventual peace process.  Mbugua described her vision of civil 
society engagement as shifting the focus of dialogue with civil 
society representatives from general themes of security and 
power-sharing and wealth-sharing to specific discussions on IDPs 
expectations for compensation, security, and political empowerment. 
She emphasized that Civil Affair's (CA) role is facilitative, thus 
putting the onus on civil society groups, including tribal 
representatives and IDPs, to sharpen their own agendas and represent 
their constituencies. 
 
¶3. (SBU) As part of this effort, UNAMID CA in North Darfur hosts 
weekly civil society meetings, usually attended by up to 40 
participants of diverse gender, political, tribal (including Arab), 
intellectual and professional affiliations.  The CSOs collectively 
nominated a Secretariat that takes minutes, drafts agendas and, 
eventually, may play a role in determining which representatives 
will participate in peace talks as "experts" in a specific domain 
(i.e., land, power sharing, wealth sharing, security, compensation, 
humanitarian). 
 
¶4. (SBU) Mbugua observed that the forum has gained momentum over the 
last weeks and, to preserve its transparency, also includes 
government officials from the land commission.  She contended that 
the presence of GoS officials in the meetings did not deter civil 
society members from voicing their opinions, though she conceded 
that political parties, present at the gatherings, should eventually 
be "peeled away" once UNAMID's political affairs capacity grows.  CA 
has also closely monitored and reacted to any reprisals against 
civil society participants.  In mid-March, UNAMID will facilitate a 
workshop in El Fasher focused on land issues, to be followed by 
other workshops on specific peace-related topics.  (Note: PolOffs 
will attend the workshop.  End Note.) 
 
¶5. (SBU) Mbugua noted that CA is working closely with the Joint 
Mediation Support Team (JMST) to help identify representative civil 
society leaders to participate in the peace process.  Above all, she 
stressed, the nominees for such positions--who would convey the 
views of their constituencies and report back to them--must come 
from the CSOs themselves, without interference from UNAMID.  Mbugua 
commented that part of her strategy is to encourage CSOs to make 
their positions known more publicly, which could give civil society 
stakeholders greater leverage over other actors, especially the 
armed movements.  Mbugua stated that UNAMID Civil Affairs offices in 
South and West Darfur were pursuing similar approaches in organizing 
and fortifying civil society, though making progress in these other 
two states remained a challenge because of the more complex tribal 
dynamics--particularly with regard to Arab tribes--and GoS 
interference. 
 
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USG HELP: BUILDING CAPACITY AND BACKING THE DPRC 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶6. (SBU) Following up on previous conversations with FieldOff, 
Mbugua identified two critical areas where the U.S. Government might 
be able to lend assistance in bolstering Darfurian civil society. 
First, she noted that the newly established Darfur Peace and 
Reconciliation Council (DPRC) in North Darfur lacks the most basic 
capacity and desperately needs help in operationalizing its mandate. 
 Expediting the institutional strengthening of the DPRC would not 
only reinforce a key structure in the Transitional Darfur Regional 
Authority (TDRA), but also provide a tangible demonstration of 
Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) implementation.  Mbugua expressed a 
similar interest in "invigorating" other institutions of the TDRA, 
such as the Land Commission, so they can perform much-needed 
 
 
administrative functions.  For example, she suggested that CA could 
co-locate staff with the commissions. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Second, Mbugua suggested that the U.S. might help build 
UNAMID Civil Affair's internal staff capacity so as develop such 
skills as grassroots negotiation, mediation and facilitation.  She 
pointed out that her existing staff excelled as reporting and 
monitoring officers, understood the political context, and had 
excellent contacts.  However, the expanded civil affairs mandate of 
UNAMID required aptitude in transforming and building relationships 
between different groups, skills that many of her mid-level civil 
affairs officers lacked. 
 
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COMMENT 
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¶8. (SBU) Mbugua is among the few officers in UNAMID, the JMST, and 
the Darfur Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (DDDC) who has been 
capable of articulating a vision for addressing the issue of civil 
society in the peace process, and who understands that UNAMID's 
mandate still includes implementation of the DPA.  The fact remains, 
however, that UNAMID Civil Affairs, JMST and DDDC have all 
under-performed, for various reasons, so far. The USG could consider 
programmatic approaches to building UNAMID Civil Affairs staff 
capacity, including through mediation and facilitation skills 
workshops.  Finally, having been a principal proponent of the DPA 
and its institutions, the USG can play a concrete and visible role 
in its implementation--and help the peace process--by supporting 
Mbugua in her efforts to increase the capacity of the TDRA's 
institutions so they can function as intended. 
 
FERNANDEZ