VZCZCXYZ5611
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKH #0324/01 0641428
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 041428Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0117
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS KHARTOUM 000324 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/E, AF/C, AF/SPG 
DEPT PLEASE PASS TO NSC 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF UG CG SU
SUBJECT: LRA PEACE TALKS CONCLUDE, AWAIT SIGNING OF FINAL AGREEMENT 
 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary:  The Government of Uganda and the Lord's 
Resistance Army (LRA) signed agreements on the two outstanding 
agenda items: the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and 
the Implementing Commitments and Mechanisms.  The Government of 
Southern Sudan mediator, Vice President Riek Machar, was 
disappointed that the parties could not agree on a specific date for 
the signing of the Final Peace Agreement beyond an understanding 
that the agreement must be signed on or before March 28.  With that 
commitment, the GOU agreed to extend the Cessation of Hostilities 
Agreement until March 28.  The LRA delegation planned to travel to 
The Hague to meet with the International Criminal Court (ICC). 
Machar may call the parties back to Juba on March 12 to extract an 
exact signing date.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (U) The Government of Uganda and Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) 
signed the agreements on the Disarmament, Demobilization, and 
Reintegration and the Implementation Protocol on February 29.  These 
were the remaining sections of the overall peace agreement.  The LRA 
refused to sign the umbrella or chapeau document, the Final Peace 
Agreement, or set a date for the signing ceremony until LRA leader, 
Joseph Kony, had assurances from the ICC that it would honor the 
agreement. 
 
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KONY REMAINS PREOCCUPIED WITH ICC 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Kony's demand allegedly emanated from the LRA's trip to 
Rikwangba on February 28.  The LRA delegation said it needed to take 
the final peace documents to Kony.  According to the LRA's lead 
negotiator, David Matsanga, Kony accepted the agreement, but 
remained concerned about the ICC warrants.  Kony wanted assurances 
from the ICC that it would respect a UNSC deferment of the warrants. 
 The LRA team claimed that Kony wanted its members to spend the 
night in Rikwangba.  The LRA delegates also insisted on traveling to 
The Hague before the final deal was signed. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) The GOU raised doubts that the LRA delegation saw Kony at 
Rikwangba because no vehicles had been sent from Juba to take the 
delegation from Nabanga, where the helicopter landed, to the 
assembly area.  When Kampala P/E Chief asked about vehicles, the LRA 
delegation said a 12-passenger truck drove through the night from 
Juba to transport them.  Other sources tell us that the LRA 
delegation met with LRA generals Santo Alit and Thomas Kwoyelo, and 
possibly General Abugarda.  We cannot verify whether or not the LRA 
delegates saw Kony, but it appears unlikely.  They may have spoken 
to Kony via satellite telephone. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
TWO FINAL DOCUMENTS SIGNED 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶5.  (U) Kony reportedly gave the LRA delegation permission to sign 
the remaining documents on DDR and the implementing protocol.  The 
LRA's delegation leader, Matsanga, stated the LRA had achieved what 
people predicted could not be done and that he felt the agreement 
was well-negotiated with international support under the auspices of 
the Government of Southern Sudan.  He thanked U.N. Special Enovy for 
LRA-Affected Area Joachim Chissano for advising the LRA that every 
negotiation involves risk and that if the LRA did not take the risk, 
it could not be part of the process.  Matsanga boldly announced that 
Kony would sign the Final Peace Agreement alongside President 
Museveni.  He challenged the United States to put up the necessary 
infrastructure, i.e. tents and latrines, at Rikwangba as incentives 
for the LRA to assemble. 
 
¶6.  (U) Matsanga also stated the Kony instructed him to urge the 
internally-displaced persons (IDPs) to return to their homes. 
Matsanga claimed that Kony was unhappy that Ugandans were living as 
prisoners in the IDP camps.  Matsanga also asked that the Ugandan 
Government take the agreement to The Hague with assurances that the 
LRA would not return to armed struggle.  He also said that support 
for the deferment would be needed at the UNSC among the permanent 
members.  Matsanga's final point was that Uganda was not/not a 
failed state, like Sierra Leone or Liberia, and that the ICC must 
allow the Ugandan courts to work.  The ICC was designed to handle 
cases for failed states, argued Matsanga.  He also promised that 
Kony would come out on the radio to give his analysis of the 
agreement and tell Ugandans why he supported the peace process. 
Matsanga claimed that spoilers constantly called members of the LRA 
delegation with complaints that the process was moving too fast.  He 
accused the GOU of hosting spoilers.  His final statement was that 
the LRA would challenge the Government for power in the 2011 
elections. 
 
¶7.  (U) In his remarks, the leader of Uganda's delegation, Ruhakana 
Rugunda, saluted the parties, the mediator, Chissano, and the 
observers.  He hoped that the substantial progress made was an 
indication of what was to come as both parties fused into one team 
to ensure peace in Uganda.  Rugunda expressed his desire that the 
conflict-affected areas could now be known as Uganda's rapidly 
developing areas with regained normalcy and prosperity.  He assured 
the LRA that the GOU was committed and that there were no spoilers 
on the Government side.  Rugunda admitted that he was sometimes 
embarrassed by the commitment of the observers to the process. 
(Note: This was a reference to the observers working with the 
parties with only a few hours' sleep while some delegates slept. 
End Note.) Rugunda said that progress had been made, but the end of 
the process had not completely arrived.  The signing of the FPA 
remained outstanding.  He said he was glad to hear that Kony said 
that he would come for the signing because northern Ugandans were 
waiting for a firm signal from Kony.  He proposed that Kony appear 
on radio Mega FM to give a message directly to the IDPs.  He 
welcomed the members of the LRA delegation to Kampala, even before 
the FPA was signed. 
 
¶8.  (U) President Chissano thanked the parties, particularly Ugandan 
President Museveni, for urging him to accept the task and Kony for 
giving him the same assurances that Museveni had about his 
commitment to peace.  Chissano said that we had moved toward a peace 
that was irreversible and that with genuine reconciliation, Uganda 
could build a great country.  He said that he would report to the 
U.N. Secretary General, but needed the final instrument quickly. 
Chissano also hoped that the successful negotiations would open a 
new chapter for Sudan.  He had received permission from Sudanese 
President Omar al-Bashir to participate in the talks and urged 
Bashir to support the agreement.  Chissano also recognized the 
Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) for allowing 
the LRA to remain there while the dialogue proceeded. 
 
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NO DATE FOR FINAL SIGNING CEREMONY 
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¶9.  (SBU)  Machar tried in vain to obtain a date for the final 
signing, but Matsanga, not missing any opportunity to grandstand, 
orchestrated another dramatic walk-out.  Matsanga claimed that he 
agreed with the GOU to drop language in the implementing protocol in 
exchange for a signing date of March 28.  He claimed that the GOU 
reneged on the date and called the GOU delegates "liars" and 
"thieves."  The GOU said that it told Matsanga the signing should 
occur "no later than March 28."  Matsanga argued the LRA delegation 
had to travel to The Hague and that Kony needed a week to prepare 
for Easter.  For the GOU, this meant that the Cessation of 
Hostilities Agreement would have to be extended, which it had 
publicly said it would not do.  In the end, the parties signed an 
extension of the CHA to March 28.  Machar said he would call the 
parties back to Juba on March 12 to finalize the date for 
signature. 
 
- - - - 
COMMENT 
- - - - 
 
¶10.  (SBU) This round of negotiations, which began on January 30, 
marked the end of the Juba phase of the peace process.  After the 
formal signing ceremony, the implementation of the agreement moves 
to Uganda.  The 30-day transition period (renewable once for another 
30 days) begins with the signing ceremony.  During that time, the 
LRA must fully assemble and the GOU must set up the Special High 
Court.  Machar dismissed some of the reports of recent suspected LRA 
activity in southern Sudan.  Machar also remains concerned, as are 
we, about Matsanga's erratic behavior and Kony's uncertain 
commitment to the peace deal. 
 
FERNANDEZ