VZCZCXYZ4735
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKH #0322/01 0641351
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 041351Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0111
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS KHARTOUM 000322 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF S/E WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG, S/CSR 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREF ECON EAID SOCI MOPS SU
SUBJECT: NORTH KORDOFAN STRESSED BY NEIGHBORING DARFUR CONFLICT 
 
REF: A. KHARTOUM 67 
¶B.  KHARTOUM 275 
 
¶1.  (U)  SUMMARY: According to numerous Sudanese contacts on a 
recent trip to the North Kordofan cities of El-Obeid and An-Nahud, 
the Darfur conflict clearly is stressing the neighboring state's 
economy and infrastructure.  Although North Kordofan shares many of 
the same factors that bred violence in Darfur, opinions differ as to 
whether that conflict will spread more significantly.  Many praise 
the Hamar tribal chief's reconciliation program for former Darfur 
rebels, stating that it could serve as a model for other tribal 
leaders.  END SUMMARY. 
 
DARFUR CONFLICT HARMS KORDOFAN'S ECONOMY 
---------------------------------------- 
¶2.  (U) In a variety of meetings in El-Obeid and An-Nahud with 
econoff from February 20-24, all contacts emphasized that Darfur's 
crisis hurts the North Kordofan economy, infrastructure, and 
government, specifically noting reduced trade, the influx of 
internally displaced persons (IDPs), and the strain they place on 
government services.  On February 21, the manager of An-Nahud's 
agricultural crop market, Othman Muhammad Ali, told EconOff that he 
has seen volume at the market reduced as Darfurian crop and 
livestock exports to Kordofan have declined.  He complained that 
Kordofan's exports to Darfur, especially of sorghum, peanuts, and 
general goods, had fallen significantly and affected his business. 
 
 
¶3.  (SBU) On February 23, Abu Agala El-Zagil of the Nahud 
Information Center told econoff that a number of banks in western 
North Kordofan, most notably in Ghebeish, decided to close and move 
away after rebels attacked nearby areas.  (Note:  After An-Nahud, 
Ghebeish is the second largest city in West Kordofan.  In December 
2006, JEM forces attacked Ghebeish killing 45 members of the Popular 
Defense Forces, after which the Sudanese Armed Forces increased its 
presence.  End Note.)  El-Zagil added that some traders are afraid 
to travel in Western Kordofan and that their purchases from the 
region have decreased significantly. 
 
¶4.  (U) According to local An-Nahud town commissioner Al-Sharif 
Al-Fadil economic and cultural ties between Kordofan and Darfur have 
been significantly reduced.  Al-Fadil noted that trade between the 
two regions is natural, as Kordofan was occupied by the Fur people 
for centuries as part of the Fur sultanate.  Al-Fadil, like others, 
added that before the conflict, trade was significant between the 
South Darfur capital of Nyala and An-Nahud. 
 
WHILE IDPs STRAIN INFRASTRUCTURE 
-------------------------------- 
¶5.  (U) Contacts also stated that the influx of internally displaced 
persons from Darfur into Kordofan has strained its infrastructure, 
social fabric, and level of government services.  In a February 21 
meeting with econoff, North Kordofan's Minister of Health, Abd 
Al-Hamid Moneim Mansour, estimated that there are "tens of thousands 
of internally displaced persons from Darfur."  He stated that 
Kordofan always has been a bridge between many different parts of 
the country, but that it is struggling to provide services to these 
new residents.  "The budget is not enough even to pay for basic 
services for the people of Kordofan, let alone those from Darfur," 
said Mansour.  On February 20, Al-Rashid Othman Al-Sayyed Abd 
Al-Baqi, the General Secretary for the Sudanese Businessmen's 
Association in North Kordofan State stated that squatter camps have 
started to form outside of El-Obeid consisting primarily of Darfur 
IDPs. 
 
WILL THE CONFLICT SPREAD TO KORDOFAN? 
------------------------------------- 
¶6.  (U) According to contacts, many of the same factors that 
triggered the Darfur conflict exist in Kordofan, including tribal 
diversity, unresolved issues over grazing rights and agricultural 
areas, years of drought, and a real water shortage.  "The lack of 
development is the reason for the war in Darfur.  If we want to stop 
Darfur's problems from spreading into Kordofan, we need 
development," said Abd Al-Hamid Mansour, the Minister of Health of 
¶N. Kordofan State.  Mansour specifically noted the stress on areas 
such as Dam Gamad, Ghebeish, and Wad Banda, where tens of thousands 
of Darfur IDPs and years of drought strain limited resources. 
 
¶7.  (U) Muhammad Gomma of An-Nahud's Veteran's Association ("The 
Martyrs Organization") noted that although the levels of violence in 
Kordofan are low compared to Darfur, the people of his state also 
suffer from violence within their borders.  According to Gomma, 17 
of those killed in the August 2007 Wad Banda attacks by JEM rebels 
from Darfur were from Nahud.  According to Gomma, (who has worked 
with some of the rebels after their reintegration into society) many 
rebels told him that they set their sights on Kordofan as it 
provides the only direct paved road to Khartoum.  "For the rebels, 
Kordofan is the only way to attack the capital," stated Gomma. 
 
¶8.  (U) Other contacts were more optimistic, denying that widespread 
conflict will spread into Kordofan.  Dr. Salih Fadel El-Saeed, a 
World Bank Projects coordinator and Kordofan native, told econoff 
that the people of Kordofan are peaceful and their mentality differs 
from those in Darfur.  "We have confidence in the police, military 
and security and they will stop the rebels from coming into 
Kordofan," stated El-Saeed. Likewise, average citizens of El-Obeid, 
such as three young unemployed college graduates (Nidal, Nizar, and 
Muhammad) told econoff at a small tea stand in downtown El-Obeid 
that although they are very frustrated with the economy and their 
futures, they do not see the rebels gaining support from young men 
such as themselves in El-Obeid. 
 
KORDOFAN'S OWN REBELS 
--------------------- 
¶9.  (U)  All Kordofan contacts knew of native rebel groups (such as 
the Kordofan Alliance for Development (KAD) and the Sons of Kordofan 
Alliance (SKA) - reftel A) as well as prominent rebel leaders 
hailing from North Kordofan such as Abu Rannat (a native of 
An-Nahud) and these groups' relationship to the Justice and Equality 
Movement. The NCP-appointed commissioner of An-Nahud stated that KAD 
consists mostly of youth who have concluded they must fight for 
development.  He said that KAD leaders lack a wide following, and 
many of them only recently returned to Sudan after years of hard 
labor in Libya.  "When they came back to Sudan, they felt as though 
they deserved something and so they took up arms," stated Sharif. 
 
GENERAL ABU RANNAT & JEM 
------------------------ 
¶10.  (U) Almost all contacts were familiar with Brigadier General 
Ibrahim Abu Rannat, a military commander of the Sons of Kordofan 
Alliance (SKA) who integrated his forces with the Justice and 
Equality Movement (JEM) in January 2008.  According to Muhammad 
Gomma, Abu Rannat lacks extended tribal or familial network in the 
region, but he does have valued military experience, personal 
charisma, and local knowledge.  Kordofan's Minister of Health Abd 
Al-Hamid Moneim Mansour, downplayed Abu Rannat's connection to 
Kordofan, stating that although his grandfather was a mayor of 
An-Nahud, his family left the area long ago.  Abu Agala El-Zagil of 
the An-Nahud Information Center agreed, "Abu Rannat is not close to 
the people of Nahud and will not influence them.  He does not have a 
following in the area." 
 
¶11.  (U) On February 25, Dr. Tahir Adam, the Speaker of the 
Legislative Council of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), told 
econoff by satellite phone (reftel b) that Abu Rannat's leadership 
is an asset to his movement.  Adam, also a native of An-Nahud, said 
that Abu Rannat has been a lifelong friend and that Abu Rannat's 
education, military experience, and knowledge of An-Nahud will help 
JEM's activities in Kordofan.  Adam also stated that JEM intends to 
carry out more operations in Kordofan's oilfields, in the Nuba 
mountains and near the cities of An-Nahud and El-Obeid. 
 
RECONCILIATION EFFORTS 
---------------------- 
¶12.  (U) Many contacts praised a reconciliation effort led by the 
local commissioner, the Hamar Tribal Chief (overseeing the largest 
tribe in North Kordofan), and seventy other local leaders.  On 
January 21, An-Nahud held a public ceremony for eight rebels who 
rejoined society after being pardoned by the State.  According to 
Muhammad Gomma, an individual who has worked to re-integrate former 
rebels into society, the reformed rebels include:  Hassan Hamad 
Al-Neel, a former senior rebel leader (who after the signing of the 
DPA defected from SLM-Minnawi to the JEM Collective Leadership of 
Bahar Abu Garda); Mohamed Bilal, a former Secretary General of KAD; 
Mohamed Abdel Ghani, a former military general in JEM; and several 
other individuals.  Gomma stated that there are five other reformed 
rebels currently in Ghebeish, who have received a general pardon 
from the state as well as a compensation package (including a car 
for the group, property, and possible government jobs).  Gomma 
stated that these former rebels have been forgiven by their fellow 
citizens, although some of them had participated in the Wad Banda 
and Ghebeish attacks that led to the deaths of many individuals. 
 
¶13.  (U)  According to Abd Al-Gadir Moniem Mansour, his position as 
the Nazir (Tribal Chief) of the Hamar Tribe makes him the best 
negotiator with these rebels, giving him the added authority 
necessary to gain their trust.  "Darfur's problems are due to the 
lack of local authority and weak government systems that have 
attempted to replace the traditional system.  The traditional 
authority needs to be empowered."  Separately, Gomma of the 
Veteran's Association agreed saying, "Traditional leaders have a 
role to play in reconciliation.  They are respected, but are not too 
closely associated with the government."  Gomma cautioned, however, 
that the official pardon and the compensation package must first 
come from the state. 
¶14.  (U) Mansour said that after the initial success of his 
reconciliation program, he has continued his work by calling rebels 
on their satellite phones, meeting them in person, and providing 
religious, tribal, and civic justifications for them to turn away 
from violence.  Mansour stated that he has convinced hundreds of 
rebels to lay down their arms.  While he has received some state 
support, Mansour said that he could do more if the government 
provided more financial, moral, and logistical support.  "What 
people forget," stated Mansour, "is that forgiveness has to be an 
important part of the solution to Darfur's problems." 
 
CRITICS OF THE RECONCILIATION PROGRAM 
------------------------------------- 
¶15.  (U) Abu Agala El-Zagil of the An-Nahud Information Center 
criticized the reconciliation program, charging that the Nazir is 
overstepping his authority.  "Security is not the role of the Nazir, 
and this is much bigger than anything he can do," said El-Zagil. 
According to El-Zagil, most of the rebels are greedy individuals, 
and the compensation packages they receive will only encourage 
others to join rebel movements.  Dr. Abdel Daiem Abdel Salam of the 
Information Media Department at Western Kordofan University agreed, 
saying "The reconciliation efforts are just propaganda, and these 
rebels should not be rewarded for what they have done, especially 
with money, land and jobs.  For every eight that return to society 
in this program, another 16 will join the movement." 
 
¶16. (U) Some rebel leaders have rejected these small initiatives, 
seeking a more comprehensive reconciliation program. On February 25, 
2008 "Akhbar Al-Youm" reported that KAD military leader Mohamed 
El-Balil Eisa speaking in Chad, tentatively agreed to begin a 
dialogue with the Government of Sudan.  Although recognizing the 
efforts of the Hamar Nazir, Eisa stated that the effort should be 
bigger than selective negotiations with individuals like Hassan 
Hamad El-Nil and others who defected from KAD.  Eisa stated that 
North and South Kordofan should be looked at holistically ("from the 
south in Abeyi to the north in Sodari, and the east in Jabra to the 
west El-Toboon,") and not just from the perspective of the Hamar 
tribe.  According to Eisa, the people of Kordofan do not seek power, 
but they do not want to be neglected while peace agreements (such as 
the CPA, DPA and ESPA) provide support to other regions of Sudan. 
 
¶17.  (U) Dr. Tahir Adam, the Speaker of the Legislative Council of 
the Justice Equality Movement (JEM) also criticized the 
reconciliation program saying, "It is not going to work.  It is 
bigger than getting one or two individuals reintegrated into 
society.  The only option for the youth is to topple the 
government." 
 
¶18.  (SBU) COMMENT:  Darfur's problems clearly put an economic and 
social burden on Kordofan.  However, measuring the exact extent of 
that impact is difficult across this huge region.  Some of our 
contacts seemed to exaggerate this burden, believing that their 
pleas will lead to more aid and attention.  With respect to 
security, El-Obeid is far from the Darfur border and rebel 
operations conducted east of An-Nahud appear unlikely.  If Darfur 
rebels attempt to conduct operations this far into Kordofan, this 
would be a significant development in the Darfur conflict - and 
JEM's attempt to spread it into neighboring Kordofan.  For it's 
part, An-Nahud appears to be a dusty backwater, with an 
underdeveloped water, electrical, and transportation network.  If 
infrastructure projects promised to An-Nahud are not delivered in 
2008 (including the completion of the El-Obeid to An-Nahud road and 
twenty-five kilometers of paved internal roads) An-Nahud could 
inspire more young men from Kordofan to follow in the steps of their 
native rebel leaders Abu Rannat and Tahir Adam. 
 
¶19.  (SBU)  COMMENT CONTINUED:  Mansour, the Hamar Tribal Chief, 
should be commended for his reconciliation efforts and overall role 
in Kordofan.  Although until now he has not succeeded in returning 
large numbers of rebels to society, he has been able to recruit 
significant individuals within rebel movements.  As president of the 
Sudanese Tribal Association, Mansour may be able to encourage other 
tribal leaders to follow his lead in bringing rebels back into 
society. 
 
FERNANDEZ