VZCZCXYZ4104
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKH #0319/01 0641144
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 041144Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0105
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS KHARTOUM 000319 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UN US SU
SUBJECT: HOW TO RESTRUCTURE A CEASEFIRE COMMISSION WITHOUT AN 
EFFECTIVE CEASEFIRE IN DARFURUNAMID UNABLE TO STOP FIGHTING IN WEST 
 
 
DARFUR BUT WILLING TO TRY TO SUPPORT HUMANITARIAN EFFORT 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1. (SBU) This cable provides an update on the most recent activities 
of the UNAMID Ceasefire Commission (CFC), impediments to its 
functioning and an analysis of measures the CFC Secretariat can take 
now to enhance its effectiveness if and when a genuine ceasefire 
takes hold in Darfur.  The USG should push for an immediate Joint 
Commission meeting to address ceasefire and monitoring 
mechanism-related issues.  End summary. 
 
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CFC CURRENT STATUS: IN STASIS 
----------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) The UN-AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) Ceasefire Commission 
(CFC) remains effectively "suspended," pending progress on the 
Darfur political front and resolution on a range of thorny 
questions, including the level of support UNAMID may offer rebel 
representatives, rules of procedure and the composition of the CFC 
itself.  No regular CFC meetings are being held; Darfur Peace 
Agreement (DPA) signatories and non-signatories alike have been 
ejected from UNAMID facilities and required to return all equipment 
(e.g., vehicles, phones) previously provided by the African Union 
Mission in Sudan (AMIS).  The Government of Sudan (GoS) expelled 
Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) representatives from all 
GoS-controlled areas in January, and the few Sudan Liberation Army 
Non-Signatory Faction (SLA-NSF) members still present in El Fasher 
are permitted to stay only long enough to collect outstanding 
Mission Subsistence Allowance (MSA) payments. 
 
¶3. (SBU) MSA, which for months impaired the functioning of the CFC 
and exacerbated tensions between the rebels and AMIS, was paid (with 
a few individual exceptions) through September 2007 at the original, 
inflated rate.  In December 2007, AMIS committed to paying rebel 
representatives for the last three months of that year, but at 
reduced rates (1000 dollars for CFC headquarters reps and 500 
dollars for reps at the sector level).  To date, the last tranche of 
MSA still has not been disbursed, though, according to one of the 
Special Assistants to Joint Special Representative (JSR) Rodolphe 
Adada, "the funds are sitting in Addis and are ready for payment." 
Force Commander Martin Luther Agwai stated from the outset of his 
command that, under UNAMID, no MSA will be paid, though the CFC may 
reasonably lend some logistical support to liaison officers (the new 
term for rebel CFC reps) to facilitate their participation in 
CFC-related activities. 
 
¶4. (SBU) With no scheduled meetings, few rebel representatives in 
town or at sectors, no assigned European Union observer and, above 
all, no genuine ceasefire, the vestigial CFC Secretariat is focused 
on developing a concept for operations--with new rules of 
procedure--for a "re-born" CFC, if and when there is a cessation of 
hostilities and a more formal agreement in place.  Its work, 
however, is impeded by the inconvenient reality that fundamental 
issues, such as CFC composition and ceasefire modalities, are 
presently impossible to determine given the unsettled political and 
military landscape in Darfur. 
 
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WAYS AHEAD? 
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¶5. (SBU) South African CFC Chief of Staff Colonel Steven Van Neel 
explained to FieldOff in late February that the Commission continues 
to consider organizational issues, including the number of liaison 
officers.  Van Neel recommends that for each ceasefire party 
represented on the CFC, it will have one liaison officer at CFC 
headquarters in El Fasher and two at each of the Sector 
headquarters.  UNAMID will offer only logistical support to those 
liaison officers who are needed for an investigation or to 
facilitate access to rebel-held areas.  Ceasefire investigations and 
reports will not require the consensus or approval of liaison 
officers for UNAMID to take action or forward to the political 
level.  (Comment: The viability of the CFC is linked to the 
effectiveness of the Joint Commission, which, in theory, should 
provide political guidance to the CFC and deterrence to would-be 
ceasefire violators.  A dysfunctional Joint Commission, as was the 
case under AMIS, will inevitably result in an impotent CFC.  End 
Comment.) 
 
¶6. (SBU) Van Neel elaborated on the vision for the CFC, emphasizing 
that it should be a single chamber that includes all relevant 
parties to an eventual ceasefire agreement.  JEM and the SLA 
factions of Abdulwahid and Ahmed AbdulShafie must participate. 
Also, additional technical expertise, such as legal officers and 
 
 
forensic and criminal investigators should round out the CFC 
Secretariat to supplement its capacity to carry out credible 
 
SIPDIS 
investigations. 
 
¶7. (SBU) FieldOff underscored for Van Neel, based on previous CFC 
missteps, the importance of ensuring a civilian presence in the 
ceasefire mechanism.  This participation could come from UNAMID 
political affairs or the Joint Mediation Support Team (JMST), who 
inevitably engage many of the same non-signatory groups and 
interlocutors as the CFC.  Van Neel agreed that embedding UNAMID's 
civilian component in the ceasefire mechanism, in addition to 
enhancing information flow across all parts of the mission, would 
help ensure that political issues arising in the CFC could be more 
expeditiously addressed than in the past.  (Comment: Among AMIS 
CFC's greatest failings was the lack of any AU political 
participation in the mechanism--as well as a paucity of guidance 
from the Joint Commission-- compelling the Force Commander to make 
political decisions--such as cuts in MSA--beyond his authority, 
sometimes with disastrous consequences.  End Comment.) 
 
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ASSESSMENT: CFC IN THE INTERIM 
------------------------------ 
 
¶8. (SBU) With progress on the political front in Darfur stalled, no 
meaningful implementation of the DPA's security provisions and no 
effective ceasefire in place, the CFC must attempt to re-cast itself 
for the time being as an interim monitoring mechanism.  A February 
19 letter from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) 
to UNAMID Headquarters requested that the CFC consider steps to 
bolster its relevance and enhance its collaboration with the JMST. 
There are three areas where focused efforts by the CFC could set the 
foundation for greater effectiveness if and when a ceasefire takes 
hold in Darfur. 
 
¶9. (SBU) First, the CFC can continue to serve as the military focal 
point for dialogue with the rebel fighters in the field. 
Maintaining these channels of communication is essential in 
facilitating UNAMID's overall acceptance and access to 
rebel-controlled areas.  The Force Commander and CFC Chief of Staff 
have already engaged with non-signatories, but these efforts must be 
sustained until and beyond the adoption of a ceasefire.  Developing 
these relationships early is critical.  SLA Non-signatories faction 
(NSF) representative LTC Abdou conveyed to FieldOff his frustration 
that UNAMID was already beginning to resemble AMIS, caving to GoS 
manipulations (on TCCs, expulsion of non-signatory CFC 
representatives and renewed fighting in West Darfur) and not 
sufficiently consulting with factions outside of the DPA. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Second, the CFC must shift its immediate focus to 
monitoring and verification of hostilities impacting civilian 
population.  These activities should be undertaken in concert with 
the civilian component--especially the UN Department of Safety and 
Security (UNDSS) and UNAMID Protection--to allow for a more 
comprehensive understanding of events on the ground.  As the Joint 
Mission Analysis Cell (JMAC) grows and UNAMID gains greater force 
capacity, the CFC should be able to better monitor and verify 
hostilities, which will inform the civilian arm of UNAMID involved 
in any ceasefire or, eventually, broader political negotiations. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Third, the CFC, drawing upon expertise from DPKO and 
international partners, must continue to closely examine the 
security provisions of the DPA to identify areas that require 
strengthening, acknowledging that any future ceasefire must, above 
all, be "implementable" by the parties and backed up by robust 
international verification.  Connected to this, the CFC should 
clarify its rules of procedure, with oversight from UNAMID political 
leadership, to ensure that it does not stray--as has happened in the 
past--from its mandate or authorities. 
 
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Comment 
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¶12. (SBU) An eventual cessation of hostilities and ceasefire will be 
the cornerstone of any peace process in Darfur.  Without an 
effective mechanism and the capacity to enforce such an agreement, 
an end to the crisis in Darfur will remain elusive.  The USG must 
continue to urge international partners and the UN/AU-led mediation 
process to focus on this objective and be willing to lend the 
necessary resources and political capital to make attaining it a 
realistic possibility.  Post recommends that Washington demarche 
DPKO, Addis and Darfur partners to convene an immediate Joint 
Commission meeting to address ceasefire-related issues and re-focus 
attention on the establishment of a verification and monitoring 
mechanism under UNAMID. 
 
 
 
FERNANDEZ