VZCZCXYZ0364
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKH #0317 0631555
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 031555Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0101
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS KHARTOUM 000317 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SE WILLIAMSON AND AF/SPG 
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS KDEM EAID MARR SU
 
SUBJECT: SPECIAL ENVOY WILLIAMSON'S MEETING WITH SPLA 
 
 
¶1.  (SBU) SUMMARY: SENIOR SPLA LEADERSHIP GREATLY APPRECIATES USG 
SUPPORT IN BOTH HELPING TO BUILD MILITARY INFRASTRUCTURE AND IN 
MILITARY TRAINING, AND THEY EXPRESSED THE DESIRE FOR A CONTINUED 
CLOSE WORKING RELATIONSHIP.  BOTH LT. GENERAL DOMINIC DIM DENG, THE 
MINISTER FOR SPLA AFFAIRS, AND LT. GENERAL OYAY DENG AJAK, CHIEF OF 
STAFF OF THE SPLA, ALSO EXPRESSED THEIR RISING FRUSTRATION AT THE 
SLOW PACE OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CPA.  THE SPLA LEADERSHIP HAS 
FUNDAMENTAL DOUBTS ABOUT THE INTENTIONS OF THE NCP ON THE 
NORTH-SOUTH BORDER, EXACERBATED BY THE CONTINUING FAILURE TO 
PROPERLY SEPARATE FORCES, AND BY THE EFFORTS OF THE NCP TO 
DESTABILIZE THE BORDER AREA TO ENABLE IT TO SUCCEED IN CLAIMING MORE 
TERRITORY IN THIS MINERAL RICH REGION.  THE SPLA WARNED THAT IN 
THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, EVEN A SMALL SPARK COULD LEAD TO WIDESPREAD 
FIGHTING.  FINALLY, THE GENERALS COMMITTED TO THE QUICK COMPLETION 
OF THE SPLA DEFENSE WHITE PAPER. END SUMMARY. 
 
------------------------------ 
SPLA PLEASED WITH U.S. SUPPORT 
------------------------------ 
 
¶2.  (SBU) DENG AND AJAK, ALONG WITH OTHER SENIOR COMMANDERS OF THE 
SPLA, MET WITH THE SPECIAL ENVOY ON FEBRUARY 28 IN JUBA AT THE NEW 
SPLA HEADQUARTERS RECENTLY BUILT FOR THEM BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT. 
THEY EXPRESSED THEIR GRATITUDE FOR THE NEW FACILITY, NOTING THAT IT 
ALLOWED THEM FOR THE FIRST TIME TO HOUSE THE ENTIRE SENIOR 
LEADERSHIP OF THE SPLA IN ONE SPACIOUS LOCATION.  IT WAS, THEY SAID, 
AN IMPORTANT STEP FORWARD IN THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE SPLA FROM A 
GUERRILLA BUSH ARMY INTO A MODERN, PROFESSIONAL MILITARY.  THEY WERE 
ALSO GRATEFUL FOR THE ONGOING MILITARY TRAINING THAT THE USG IS 
PROVIDING, AND EXPRESSED THEIR STRONG DESIRE FOR MORE SUCH SUPPORT. 
 
----------------------- 
GIVE US THE WHITE PAPER 
----------------------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU) THE SPECIAL ENVOY STRONGLY URGED THE SPLA TO FINISH THE 
DEFENSE WHITE PAPER IN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS, HIGHLIGHTING THAT WITHOUT 
IT THE USG WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO PROVIDE THE LEVEL OF SUPPORT TO THE 
SPLA THAT WE WOULD LIKE TO GIVE.  THE GENERALS RESPONDED THAT THEY 
UNDERSTOOD THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PROJECT AND WOULD ACT QUICKLY TO 
GET A FINAL DRAFT TO PRESIDENT KIIR, WHOM THEY WOULD ENCOURAGE TO 
ISSUE IT BY PRESIDENTIAL DECREE RATHER THAN WAIT UNTIL THE NATIONAL 
ASSEMBLY MET AGAIN IN APRIL.  THEY PROMISED TO DO THEIR BEST TO HAVE 
IT INTO AMERICAN HANDS IN THE TIME FRAME URGED BY THE SPECIAL 
ENVOY. 
 
-------------------------- 
SKEPTICAL OF NCP INTENTIONS 
-------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU) ON DARFUR THE SPLA HAS HELPED THE REBELS POLITICALLY BUT 
NOT MATERIALLY.  THEY BROUGHT 19 REBEL GROUPS TO JUBA AND SUCCEEDED 
IN CONSOLIDATING THEM INTO 4 TO HELP WITH THE PEACE PROCESS, BUT 
THEY WERE NOT OPTIMISTIC THAT THEIR EFFORTS WOULD COME TO MUCH 
BECAUSE IN THEIR OPINION THE NCP WAS NOT SERIOUS OR COMMITTED TO THE 
PEACE PROCESS.  KHARTOUM'S GOAL WAS TO TOPPLE THE GOVERNMENT IN 
CHAD.  IF THEY SUCCEEDED, KHARTOUM WOULD NEXT SEEK TO PUSH FOR A 
MILITARY VICTORY OVER THE REBELS, AND THE FIGHTING WOULD CONTINUE 
INDEFINITELY.  THE GENERALS ADVISED THAT THE SITUATION IN DARFUR AND 
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CPA WERE CLOSELY TIED, AND THAT IF THE CPA 
FAILED, THERE WOULD BE NO SOLUTION OF THE FIGHTING IN DARFUR, 
EITHER. 
 
 
---------------------------- 
CPA IMPLEMENTATION TOO SLOW 
---------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (SBU) THE GENERALS WORRIED THAT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CPA 
WAS MOVING MUCH TOO SLOWLY, ESPECIALLY ON THE POTENTIALLY EXPLOSIVE 
ISSUE OF THE BORDER DEMARCATION.  ONCE AGAIN, THE NCP LACKED TRUE 
COMMITMENT TO MAKING THE PEACE PROCESS WORK. THEIR REAL INTEREST WAS 
IN GRABBING AS MUCH SOUTHERN LAND AND MINERAL WEALTH AS THEY COULD, 
AND THAT WAS WHY THE SAF HAD NOT FULLY FROM OIL-RICH PARTS OF THE 
BORDER (THE SPLA HAS ALSO NOT FULLY WITHDRAWN).  WHAT WAS NEEDED, 
THEY SAID, WAS A TRUE BUFFER ZONE, TO PREVENT CLASHES NOT ONLY WITH 
THE SAF, BUT WITH THE LOCAL MILITIAS THAT THE SAF WAS ARMING AND 
SUPPORTING WITH THE GOAL OF CREATING INSTABILITY THAT WORKED TO 
THEIR FAVOR.  THE GENERALS WARNED THAT IF FIGHTING STARTED IT HAD 
THE POTENTIAL TO SPREAD ALONG THE ENTIRE BORDER AND ERUPT INTO 
ANOTHER FULL SCALE WAR.  THE SPLA WAS PATIENT, BUT IT STOOD READY TO 
REPLY TO NCP PROVOCATIONS IF REQUIRED.  A BUFFER ZONE ALONG THE 
BORDER WOULD GO A LONG WAY TO PREVENTING THAT FROM HAPPENING. 
 
FERNANDEZ