VZCZCXRO8202
OO RUEHGI RUEHRN RUEHROV
DE RUEHKM #0412/01 0781442
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 181442Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0137
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHGI/AMEMBASSY BANGUI IMMEDIATE 0001
RUEHTO/AMEMBASSY MAPUTO IMMEDIATE 0481
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA IMMEDIATE 3439

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KAMPALA 000412 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
KHARTOUM PLEASE PASS TO JUBA 
DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO USAID AND OFDA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC CG EAID PHUM PREF SU UG
SUBJECT: LRA-GOU PEACE AGREEMENT: IMPLICATIONS FOR NORTHERN 
UGANDA 
 
REF: KAMPALA 
 
KAMPALA 00000412  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
 ¶1.  (U) Summary: The Final Peace Agreement (FPA) between the 
Government of Uganda and Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) awaits 
signature, possibly by March 28.  The parties will return to 
Juba during the week of March 24 to determine the signature 
date.  Whether or not the document is signed, the peace 
process has yielded significant dividends to the people of 
northern Uganda, including improved security and an 
opportunity to leave the internally-displaced persons camps 
to return to or near their homes.  The U.S. can focus efforts 
on implementation of sections of the agreement that end the 
perception of northern marginalization, contribute to 
economic recovery and northern development, and are aimed at 
reconciliation to consolidate peace in northern Uganda.  End 
Summary. 
 
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OVERVIEW 
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¶2.   (U) The Government of Southern Sudan-mediated 
negotiations between the Lord's Resistance Army and the 
Government of Uganda began in July 2006, experienced frequent 
delays and periods of little or no activity, and were 
concluded on February 29, 2008 after a month of intensive 
negotiations.  The FPA will be comprised of seven sections: 
The Cessation of Hostilities Agreement Addenda Six (in 
effect); Comprehensive Solutions (in effect after the LRA 
disarmament), Accountability and Reconciliation and Annex (in 
effect); Permanent Ceasefire (in effect 24 hours after 
signing of FPA); Disarmament, Demobilization, and 
Reintegration (DDR) (in effect after transitional period); 
the Implementation and Monitoring Mechanisms (IMM) (in effect 
after FPA signature); and the Final Peace Agreement and 
Implementation Mechanism Schedule (in effect upon signature). 
 
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CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AND PERMANENT CEASEFIRE 
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¶3.  (U) The first Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CHA) 
was signed on August 26, 2006, establishing assembly areas at 
Rikwangba and Owiny Kibul, southern Sudan.  Owiny Kibul was 
dropped in a later agreement.  The CHA has been renewed five 
times.  The Cessation of Hostilities Monitoring Team (CHMT) 
was established to verify violations of the CHA.  A Permanent 
Ceasefire Agreement will supercede the CHA, and the CHMT will 
become the Ceasefire Monitoring Team (CMT), which will manage 
the DDR process at the Rikwangba assembly area.  The Sudan 
Peoples' Liberation Army will provide security, logistics, 
and service support to the assembly area and buffer zone. 
The LRA is required to fully assemble at Rikwangba within 30 
days of the signing of the FPA (extendable to 60 days).  A 15 
kilometer buffer zone was established.  Ceasefire violations 
include attacks, threats and acts of violence directed 
against the other party; hostage taking; seizure of personnel 
or property of humanitarian organizations; hostile 
propaganda; acquisition, recovery, or replenishment of arms, 
ammunition, or other military equipment by the LRA; and 
recruitment of forces by the LRA. 
 
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COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTIONS 
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¶4.  (U) The Comprehensive Solutions agreement covers the 
political issues raised by the LRA, and it is focused on 
Uganda's future.  It contains mechanisms to address the 
impact and causes of conflict, recognizes the Peace, 
Recovery, and Development Plan (PRDP) and existing Government 
interventions, contains a reparations provision, sets up a 
trust fund for victims, and provides for government 
appointments for people from conflict-affected areas.  The 
Joint Liaison Group, which is comprised of both Government 
and LRA, will make nominations for Government positions.  The 
GOU will ensure the Equal Opportunities Commission becomes 
operational, actively promotes increased access to 
universities for individuals from the conflict-affected areas 
and strengthens the reestablishment of the legal system in 
the north, deployment of the Uganda Police Force, and 
district land boards.  The GOU is obligated to ensure that 
the security services reflect national character.  The GOU 
shall develop and implement a strategy for assisting the 
 
KAMPALA 00000412  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
return and resettlement of internally-displaced persons and 
implement the PRDP. 
 
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ACCOUNTABILITY AND RECONCILIATION PRINCIPLES AND ANNEX 
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¶5.  (U) The Accountability and Reconciliation agreement and 
annex focus on past atrocities.  The agreement allows for 
legal trials for the most serious crimes and traditional 
justice mechanisms for others.  It requires the GOU to 
establish a Special Division of the High Court.  The GOU will 
establish a body that analyzes the causes and effects of the 
conflict, examines human rights violations, and promotes 
truth-telling.  The body may hold hearings and will publish 
its findings.  There is separate treatment for state and 
non-state actors.  Ugandan soldiers that committed atrocities 
would be prosecuted under the UPDF Act.  Traditional 
mechanisms form the central part of the alternative justice 
and reconciliation framework. 
 
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DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION, AND REINTEGRATION 
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¶6.  (U) The agreement on DDR is consistent with international 
principles and includes provisions for the protection of 
children and attention to gender issues.  The CMT is charged 
with recording information about the LRA members and 
determining who wants to be absorbed into the Uganda military 
and security agencies.  The DDR can be implemented through 
existing mechanisms such as the Amnesty Commission.  Initial 
disarmament and demobilization will take place at Rikwangba, 
southern Sudan, with reintegration occurring in Uganda.  The 
DDR requires liaison between Sudan and Uganda and could 
involve a prolonged period during which the LRA assembles. 
 
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IMPLEMENTATION AND MONITORING MECHANISMS 
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¶7.  (U) Key implementing mechanisms include the Joint Liaison 
Group and the Oversight Forum, which provide both political 
oversight and technical monitoring.  With the establishment 
of the JLG and the OF, the peace process moves to Kampala 
from Juba, but the GOSS mediator maintains linkages to the 
process.  The JLG is tasked with facilitating and monitoring 
the implementation of the FPA.  It is composed of three 
persons nominated by the Government, three LRA nominees, and 
a person selected by the Chief Mediator, who will serve as 
the JLG chair.  The OF consists of the Chief Mediator (or 
representative); UNSG Special Envoy for the LRA-Affected 
Areas, (or representative) who shall speak for the OF; one 
representative from each of the African Union observer 
countries (Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Tanzania, 
Mozambique, and South Africa); one representative from the 
other observers to the FPA (EU, United States, Canada, and 
Norway).  The OF will meet once a month during the transition 
period.  U.N. Special Envoy for LRA-Affected Areas Chissano's 
office in Kampala will provide the technical and secretariat 
support for the OF. 
 
¶8.  (U) The agreement established the transitional period of 
one month, with the possibility of extension.  During the 
transitional period, the Government must prepare the 
accountability mechanisms, which include investigations, 
establishment of a Special Court, and make an approach to the 
U.N. Security Council for deferral of International Criminal 
Court warrants for Joseph Kony, Okot Odhiambo, and Dominic 
Ongwen.  The LRA is obliged to observe the Permanent 
Ceasefire and fully assemble at Rikwangba.  The DDR process 
would begin after the transition period.  The CMT will verify 
whether the LRA assembled at Rikwangba and whether LRA forces 
in northern Uganda have surfaced.  After disarmament and 
demobilization, the LRA would be dissolved. 
 
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FINAL PEACE AGREEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶9.  (U) During the last round of negotiations in Juba, the 
parties decided that the FPA should be signed no later than 
March 28.  The FPA document is a chapeau for the other 
agreements that were signed, and contains preamble language 
 
KAMPALA 00000412  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
introducing the agreements reached.  Both parties have a 
draft implementation schedule, which cannot be finalized 
until the FPA is signed because it contains the timing of 
various obligations that depend on the date of the FPA's 
signature. 
 
- - - - - - 
NEXT STEPS 
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¶10.  (SBU) Implementation of the agreement could be slow and 
patchy without sustained national and international political 
support for the parties.  The issue of LRA assembly remains 
key to the agreement, but Chief GOU negotiator Rugunda told 
the Ambassador on March 18 that he believes the LRA will sign 
the final agreement.  He does not believe Kony will show up 
to sign, nor does he believe all LRA fighters will assemble. 
Current LRA movements on the ground and Matsanga's erratic 
demands appear to confirm the GOU's suspicions.  (The 
question of the ICC remains a key concern for the LRA, and 
Matsanga now is demanding that the GOU request a deferral of 
the warrants before the FPA is signed.) 
 
- - - - - - - 
IMPLICATIONS 
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¶11.  (SBU)  There is broad belief by a number of senior GOU 
officials and northern leaders that the Juba Peace Process 
has yielded results beyond the actual documents signed, or 
whether Kony actually disarms at this time.  Improved 
security conditions allowed hundreds of thousands of 
northerners to leave squalid displaced persons camps and 
return to or near their homes.  Currently, Government 
officials at the national and local levels are confident 
enough in the status quo, that they are de-linking the peace 
and recovery processes. 
 
¶12.  (SBU)  The Juba Process has helped the Government with 
two key constituencies, the international community and 
northern Ugandans.  The Government, by spending 18 months 
negotiating with the LRA, has demonstrated its commitment to 
peace to skeptical northerners, and now has a document that 
it could use to justify military operations against the LRA 
to its domestic and international audiences.  The LRA used 
the negotiations to try to clean up its image for possible 
conversion to a political front, stave off the International 
Criminal Court, and buy time.  However, frequent delays, 
squabbles over allowances, the execution of LRA deputy 
Vincent Otti, and claims that the LRA represented all 
northern Ugandans contributed to a loss of sympathy 
northerners and their elected and traditional leaders may 
have had for the LRA cause.  Current foot-dragging over the 
signature date also is likely designed to bring the 
implementation of the agreement into April, when the rainy 
season starts and military operations become difficult. 
 
- - - - - 
OUR ROLE 
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¶13.  (SBU) Enhanced U.S. involvement in Juba accelerated the 
negotiations phase of process, which had been plagued by long 
delays.  Coupled with significant assistance programs, U.S. 
actions also convinced the LRA that the U.S. was serious 
about the consolidation of peace and security in northern 
Uganda.  Regardless of whether the LRA delegation can deliver 
on its part of the bargain, particularly the assembly of LRA 
forces, our role now should be to work with the Government on 
implementation of its "obligations," particularly those 
pertaining to reconstruction and reconciliation, which will 
benefit a tentative north-south political rapprochement 
within Uganda.  We can also support efforts to bring as many 
LRA out of the bush as possible, whether through a process of 
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration or through the 
Government's Amnesty Program.  Lastly, we should continue to 
explore options with the GOU on means to end Kony's threat to 
regional stability and development. 
BROWNING