VZCZCXRO7973
OO RUEHIK RUEHPW RUEHYG
DE RUEHBUL #0688/01 0781247
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 181247Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3289
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 000688 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, S/CRS 
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG 
NSC FOR JWOOD 
OSD FOR SHIVERS 
CG CJTF-82, POLAD, JICCENT 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KDEM PGOV AF
SUBJECT: IN POLITICS DOMINATED BY GIANTS, REFORMERS ARE 
VULNERABLE 
 
REF: A. 07 KABUL 3498 
     ¶B. KABUL 667 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  The number of Afghan political parties has 
grown dramatically since the fall of the Taliban.  Though 
small party leaders often explore coalitions and alliances, 
two primary competing blocs are emerging:  the United Front 
opposition, and a looser coalition around Karzai.  Both 
groups are courting prospects across the range of wholly new 
political parties and various splinter groups.  The United 
Front offers small parties a voice in the National Assembly 
and promises leaders positions in a future government. 
Karzai dangles improved government services, government jobs 
and sinecures.  The competition has increasingly left 
reformers, who are unwilling to choose between what they 
consider two unattractive alternatives, isolated, powerless, 
and at risk of irrelevance. 
 
Whales Hunt the Little Fish 
--------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) Political parties have proliferated since the fall 
of the Taliban; over eighty have registered with the Ministry 
of Justice.  Most of these are either fragments of old 
parties or jihadi groups, whose ambitious leaders struck out 
on their own, or new parties founded by often idealistic 
reformers who returned to Afghanistan after 2001.  Palace 
Policy Advisor Sebgatullah Sanjar categorizes today's parties 
in four groups:  pre-communist, such as Afghan Millat; 
jihadi, such as Jamiat (Rabanni); ethnic, such as Junbesh 
(Uzbek); and newly emerging, such as the 3rd Line (REF A). 
Despite the reformers, propensity for ideological politics, 
Afghanistan's political landscape remains dominated by 
personal and ethnic alliances.  Various attempts by reformist 
parties to form more powerful political blocs have failed 
because of misgivings about the ideological compromise 
required of allies and leaders' unwillingness to cede 
personal power to a committee of parties. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Two expanding factions increasingly dominate Afghan 
politics, the United Front opposition and Karzai supporters. 
Both groups are focused on building pan-national electoral 
support, but remain ethnically dominated and operate largely 
behind closed doors.  Independent groups that refuse to align 
with one of these giants risk irrelevance and political 
oblivion. 
 
Two Groups Canvassing for Electoral Support 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) The United Front and President Karzai are competing 
in their efforts to entice weak and small parties into their 
respective camps.  The United Front promises a voice in the 
National Assembly as well as access to power and positions in 
a future United Front-dominated government.  Karzai, 
meanwhile, uses delivery of government services as a 
political lever, and awards sinecures to party leaders who 
refrain from criticizing him. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Politics within the Hazara ethnic group (REF B) are 
a case study of Afghanistan's evolving political landscape. 
Prior to 2001, Hazaras relied heavily on the Wahdat party as 
a bulwark against the Taliban.  Since the Taliban, however, 
ambitious Hazara leaders have established their own parties. 
Two chief Wahdat leaders, Haji Mohammad Mohaqqeq and Second 
Vice President Mohammad Karim Khalili, often fair-weather 
friends during the anti-Soviet jihad, created their own 
branches of Wahdat.  Other political aspirants, meanwhile, 
took advantage of Wahdat's fragmentation to assert their 
authority.  Ustad Mohammad Akbari established a new wing of 
Wahdat and Sayed Mustafa Kazemi (who was killed in the 
November 6, 2007 Baghlan sugar factory bombing) founded a new 
Hazara political faction, the National Power Party.  Karzai 
and the United Front competed to pull these four leaders' 
parties into their orbits.  The United Front, allegedly close 
to Iran, approached Akbari and Kazimi, also rumored to retain 
 
KABUL 00000688  002 OF 002 
 
 
ties to Iran.  Khalili and Mohaqqeq, who claim, perhaps to 
curry favor with us, to have broken with Iran, sought a 
strong ally to compete with Akbari and Kazimi, and sided with 
Karzai. 
 
Different Groups, Different Means of Outreach 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) The United Front bloc operates politically even 
though it has not officially registered as a party with the 
Minister of Justice.  Sayed Jawad Hossaini, leader of the 
Young Islamic Party of Afghanistan, founded in 2002, 
explained his party's recruitment by the United Front. 
Hossaini said he refused several entreaties to join the 
United Front in 2007, but ultimately decided to accept in 
early 2008.  He based his decision on the need to join a 
larger group in order to have any voice in government.  The 
United Front also offered him a seat on its controlling 
leadership council.  Hossaini added he does not agree with 
some United Front positions, such as support for the Amnesty 
law, but nonetheless felt it politically advantageous to join 
the group. 
 
¶7. (SBU) President Karzai, who does not have a party and has 
rejected several parties' solicitations, still trades in 
offers of government positions, sinecures and services in 
exchange for political support or acquiescence.  Fatema 
Nazeri, a Hazara member of parliament from Kabul, explained 
her fledgling party's affiliation to Karzai.  At her first 
political event, Nazeri staged a protest against the 
government because her supporters' neighborhood lacked 
electricity.  Karzai responded, quickly offering electricity, 
but apparently at a price.  Despite her initial position in 
opposition to the government, Nazeri explained she has since 
become close to Farouk Wardak, Karzai's political fixer. 
Nazeri implied she bartered political support for electricity. 
 
The Disorganized but Fertile Middle 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) Parties unwilling to choose a side in this ongoing 
duel form a strong democratic current in Afghan politics, but 
complain they have no political voice or financial means. 
These are new parties run by reformers, most of whom left 
Afghanistan during the wars, some of whom stayed to run NGOs 
and schools.  Their leaders abhor Afghanistan's tribal 
politics, shun its warlords, and complain that Iran, 
Pakistan, and Russia are meddling in domestic politics. 
Though reformers share these complaints, they remain unable 
to swallow their differences and unite.  Their reluctance to 
work together prevents them from building a political bloc 
that could offer Afghans an alternative to the United Front 
or President Karzai.  Until reformers can cooperate to the 
degree necessary to win real political power, however, 
Afghans will likely gravitate towards one of the two big 
players. 
WOOD