VZCZCXRO6277
OO RUEHIK RUEHPW RUEHYG
DE RUEHBUL #0667/01 0761604
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 161604Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3270
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 000667 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, S/CRS 
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG 
NSC FOR JWOOD 
OSD FOR SHIVERS 
CG CJTF-82, POLAD, JICCENT 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: IR PGOV AF
SUBJECT: HAZARAS DIVIDED BY KARZAI, UNITED FRONT POLITICS 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  The once united Hazara ethnic group has 
politically splintered since the fall of the Taliban; its 
fragments are being divided between Karzai and the opposition 
United Front.  Powerful Hazara leaders' connections to Iran, 
or lack thereof, sometimes dictate their affiliation with 
Karzai or the reportedly Iran-connected United Front. 
Smaller groups, meanwhile, calculate their allegiance based 
on their perceptions of the balance of power in Kabul.  Some 
Hazara leaders have begun to complain their ethnic group is 
no longer sufficiently represented in Karzai's government. 
Like some other ethnic groups, they claim Karzai's coalition 
government has lost its former regard for representative 
ethnic balance. 
 
One Politically Fractured Ethnic Group 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) The Hazara ethnic group, once fairly united by 
adversity under the Wahdat and Harakat parties, is 
politically divided and ripe for recruitment into the 
coalitions coalescing around Karzai or the opposition United 
Front.  After the fall of the Taliban, the Hazaras' brutal 
recent antagonist, many Hazara leaders broke from their 
dominant power structures.  The spine of Hazara politics, 
Wahdat, split into four branches, one under the leadership of 
Vice President Mohammad Karim Khalili, and three respectively 
under the leadership of National Assembly members:  Haji 
Mohammad Mohaqqeq, Ustad Mohammad Akbari, and Sayed Mustafa 
Kazimi. 
 
¶3. (SBU) The other Shia party that had attracted Hazara 
membership, Harakat-e-Islami-e-Afghanistan, divided 
similarly.  Harakat's founder, the Kandahari Shia Pashtun 
Ayatollah Muhammad Asif Mohseni, retired from politics in 
2005 to devote himself to his charitable foundation, and his 
deputies, Hojatolislam Seyyed Muhammad Ali Jawed and Herat 
Governor Sayed Hussein Anwari, divided the party between 
them.  Harakat director of international relations Murtaza 
Negzad later broke from Jawed and Anwari, forming a third 
branch of Harakat. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Up and coming Hazara leaders, meanwhile, further 
divided the Hazara political block, presenting the Hazara 
political community with additional options.  National 
Assembly member Fatema Nazari formed a new women's group to 
lobby for Hazara issues in Kabul.  A young Hazara named Sayed 
Jawad Hossaini also formed a new group, the Young Islamic 
Party of Afghanistan, which is primarily Hazara, but reaching 
out to all religions and ethnicities. 
 
Hazara Parties - Iranian Birth, Afghan Wars 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) Eight Hazara political parties were born in Iran 
during the anti-Soviet jihad.  Known as the "Tehran Eight", 
these groups and their Iranian-backed militias formed the 
nucleus of all subsequent Hazara politics.  Through the 
course of the jihad, mujahadeen civil war, and vicious fight 
against the Taliban, Harakat and Wahdat came to dominate 
Hazara politics.  Over time, some Hazara leaders chose to 
break with Iran, while some stayed close.  These legacy 
relationships now help define political allegiances among 
Hazara leaders and Hazara relationships with external groups. 
 
Hazaras Divided in Karzai-United Front Struggle 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶6. (SBU) Kabul's political giants, Karzai and the United 
Front, are courting the new Hazara parties and groups.  Those 
powerful Hazara leaders with connections to Iran have proved 
generally more sympathetic to the United Front, which is 
rumored to depend partially on Iranian funding.  Smaller 
parties and splinters have coldly calculated their allegiance 
based on the benefits they perceive from allying with one 
side or the other. 
 
¶7. (SBU) According to Wahdat International Relations director 
Abdul Ali Azad, National Assembly members Akbari and Kazimi 
 
KABUL 00000667  002 OF 002 
 
 
quickly aligned themselves with the United Front because of 
their shared Iranian connections.  Azad adds this caused 
Mohaqqeq and Khalili, who are not as connected to Iran, to 
overcome their differences and explore entry into Karzai's 
political orbit.  According to Harakat leader Negzad, Harakat 
is similarly divided between Karzai and the United Front. 
Jawed, who is religious, close to Iran, and has a personal 
relationship with Lower House Speaker and United Front leader 
Mohammad Yonus Qanooni, held a series of meetings and 
publicly announced that Harakat would side with the United 
Front.  Anwari, who is more secular and not connected to 
Iran, resisted, dividing the party between him and Jawed. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Among smaller party leaders considering with whom to 
align themselves, Iranian connections seem less a determining 
factor than crude political power calculations.  Young 
Islamic Party of Afghanistan leader Hossaini, who announced 
his allegiance to the United Front at a recent press 
conference, said the prospect of a stronger political voice 
caused him to align with the United Front.  He added he made 
the decision despite not agreeing with many United Front 
positions.  Negzad, meanwhile, said separately he supported 
Karzai in the last election but would likely seek another 
patron, the United Front, because Karzai promised Negzad a 
deputy minister position but never delivered. 
 
Internal Divisions Weaken Perceived Hazara Influence 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) While the best known Hazara leaders maintain their 
power and authority, weaker Hazara politicians complain the 
ethnic group as a whole is losing ground in the government, 
which may be a symptom of their current political division. 
Harakat leader Negzad complained that Hazaras are 
increasingly left out of Karzai's administration.  He said 
while the better known Hazara personalities, such as 
Mohaqqeq, Khalili, and Anwari, maintain their positions, 
Hazaras in the ministries have increasingly lost their jobs 
to Tajiks and Pashtuns.  He claimed Hazaras now represent 
less than four percent of the government workforce, too low a 
percentage for an ethnic group he said comprises 20 - 30 
percent of Afghanistan's population.  (Note: We believe the 
Hazaras represent less than ten percent of Afghanistan's 
population.  End Note)  While Negzad exaggerates declining 
Hazara influence as well as the size of Afghanistan's Hazara 
population, the fracturing of the Hazara block has likely 
contributed to some decline in Hazara participation in the 
government.  This perception that they are losing influence 
is a partial impetus for Hazara leaders' increased outreach 
to larger patrons as they seek to secure political influence. 
WOOD