VZCZCXYZ0525
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBUL #0568/01 0651017
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 051017Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3134
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

UNCLAS KABUL 000568 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/FO DAS CAMP, SCA/A, PRM 
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG 
NSC FOR JWOOD 
OSD FOR SHIVERS 
CG CJTF-82, POLAD, JICCENT 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREF PREL PHUM AF
SUBJECT:  Afghan Refugee Camp Closures in Pakistan:  Scenarios and 
Possible Impacts 
 
¶1. (SBU) The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
is developing a contingency plan for Pakistan's refugee camp 
closures and foresees three possible scenarios involving the return 
of 130,000, 266,000 or 400,000 refugees, respectively.  NGOs are 
hesitant to commit resources until they know funding availability, 
and donors are somewhat hamstrung by their funding cycles.  All 
scenarios present serious challenges to Afghanistan's security 
situation and ability to absorb and successfully reintegrate 
returnees.  These numbers should be taken seriously and planned for, 
but a recent expansion by Government of Pakistan (GOP) authorities 
of relocation options available to those dislocated now includes 
moving to any existing camp in Pakistan, a development that could 
take the pressure off returnee scenarios. 
 
Possible Return Scenarios 
------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) UNHCR recently dispatched a senior officer from Geneva to 
Pakistan and Afghanistan to meet with government officials, refugee 
leaders, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and donors.  His 
findings indicate three possible scenarios, with Scenario 1 the most 
likely.  The approximated numbers are derived from Pakistani Proof 
of Registration records minus repatriation records from 2007. 
 
Scenario 1:  130,000 Returns (Plus 60,000 Possible Extras) From 
Camps In NWFP and Baluchistan 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) Scenario 1:  130,000 returnees from three camps: Jalozai - 
84,000; Jungle Pir Alizai - 16,000; and Girdi Jungle - 30,000. 
UNHCR also expects approximately 60,000 returns from residual Kacha 
Gari (closed in 2007) and other urban caseloads but did not factor 
these individuals into any scenario as they will return gradually, 
if at all, rather than be forced out of camps.  Jalozai residents 
will likely return, in descending order, to the east, central, 
north, and south, while residents of the two Baluchi camps would 
likely return to Kandahar and Helmand provinces.  The GOP was unable 
to close these self-sustaining camps in 2007, and, although they are 
still slated for closure, the GOP may be unwilling or unable to 
confront residents a second time.  The closure of Jalozai and the 
two Baluchistan camps has been already agreed upon in the 
Afghan/Pak/UNHCR Tripartite Agreement. 
 
Scenario 2:  266,000 Returns From NWFP And Baluchistan 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) Scenario 2:  266,000 returnees:  the 130,000 in Scenario 1; 
plus possible closure of six NWFP camps in Kohat District 
(population 65,000) and all seven camps in Hangu District (56,000). 
In addition, UNHCR suspects the GOP may try to close the Khogiani 
cluster near Peshawar in NWFP (3,100) and two camps in Baluchistan - 
Mohammad Khel near Quetta (5,700) and Zarkarez near Loralai (5,600). 
 GOP officials recently indicated that camp residents can choose to 
relocate (UNHCR will assist) to any existing camp in Pakistan, not 
only in the NWFP camps in Dir and Chitral, but also to Myanwali camp 
in the Punjab.  Residents from Khohat and Hangu, if these camps are 
closed, will likely return to Afghanistan's east, southeast, center, 
and north, while the remaining groups will head primarily south, 
with some movement to the north, east, and center. 
 
Scenario 3:  400,000 is "Worst-Case" 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) Although this option was not presented in a February 18 
briefing for donors, it appeared three days later at an NGO/donor 
briefing as the worst-case scenario.  This scenario includes the 
individuals from Scenarios 1 and 2 (266,000), plus an additional 
135,000 from possible camp closures in other NWFP districts.  The 
breakdown would be Berari, Khaki, and Ichrian in Mansehra District 
(24,400); Padhana and Panian in Haripur District (76,200); Barawal, 
Chakdara, and Toor in Dir (24,800); Dabara in Tank (3,200); and 
Kalatak in Chitral (1,500).  Returnees from these camps are expected 
to return to the east, north, center, and southeast. 
 
The Poorest of the Poor 
----------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) Most refugees told UNHCR that lack of land is the primary 
obstacle to return, closely followed by tribal feuds, lack of 
infrastructure (health care, water, and education), lack of housing, 
and security and accessibility.  Returnees are also likely to be 
very vulnerable.  Most Afghan refugees in Pakistan live in urban or 
peri-urban areas and depend on day labor to survive, so relocating 
to a remote rural area would be difficult.  This group is literally 
the poorest of the poor, with a greater number of young children 
than in past returnee populations. 
 
Security and Economic Concerns 
------------------------------ 
 
¶7. (SBU) UNHCR reports that Pakistani officials appeared surprised 
by UNHCR's estimates that anywhere from 50-80% of recently 
repatriated Afghans have since returned illegally to Pakistan for 
employment.  These officials acknowledged privately that keeping 
registered Afghans in clearly designated camps is better than having 
illegal immigrants dispersed throughout the country.  UNHCR Kabul 
has also heard that the GOP wants to clear all camps within a 14 km 
radius of any sensitive installation, including water and electrical 
plants.  Theoretically, closing camps near sensitive installations 
could mean an additional 250,000 individuals would repatriate but we 
believe that Pakistan will not follow through on this idea.  On the 
economic front, many contacts believe that if most Afghans 
repatriated precipitously, many sectors of Pakistan's economy would 
suffer a very heavy blow, especially agriculture, construction, 
carpet work, investment, and real estate. 
 
Returns May Not Be As High As Predicted 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) We believe the numbers cited in all scenarios would be 
somewhat lower but understand UNHCR's need to plan for the 
worst-case scenario.  Approximately 30% of Jalozai residents have 
already returned to Afghanistan after belated attempts last year to 
close the camp, and attempts to close Pir Alizai and Girdi Jungle 
camps could be as unsuccessful in 2008 as they were in 2007.  Camp 
residents may choose to relocate within Pakistan or simply disappear 
into the underground economy, although rising food and fuel prices 
make it more difficult to survive outside a camp environment. 
 
UNCHR's Plan: Push Back but Consider Camps 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶9. (SBU) The next Afghan/Pak/UNHCR Tripartite Commission meeting 
will take place at the end of March, where UNHCR expects the GOP to 
identify additional camps for closure, which the Afghan government 
and UNHCR will oppose.  There was some concern that Pakistan would 
resist naming specific camps until shortly before closure to prevent 
residents from organizing protests and blocking closure, but recent 
assurances by GOP authorities claim all new closures will be agreed 
 
upon by the Tripartite.  UNHCR will not assist in any closures or 
repatriation efforts not discussed within the Tripartite context. 
Afghan authorities will push for a gradual approach and stress that 
a massive refugee influx could cause tension, violence, and economic 
disruption. 
 
¶10. (SBU) In a striking departure, UNHCR also said it might consider 
"alternative infrastructure", i.e., temporary camps within 
Afghanistan, which have been heretofore anathema to their mission 
here.  With landlessness a major problem, however, camps may have to 
be an option. 
 
NGOs and Donors Slow to Commit Resources 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) NGOs were reluctant to commit resources to a contingency 
plan until they were sure of funding sources. ECHO and Embassy PRM 
and USAID/OFDA Officers (the only donors present at a recent 
planning meeting) could only reiterate our 2008 funding priorities 
and deadlines.  NGOs noted USAID's involvement would be particularly 
useful, with its more flexible and robust funding.  ECHO said it 
would reserve 1-1.5 million euros to react to a possible summer 
surge of repatriation.  PRM has no current ability to reserve funds 
for mid-year distribution but it may be helpful to build geographic 
flexibility into regional projects. 
 
Afghan Capacity Not Up to the Challenge 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) Notably absent in the discussions were the Afghan 
government entities responsible for handling repatriation and 
emergency response.  These organizations proved themselves inept in 
handling this winter's weather crisis and will no doubt lean heavily 
on the international community for support.  With additional forced 
repatriation from Iran and likely spring floods following the heavy 
snowfall this year, we expect a busy humanitarian season, with 
continuing inadequate Afghan leadership on the issue. 
 
¶13. (U) Embassy Islamabad cleared this cable. 
 
WOOD