VZCZCXRO4838
PP RUEHCHI RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHJA #0526/01 0740919
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 140919Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8334
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 000526 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EAT/MTS; EAP/RSP; INP; IO/T; PM/NE 
DEPT ALSO FOR OES/STC; OES/EGC 
DEPT PASS TO DOE/NNSA/OFFICE OF THE SECOND LINE OF DEFENSE 
DEPT ALSO PASS TO DOE/NA-25 
SINGAPORE FOR DHS/COAST GUARD/PPURGANAN AND SSTOERMER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON ETRD EWWT ID KNNP KTIA PREL TRGY
SUBJECT: UPDATE ON MEGAPORT INITIATIVE IN INDONESIA 
 
REF: A) STATE 13447 B) 04 JAKARTA 4840 C) STATE 
 
     107497 D) JAKARTA 01714 
 
(SBU) Summary and Action Request: Indonesian Foreign Ministry 
officials told us that the Government of Indonesia (GOI) is 
still developing its position on the Megaports Initiative. 
They presented to us a list of concerns, which they have 
submitted to the Foreign Minister for his guidance on next 
steps.  Director for North and Central American Affairs Harry 
Purwanto agreed to meet with Department of Energy (DOE) 
representatives to further the discussion.  ACTION REQUEST: 
Embassy requests that DOE recommend a  date for meeting with 
the Indonesian Foreign Ministry in Jakarta to discuss 
Megaports concerns if agreeable.  End Summary. 
 
Megaports Still Under Consideration But Concerns Remain 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) In a meeting with Deputy Director at the Directorate 
for International Security and Disarmament Andy Rachmianto, 
he said that the Foreign Ministry is coordinating with 
interested ministries on this issue and that they had not 
reached consensus.  He shared the concerns of this group and 
emphasized that they did not originate from the Foreign 
Ministry alone, but from various agencies.  He said that the 
Foreign Ministry was a key player in the discussions, 
however.  Rachmianto told us that the GOI would take its time 
in examining all initiatives presented by foreign nations and 
that the USG should not expect a quick response.  He added 
that the Foreign Ministry office dealing with the Megaports 
Initiative is understaffed. 
 
- Rachmianto told us they had reviewed 2005-6 U.S. Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) reports on the Megaports 
Initiative and learned that the GAO had asked the DOE to 
study criticisms about delays in cargo shipments from some 
countries that had established Megaports programs. 
 
- When a GOI study team visited the port in Surabaya, East 
Java, they learned that it takes approximately 8-10 minutes 
to scan a container using a general scanner and that the port 
processes 12,000 containers daily.  Tanjung Priok, the site 
selected by DOE for installation of Megaports equipment, 
processes 50,000 containers daily and the GOI worries that 
Megaports may cause significant delays in cargo shipment 
flows.  He added that cargo shipments from Indonesia to the 
U.S. are overwhelmingly consolidated in Singapore, which is 
already equipped with Megaports scanners. 
 
- Rachmianto said that Indonesia is neither producing nor 
exporting nuclear materials; therefore, the country is not a 
high risk for nuclear proliferation.  He said Indonesia is 
importing nuclear materials for peaceful purposes under very 
special arrangements managed by their nuclear regulatory 
agencies. 
 
- He said that dual use nuclear materials present a special 
problem.  According to him, the detection of these materials 
depends heavily on intelligence, particularly in determining 
whether the use is licit or illicit.  If the shipper had 
proper documentation and could demonstrate a legitimate use 
of dual use nuclear materials, then the GOI would not 
interfere.  He said that the obligation to share data under 
the Megaports Initiative is problematic because, according to 
GOI intelligence agencies, it may require sharing classified 
 
information related to dual use materials with the USG. 
 
- Rachmianto said that currently there is no legal regime for 
dealing with the trafficking of nuclear materials in 
Indonesia unless there is a clear connection to terrorism. 
 
- He said that the Indonesian Customs agency is starting to 
use gamma ray scanners to detect radioactive material so the 
need for other types of nuclear material detection equipment 
was reduced.  He did not know where the scanners were 
manufactured, but said that customs officials were scheduled 
to attend training in the U.S. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Minhajudin Napsah at Indonesian Customs Directorate 
of Prevention and Enforcement told us that the gamma ray 
scanners referred to by Rachmianto are the Mobile Vehicle and 
Cargo Inspection System.  He described it as a gamma ray 
system designed as a tool to conduct non-intrusive 
inspections of the contents of trucks, containers, cargo and 
passenger vehicles for explosive devices and contraband.  The 
 
JAKARTA 00000526  002 OF 002 
 
 
manufacturer is Safety and Security Instruments of San Diego, 
California. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Purwanto and his Deputy Trini Gunarti told us in a 
meeting on March 11, 2008 that they would welcome a meeting 
with DOE representatives to discuss the GOI's concerns. 
Purwanto said it was his personal opinion that the objections 
to the Megaports Initiative were not political in nature, but 
involved practical considerations.  He mentioned as an 
example that Indonesia has no law to criminalize trafficking 
of nuclear materials.  He inquired about an invitation for 
GOI officials to visit Bangkok to observe an implemented 
Megaports program. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Embassy is prepared to facilitate further 
discussions on this issue between the GOI and DOE 
representatives. 
HUME