VZCZCXYZ5260
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHJA #0445/01 0640953
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 040953Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8219
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
RUEHHE/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI 0910
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 2117
RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 3368
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 2070
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC

UNCLAS JAKARTA 000445 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
AIDAC 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/MTS, DS/IP/EAP, DS/DSS, INR/EAP and INL 
DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS AID 
USAID FOR ANE/EAA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PINR PINS PREL MARR ECON ASEC SOCI ID
SUBJECT: Five ex-GAM killed in Aceh attack 
 
¶1. (U) Summary. In the worst single incident of violence since the 
signing of the Helsinki Peace MoU, at least 5 former GAM members 
were killed on March 1 in an attack on a local office in Central 
Aceh. The attack followed a series of clashes between former-GAM 
members and supporters of a local gang with minor links to 
ex-anti-separatist militia. Governor Irwandi has urged all parties 
to exercise restraint, and GAM commanders have ordered their members 
to remain calm and avoid "throwing gasoline on the fire." The 
situation in central Aceh remains calm, but tense. End Summary. 
 
KPA Office Attacked 
------------------- 
¶2. (U) Shortly after midnight on March 1, a mob attacked and burned 
the KPA office in Sangoeh Ilang, Central Aceh, some 30 km from 
Takengon. (Note: KPA is an organization created by GAM after the 
Helsinki MoU to represent former GAM members. It is based on the old 
GAM structure and hierarchy.) Several GAM members were killed in the 
attack. By mid morning, false rumors spread that KPA members from 
around the province were coming to Central Aceh to seek revenge, and 
the police set up roadblocks to keep them out. In the days following 
the attack the atmosphere in Central Aceh was quiet and tense. Shops 
in some parts of the city, particularly around the bus station, 
remained closed throughout the weekend. 
 
How Many Victims? 
----------------- 
¶3. (U) There are conflicting reports of the number of people killed 
in the attack. Provincial authorities cited by the press claim that 
six people were killed. Meanwhile, Central Aceh Police Chief Agus 
Kewadar told Consulate Medan that only five persons were killed, 
four of whom were burned to death and a fifth who died of stab 
wounds and was dumped in a well. KPA members disagree and insist 
that the number is actually higher. One KPA member in Takengon told 
the press that at least nine people were killed and several more 
severely injured. KPA spokesman Ibrahim KBS in Banda Aceh told 
Consulate Medan that he could only confirm 5 dead at present but he 
expected the number to go up because several supporters in central 
Aceh were not yet accounted for. 
 
Government's Response 
--------------------- 
¶4. (SBU) Governor Irwandi Yusuf and other provincial officials have 
called on all parties to remain calm. Provincial Police Chief 
Rismawan has promised that justice will be served and asked people 
to wait for his men to conduct a complete investigation. So far, the 
only provincial official known to travel to the area is former 
Governor Azwar Abubakar from the Aceh Reintegration Agency who went 
to Central Aceh to meet with victims and their families. In Jakarta, 
staff from the Aceh Desk at the Ministry of Politics and Security 
told Medan that the ministry would be holding meetings on Tuesday, 
March 4 to discuss the situation. 
 
Chronology 
---------- 
¶5. (U) On February 29, after a series of skirmishes between former 
GAM members (KPA) and a local gang (IPT) over control of the 
Takengon city bus terminal, the police chiefs from both Central Aceh 
district and its district capital, Takengon city, invited KPA and 
IPT members to a meeting to discuss the situation. Before the 
meeting started, a crowd of IPT supporters attacked the five KPA 
representatives, beating one of them severely before the police were 
able to get the situation under control.  During the conflict, IPT 
was closely affiliated with the Pemuda Pancasila youth organization 
but lacked both weapons and significant political power. Some IPT 
members were also involved with the anti-separatist militia PETA 
(Pembela Tanah Air, Defenders of the Homeland). 
 
¶6. (U) Upon learning of the attack on the five representatives, 
local KPA sent two truckloads of supporters into the city. Before 
additional clashes broke out, however, the regent and police chief 
intervened and convinced both sides to participate in a dialogue. 
The dialogue continued until after 10:00pm on February 29 and 
resulted in an agreement to abstain from additional violence. The 
attack on the KPA office occurred several hours later, shortly after 
midnight. 
 
KPA's Reaction 
-------------- 
¶7. (SBU) Senior KPA officials insist that they are keeping their men 
under control and that they are waiting for the police to conduct 
their investigation. Top KPA commander Muzakir Manaf told consulate 
Medan that GAM members would have flooded into Central Aceh but he 
and other commanders had forbidden them from doing so to avoid 
pouring "gasoline on the fire." Ibrahim KBS, KPA spokesman, added 
that allowing KPA supporters to go to Takengon would have been a 
fatal mistake, leading to an unpredictable cycle of violence which 
could not be controlled. Both Muzakir and Ibrahim told Medan that 
KPA will wait for the authorities to act. The organization is 
holding an emergency meeting in Banda Aceh on Tuesday to discuss the 
incident. 
 
¶8. (U) In a statement circulated by Ibrahim, KPA leaders took a 
harsher line. The statement said the attack in Central Aceh was a 
provocation designed to elicit a strong response which could be used 
to renew the conflict. They called upon the police to investigate 
the incident thoroughly, warning that failure to do so could unleash 
waves of retribution and chaos. Do not be surprised, the statement 
warned ominously, if the government and the law ultimately fail to 
act, that other parties resort to unlawful actions themselves. 
 
¶9. (SBU) The police may find it politically difficult to meet KPA's 
expectations. KPA clearly blames former PETA members for the attack 
and expects the police to identify and punish the mastermind behind 
the act. PETA and the former anti-separatist militias are still 
powerful in the area (the regent of neighboring Nagan Raya district, 
for example, was a former militia leader), however, and the police 
may find it difficult to confront the organization head on.  KPA 
members have long claimed that the police throughout the province 
refuse to crack down on criminals with ties to the former 
anti-separatist militia because of their history of cooperation 
during the conflict. Now, Ibrahim, the KPA spokesman, told Consulate 
Medan, is the police's chance to prove they are impartial and fair. 
 
 
Role of the Police 
------------------ 
¶10. (SBU) Although they blame ex-militia for the attack, KPA leaders 
imply strongly that elements within the police may have been 
complicit. Specifically, KPA has pointed to several incidents where 
they accuse the police of either failing to act or acting 
improperly: at the initial reconciliation meeting when police failed 
to prevent KPA members from being assaulted, at the second 
reconciliation meeting when police ordered KPA to send its 
supporters out of the city while allowing hundreds of IPT supporters 
to gather, and during the attack itself.  Other observers seem to 
share that view as well. In the words of Stephen Almsteier, the 
Safety and Security Coordinator for the Aceh Reconstruction and 
Rehabilitation Agency, "there would be no need to call for police 
action now if the armed police at both incidents had taken some sort 
of action at the time." 
 
¶11. (SBU) Despite evidence to the contrary, authorities are labeling 
the attack as a simple criminal incident unrelated to other matters 
and strenuously resist linking the attack to former militia members. 
District Police Chief Agus Budi Kawedar told Consulate Medan that 
"there is no connection at all" between the attack on the KPA office 
and the incidents at the bus terminal. That situation, he said, "has 
been fully resolved." 
 
¶12. (SBU) Kawedar also disagrees that the police could have done 
more to prevent the attack. The village where the attack occurred is 
about 1.5 hours driving from Takengon, he said, and the location 
only has a small police post with seven personnel. He added that 
only three police were on duty at the time of the incident on March 
1, too few to stand against such a large mob. Kawedar emphasized 
that his men are conducting a thorough investigation and that they 
have already located 12 witnesses, including one whose identity has 
not yet been disclosed. He hopes the motive for the incident can be 
announced in the next 2 or 3 days. 
 
Impact on the Peace Process 
--------------------------- 
¶13. (SBU) Unless this incident is successfully resolved, it could 
further erode former combatants' confidence in the police and give 
them a specific grievance against them. It could also lead ex-GAM in 
certain areas to seek weapons for self-defense. Gen. Amiruddin, the 
Ministry of Peace and Security's senior representative in Aceh, told 
Consulate Medan that he believes the greatest risk right now is that 
KPA members will carry out revenge attacks, triggering a cycle of 
retribution which will be hard to stop. His greatest priority, he 
said, was to support the police and "boost their credibility" so 
that KPA members did not feel obligated to take matters into their 
own hands. At the same time, he said, he is communicating quietly 
with senior KPA representatives to keep them on board with the 
process. 
 
¶14. (SBU) Some observers are linking this incident with recent 
initiatives to divide the province. Governor Irwandi Yusuf 
acknowledged those concerns to the press and cited them as a key 
reason for the police to conduct a thorough investigation. Numerous 
KPA/GAM leaders are on record stating that dividing the province 
would be a grave violation of the Helsinki MoU and that to do so 
would jeopardize the peace process. Hume