VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHIT #0128/01 0731225
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 131225Z MAR 08
FM AMCONSUL ISTANBUL
TO RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 7530
RUEHNC/AMEMBASSY NICOSIA PRIORITY 0785
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7949

UNCLAS ISTANBUL 000128 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL TU CY
SUBJECT: TURKISH CYPRIOT ENVOY EAGER TO START SUBSTANTIVE 
TALKS 
 
------------ 
Summary 
------------ 
 
¶1. (SBU) The election of Cypriot President Demertis 
Christofias provides an opportunity to resolve the Cyprus 
Problem according to both Turkish Cypriot Special Envoy 
Kurtaly Erk and DAS Matt Bryza in a March 2 meeting in 
Istanbul.  Erk stated that "President" Talat is ready to 
begin negotiations under UN sponsorship using the basic 
concepts of the Annan Plan as a starting point.  Erk warned 
that the Turkish Cypriots (T/Cs) are losing patience with 
the peace process and that open ended talks that fail to 
produce concrete results would increase the possibility of 
a permanent partition of the island. Both Bryza and Erk 
agreed that ending the isolation of the T/Cs will be a 
positive step.  Erk stated that existing confidence 
building measures on the island has been generally 
successful, and he provided additional measures that should 
be undertaken. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
New Prospects for a Settlement 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" Special 
Envoy Kurtaly Erk and EUR DAS Matt Bryza were both hopeful 
regarding prospects for a settlement on the Cyprus Issue 
during a March 2 meeting, noting the election of Demetris 
Christofias as president of Cyprus presents a new 
opportunity for reunification.  Erk added that "President" 
Talat has had good communication with Christofias and the 
exit of former President Papadopoulos removes a significant 
obstacle towards a settlement. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Erk stated that Talat is ready to begin 
negotiation without preconditions under UN auspices.  The 
basic components of the Annan plan"a bi-zonal, bi-communal 
federation with two equal  "constituent states" should be the 
vision for these talks.  Erk stressed that the report 
submitted by then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in May 
2004 should be approved.  Bryza 
questioned the logic of embracing a plan name that has a 
strong 
negative connotation for the Greek Cypriots (G/Cs).  Erk 
acknowledged this, suggesting that using a such as "body of 
work" 
might be more palatable for the G/Cs. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Erk stated the importance of the "convergence" of 
two states to create a "virgin birth" for the Turkish 
Cypriots (T/Cs).  Similar to the terms of the failed 
referendum in 2004, the G/Cs need only to recognize the 
"TRNC" for an instant, according to Erk. The new state 
would maintain all the current treaty commitments of the 
ROC. 
 
-------------------------------- 
"No Talks for Talk,s Sake" 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) Erk stressed that real progress must be realized 
during these negotiations. Failures of the past have only 
frustrated T/C public opinion.  Both sides need to conduct 
results-oriented negotiations, with target dates, or better 
yet deadlines.  Open ended talks will only be for talk,s 
sake, and thus be counterproductive, according to Erk. 
Before the talks begin, the parties need to establish a 
"deadlock resolving mechanism" to overcome anticipated 
impasses.  Erk suggested drawing from US, UN, or EU 
experiences in order to establish this mechanism. Erk 
complained that the July 8 Agreement failed to work because 
it was an open-ended negotiation that failed to set target 
dates or action plans.  If the G/Cs insist on using July 8 
working groups to set the stage for comprehensive 
settlement talks, Talat can agree.  However, that 
preparatory period should last no longer than two and 
one-half months, according to Erk. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
Divorce Becoming More Likely if No Progress Toward Agreement 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) Erk stressed that his "government" is completely 
focused on a one-state solution; however the reality of the 
situation might force irreconcilable divorce. Turkish 
Cypriot frustration over Greek Cypriot intransigence and 
failed promises from the international community have 
clearly dampened public enthusiasm for reunification in the 
north.  Bryza worried that some T/C and G/C opinion polls 
showed increasing support for a two state solution, however 
 
Erk admitted there remains a strong desire for reunification, 
frustrations notwithstanding.  Renewed talks would again 
increase expectations for a settlement, and another failure 
could cause the T/Cs to forever turn away from 
reunification.    Bryza stated that these facts on the ground 
will hopefully push the G/Cs to embrace a lasting 
one-state settlement. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
End the Isolation of the "TRNC" 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) Erk argued that ending the economic isolation of 
the T/C community could increase the likelihood for 
reunification, as well as ease eventual integration after a 
prospective settlement.  Bryza agreed, and added that 
economic disparity had been one of the greatest problems 
after the reunification of Germany.  Erk lamented that the 
biggest obstacle to the T/C,s economic development could be 
easily solved by "a man with a stamp," referring to the 
issue of certificates of origin for Turkish Cypriot-produced 
goods. Before 1995 the "TRNC"  was able to trade directly 
with EU nations, but since then  administrative requirements 
have effectively isolated the T/Cs.  Bryza noted that trade 
with the EU is far more important economically for the T/Cs 
than is trade with the U.S. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Trade between the T/Cs and G/Cs through the Green 
Line is fairly small and has limited utility, according to 
Erk. He complained that the T/Cs cannot advertise their 
products in the south, while the G/Cs frequently advertise 
in the north.  Bryza asked Erk whether pushing for direct 
flights to Ercan Airport is worth the effort  given the 
limited 
commercial demand for flights to Western Europe. In 
comparison, 
the issue of certificates of origin has far greater potential 
to assist 
the T/Cs, economic development.  Erk countered that direct 
flights 
remain important to the T/Cs. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
Confidence Building Measures 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) Erk noted the significance of confidence building 
measures (CBMs), both to push the negotiations forward and 
to provide practical benefits to all the residents of the 
island. Successful past examples include deconfliction, 
demining, and the property commission.  Deconfliction, 
including banning military exercises near the Green Line, 
has reduced tensions.  Removing land mines around the Green 
Line is another positive; however more financial resources 
are needed to enable the T/Cs to continue this process. 
The existing property commission has already received about 
300 applicants, of which 30 cases have been settled, two of 
which resulted in restitution, according to Erk. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Erk also provided examples of CBMs that could be 
undertaken, such as sharing law enforcement/judicial 
information.  The tragic case of a triple murder committed 
in the south, where the murder suspect fled to the north 
highlights the need for greater cooperation, he argued. 
Erk contrasted this with past assistance that Scotland Yard 
has given to T/C authorities. Cooperating on fighting human 
trafficking was another suggested CBM. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Erk stated that the "TRNC" is ready to open 
additional crossings across the Green Line, including at 
Ledra Street.   While the "TRNC" was ready to do this prior 
to the election, Erk said confidentially that Talat had waited 
to move on Ledra until after the ROC,s presidential 
election. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
Other Issues 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) Erk stated that the EU needs to make Turkish an 
official language.  Besides the obvious symbolic benefit 
for the T/Cs, this measure also has important practical 
implications since current EU regulations require foreign 
workers to speak two EU official languages.  This current 
situation places T/C workers at a comparative disadvantage 
since they need to speak two languages in addition to their 
mother tongue. 
 
¶13. (SBU) Another critical issue for the T/Cs, according to 
Erk, is representation in the European Parliament. Erk 
stated that it was "torture" to watch the G/Cs "invade and 
 
occupy" the T/Cs, two seats.  Erk noted the difficulties of 
the T/Cs gaining full representation; however observer 
status in the parliament would be acceptable. 
 
¶14. (SBU) In a response to a question asked by Bryza, Erk 
stated that Talat has freedom to negotiate with the G/Cs 
and is not controlled by Ankara.  Finally, Erk thanked 
Bryza for the US,s continuing support for seeking a lasting 
settlement of this problem.  He also wanted to extend his 
thanks to Embassy Nicosia for their efforts in this matter. 
Bryza thanked Erk for his words and his direct and honest 
approach to seek a settlement. 
 
15 (U) DAS Bryza has cleared this message. 
WIENER