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Viewing cable 08HELSINKI126, FINLAND BEGINS EDGING TOWARD THE NRF

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08HELSINKI126 2008-03-19 12:42 2011-04-24 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Helsinki
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHHE #0126 0791242
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 191242Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4165
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L HELSINKI 000126 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/15/2016 
TAGS: PGOV MARR PREL MOPS FI
SUBJECT: FINLAND BEGINS EDGING TOWARD THE NRF 
 
 
Classified By: Polchief Gregory Thome, Reasons 1.4 b,d. 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY: President Halonen has authorized the GoF to 
make an official statement of interest in eventual NRF 
participation.  This is a welcome and necessary first step, 
and we hope the Finns will deliver their official 
notification to NATO before the Bucharest Summit.  However, 
in practice we should not expect to see Finnish troops under 
NRF command any time before 2010.  The decision to begin 
exploring the NRF process enjoys strong support within 
government, but the President and many others remain 
uncomfortable with the idea of Finnish troops' participation 
in actual NRF.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (SBU) On March 7, President Tarja Halonen and the Cabinet 
Subcommittee for Foreign and Security Policy (UTVA) granted 
approval for the GoF to officially inform NATO of Finland's 
interest in participating in the NATO Response Force (NRF). 
Although the Government must still engage in consultations 
with Parliament's Defense and Foreign Affairs Committees, 
support for informing NATO of Finnish interest is strong. 
The Defense Committee Chairman publicly announced his support 
on March 15, and the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee 
told PolChief that his committee would give the green light 
in time for Finland to officially inform NATO before the 
Bucharest Summit. 
 
3. (C) This said, the exact nature and timing of Finland's 
participation is still a long way from being determined.  The 
GoF and Halonen are nowhere close to reaching consensus 
regarding the types or numbers of forces they might offer; 
which NRF rotation they might eventually join; or even, 
according to some outspoken politicians, whether Finland will 
ever actually allow troops to participate in NRF rotations or 
operations.  President Halonen, in particular, remains very 
skeptical of placing Finnish troops under NRF command.  Even 
though she authorized an expression of interest, she still 
opposes, at this stage, Finland's being involved in actual 
NRF operations.  Kanerva, Defense Minister Jyri Hakamies and 
Finland's senior military officers believe that as the 
process advances, they will be able to convince Halonen and 
other skeptics of the advantages of full NRF participation. 
In fact, Finnish diplomats and military planners have 
suggested that the NRF's Danish-led 14th Rotation in 2010 
might represent a good first opportunity, since the Finnish 
Defense Forces (FDF) -- and, more importantly, Finnish public 
opinion -- are comfortable working with the Danes.  However, 
our contacts hastily add that such a suggestion is premature, 
and would require an entirely separate approval from the 
President. 
 
4. (C) COMMENT: Halonen's decision is a welcome first step 
and, we understand, a necessary one to help NATO begin the 
process of formally authorizing Partnership-for-Peace (PfP) 
nations to participate in NRF operations.  And although she 
still opposes actual participation in NRF ops, her thinking 
on the NRF is clearly evolving in a positive direction.  Two 
years ago, during her successful re-election bid, Candidate 
Halonen stated quite clearly that she opposed any Finnish 
involvement in the NRF and, if elected, would not approve it. 
 Now, she has taken the important step of at least permitting 
Finland to express an interest despite her personal 
reservations.  It is too early now to know whether she will 
"come around" in time for the Finns to join the Danish-led 
14th NRF Rotation, but it is certainly not out of the 
question.  END COMMENT. 
WARE