Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 143912 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AORC AS AF AM AJ ASEC AU AMGT APER ACOA ASEAN AG AFFAIRS AR AFIN ABUD AO AEMR ADANA AMED AADP AINF ARF ADB ACS AE AID AL AC AGR ABLD AMCHAMS AECL AINT AND ASIG AUC APECO AFGHANISTAN AY ARABL ACAO ANET AFSN AZ AFLU ALOW ASSK AFSI ACABQ AMB APEC AIDS AA ATRN AMTC AVIATION AESC ASSEMBLY ADPM ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG AGOA ASUP AFPREL ARNOLD ADCO AN ACOTA AODE AROC AMCHAM AT ACKM ASCH AORCUNGA AVIANFLU AVIAN AIT ASECPHUM ATRA AGENDA AIN AFINM APCS AGENGA ABDALLAH ALOWAR AFL AMBASSADOR ARSO AGMT ASPA AOREC AGAO ARR AOMS ASC ALIREZA AORD AORG ASECVE ABER ARABBL ADM AMER ALVAREZ AORCO ARM APERTH AINR AGRI ALZUGUREN ANGEL ACDA AEMED ARC AMGMT AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL ASECAFINGMGRIZOREPTU ABMC AIAG ALJAZEERA ASR ASECARP ALAMI APRM ASECM AMPR AEGR AUSTRALIAGROUP ASE AMGTHA ARNOLDFREDERICK AIDAC AOPC ANTITERRORISM ASEG AMIA ASEX AEMRBC AFOR ABT AMERICA AGENCIES AGS ADRC ASJA AEAID ANARCHISTS AME AEC ALNEA AMGE AMEDCASCKFLO AK ANTONIO ASO AFINIZ ASEDC AOWC ACCOUNT ACTION AMG AFPK AOCR AMEDI AGIT ASOC ACOAAMGT AMLB AZE AORCYM AORL AGRICULTURE ACEC AGUILAR ASCC AFSA ASES ADIP ASED ASCE ASFC ASECTH AFGHAN ANTXON APRC AFAF AFARI ASECEFINKCRMKPAOPTERKHLSAEMRNS AX ALAB ASECAF ASA ASECAFIN ASIC AFZAL AMGTATK ALBE AMT AORCEUNPREFPRELSMIGBN AGUIRRE AAA ABLG ARCH AGRIC AIHRC ADEL AMEX ALI AQ ATFN AORCD ARAS AINFCY AFDB ACBAQ AFDIN AOPR AREP ALEXANDER ALANAZI ABDULRAHMEN ABDULHADI ATRD AEIR AOIC ABLDG AFR ASEK AER ALOUNI AMCT AVERY ASECCASC ARG APR AMAT AEMRS AFU ATPDEA ALL ASECE ANDREW
EAIR ECON ETRD EAGR EAID EFIN ETTC ENRG EMIN ECPS EG EPET EINV ELAB EU ECONOMICS EC EZ EUN EN ECIN EWWT EXTERNAL ENIV ES ESA ELN EFIS EIND EPA ELTN EXIM ET EINT EI ER EAIDAF ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECTRD EUR ECOWAS ECUN EBRD ECONOMIC ENGR ECONOMY EFND ELECTIONS EPECO EUMEM ETMIN EXBS EAIRECONRP ERTD EAP ERGR EUREM EFI EIB ENGY ELNTECON EAIDXMXAXBXFFR ECOSOC EEB EINF ETRN ENGRD ESTH ENRC EXPORT EK ENRGMO ECO EGAD EXIMOPIC ETRDPGOV EURM ETRA ENERG ECLAC EINO ENVIRONMENT EFIC ECIP ETRDAORC ENRD EMED EIAR ECPN ELAP ETCC EAC ENEG ESCAP EWWC ELTD ELA EIVN ELF ETR EFTA EMAIL EL EMS EID ELNT ECPSN ERIN ETT EETC ELAN ECHEVARRIA EPWR EVIN ENVR ENRGJM ELBR EUC EARG EAPC EICN EEC EREL EAIS ELBA EPETUN EWWY ETRDGK EV EDU EFN EVN EAIDETRD ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ ETEX ESCI EAIDHO EENV ETRC ESOC EINDQTRD EINVA EFLU EGEN ECE EAGRBN EON EFINECONCS EIAD ECPC ENV ETDR EAGER ETRDKIPR EWT EDEV ECCP ECCT EARI EINVECON ED ETRDEC EMINETRD EADM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID ETAD ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA EMINECINECONSENVTBIONS ESSO ETRG ELAM ECA EENG EITC ENG ERA EPSC ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EIPR ELABPGOVBN EURFOR ETRAD EUE EISNLN ECONETRDBESPAR ELAINE EGOVSY EAUD EAGRECONEINVPGOVBN EINVETRD EPIN ECONENRG EDRC ESENV EB ENER ELTNSNAR EURN ECONPGOVBN ETTF ENVT EPIT ESOCI EFINOECD ERD EDUC EUM ETEL EUEAID ENRGY ETD EAGRE EAR EAIDMG EE EET ETER ERICKSON EIAID EX EAG EBEXP ESTN EAIDAORC EING EGOV EEOC EAGRRP EVENTS ENRGKNNPMNUCPARMPRELNPTIAEAJMXL ETRDEMIN EPETEIND EAIDRW ENVI ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC EDUARDO EGAR EPCS EPRT EAIDPHUMPRELUG EPTED ETRB EPETPGOV ECONQH EAIDS EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR EAGRBTIOBEXPETRDBN ESF EINR ELABPHUMSMIGKCRMBN EIDN ETRK ESTRADA EXEC EAIO EGHG ECN EDA ECOS EPREL EINVKSCA ENNP ELABV ETA EWWTPRELPGOVMASSMARRBN EUCOM EAIDASEC ENR END EP ERNG ESPS EITI EINTECPS EAVI ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID ELTRN EADI ELDIN ELND ECRM EINVEFIN EAOD EFINTS EINDIR ENRGKNNP ETRDEIQ ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD EAIT ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ EWWI ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEAIR ECONEFIN EHUM EFNI EOXC EISNAR ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM EMW ETIO ETRDGR EMN EXO EATO EWTR ELIN EAGREAIDPGOVPRELBN EINVETC ETTD EIQ ECONCS EPPD ESS EUEAGR ENRGIZ EISL EUNJ EIDE ENRGSD ELAD ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO ENTG ETRDECD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS
KPKO KIPR KWBG KPAL KDEM KTFN KNNP KGIC KTIA KCRM KDRG KWMN KJUS KIDE KSUM KTIP KFRD KMCA KMDR KCIP KTDB KPAO KPWR KOMC KU KIRF KCOR KHLS KISL KSCA KGHG KS KSTH KSEP KE KPAI KWAC KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KPRP KVPR KAWC KUNR KZ KPLS KN KSTC KMFO KID KNAR KCFE KRIM KFLO KCSA KG KFSC KSCI KFLU KMIG KRVC KV KVRP KMPI KNEI KAPO KOLY KGIT KSAF KIRC KNSD KBIO KHIV KHDP KBTR KHUM KSAC KACT KRAD KPRV KTEX KPIR KDMR KMPF KPFO KICA KWMM KICC KR KCOM KAID KINR KBCT KOCI KCRS KTER KSPR KDP KFIN KCMR KMOC KUWAIT KIPRZ KSEO KLIG KWIR KISM KLEG KTBD KCUM KMSG KMWN KREL KPREL KAWK KIMT KCSY KESS KWPA KNPT KTBT KCROM KPOW KFTN KPKP KICR KGHA KOMS KJUST KREC KOC KFPC KGLB KMRS KTFIN KCRCM KWNM KHGH KRFD KY KGCC KFEM KVIR KRCM KEMR KIIP KPOA KREF KJRE KRKO KOGL KSCS KGOV KCRIM KEM KCUL KRIF KCEM KITA KCRN KCIS KSEAO KWMEN KEANE KNNC KNAP KEDEM KNEP KHPD KPSC KIRP KUNC KALM KCCP KDEN KSEC KAYLA KIMMITT KO KNUC KSIA KLFU KLAB KTDD KIRCOEXC KECF KIPRETRDKCRM KNDP KIRCHOFF KJAN KFRDSOCIRO KWMNSMIG KEAI KKPO KPOL KRD KWMNPREL KATRINA KBWG KW KPPD KTIAEUN KDHS KRV KBTS KWCI KICT KPALAOIS KPMI KWN KTDM KWM KLHS KLBO KDEMK KT KIDS KWWW KLIP KPRM KSKN KTTB KTRD KNPP KOR KGKG KNN KTIAIC KSRE KDRL KVCORR KDEMGT KOMO KSTCC KMAC KSOC KMCC KCHG KSEPCVIS KGIV KPO KSEI KSTCPL KSI KRMS KFLOA KIND KPPAO KCM KRFR KICCPUR KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KFAM KWWMN KENV KGH KPOP KFCE KNAO KTIAPARM KWMNKDEM KDRM KNNNP KEVIN KEMPI KWIM KGCN KUM KMGT KKOR KSMT KISLSCUL KNRV KPRO KOMCSG KLPM KDTB KFGM KCRP KAUST KNNPPARM KUNH KWAWC KSPA KTSC KUS KSOCI KCMA KTFR KPAOPREL KNNPCH KWGB KSTT KNUP KPGOV KUK KMNP KPAS KHMN KPAD KSTS KCORR KI KLSO KWNN KNP KPTD KESO KMPP KEMS KPAONZ KPOV KTLA KPAOKMDRKE KNMP KWMNCI KWUN KRDP KWKN KPAOY KEIM KGICKS KIPT KREISLER KTAO KJU KLTN KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KQ KWPR KSCT KGHGHIV KEDU KRCIM KFIU KWIC KNNO KILS KTIALG KNNA KMCAJO KINP KRM KLFLO KPA KOMCCO KKIV KHSA KDM KRCS KWBGSY KISLAO KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KCRI KX KWWT KPAM KVRC KERG KK KSUMPHUM KACP KSLG KIF KIVP KHOURY KNPR KUNRAORC KCOG KCFC KWMJN KFTFN KTFM KPDD KMPIO KCERS KDUM KDEMAF KMEPI KHSL KEPREL KAWX KIRL KNNR KOMH KMPT KISLPINR KADM KPER KTPN KSCAECON KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KCSI KNRG KAKA KFRP KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KQM KQRDQ KWBC KMRD KVBL KOM KMPL KEDM KFLD KPRD KRGY KNNF KPROG KIFR KPOKO KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KHIB KOEM KDDG KCGC
PGOV PREL PK PTER PINR PO PHUM PARM PREF PINF PRL PM PINS PROP PALESTINIAN PE PBTS PNAT PHSA PL PA PSEPC POSTS POLITICS POLICY POL PU PAHO PHUMPGOV PGOG PARALYMPIC PGOC PNR PREFA PMIL POLITICAL PROV PRUM PBIO PAK POV POLG PAR POLM PHUMPREL PKO PUNE PROG PEL PROPERTY PKAO PRE PSOE PHAS PNUM PGOVE PY PIRF PRES POWELL PP PREM PCON PGOVPTER PGOVPREL PODC PTBS PTEL PGOVTI PHSAPREL PD PG PRC PVOV PLO PRELL PEPFAR PREK PEREZ PINT POLI PPOL PARTIES PT PRELUN PH PENA PIN PGPV PKST PROTESTS PHSAK PRM PROLIFERATION PGOVBL PAS PUM PMIG PGIC PTERPGOV PSHA PHM PHARM PRELHA PELOSI PGOVKCMABN PQM PETER PJUS PKK POUS PTE PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PERM PRELGOV PAO PNIR PARMP PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PHYTRP PHUML PFOV PDEM PUOS PN PRESIDENT PERURENA PRIVATIZATION PHUH PIF POG PERL PKPA PREI PTERKU PSEC PRELKSUMXABN PETROL PRIL POLUN PPD PRELUNSC PREZ PCUL PREO PGOVZI POLMIL PERSONS PREFL PASS PV PETERS PING PQL PETR PARMS PNUC PS PARLIAMENT PINSCE PROTECTION PLAB PGV PBS PGOVENRGCVISMASSEAIDOPRCEWWTBN PKNP PSOCI PSI PTERM PLUM PF PVIP PARP PHUMQHA PRELNP PHIM PRELBR PUBLIC PHUMKPAL PHAM PUAS PBOV PRELTBIOBA PGOVU PHUMPINS PICES PGOVENRG PRELKPKO PHU PHUMKCRS POGV PATTY PSOC PRELSP PREC PSO PAIGH PKPO PARK PRELPLS PRELPK PHUS PPREL PTERPREL PROL PDA PRELPGOV PRELAF PAGE PGOVGM PGOVECON PHUMIZNL PMAR PGOVAF PMDL PKBL PARN PARMIR PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PDD PRELKPAO PKMN PRELEZ PHUMPRELPGOV PARTM PGOVEAGRKMCAKNARBN PPEL PGOVPRELPINRBN PGOVSOCI PWBG PGOVEAID PGOVPM PBST PKEAID PRAM PRELEVU PHUMA PGOR PPA PINSO PROVE PRELKPAOIZ PPAO PHUMPRELBN PGVO PHUMPTER PAGR PMIN PBTSEWWT PHUMR PDOV PINO PARAGRAPH PACE PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOVAU PGOF PBTSRU PRGOV PRHUM PCI PGO PRELEUN PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PMR PRTER PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PRELNL PINOCHET PAARM PKPAO PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA POPDC PRELC PHUME PER PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PAUL PHALANAGE PARTY PPEF PECON PEACE PROCESS PPGOV PLN PRELSW PHUMS PRF PEDRO PHUMKDEM PUNR PVPR PATRICK PGOVKMCAPHUMBN PRELA PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PBT PAMQ

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 08HAVANA245, BERTONE VISIT GENERATES BROAD DISAPPOINTMENT

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08HAVANA245.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08HAVANA245 2008-03-14 18:08 2011-01-22 21:30 CONFIDENTIAL US Interests Section Havana
VZCZCXRO5568
PP RUEHAO RUEHCD RUEHGA RUEHGD RUEHHA RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL
RUEHQU RUEHRD RUEHRG RUEHRS RUEHTM RUEHVC
DE RUEHUB #0245/01 0741808
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 141808Z MAR 08
FM USINT HAVANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3030
INFO RUEHWH/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS PRIORITY
RUEHROV/AMEMBASSY VATICAN PRIORITY 0149
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HAVANA 000245 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/13/2013 
TAGS: CU PGOV PHUM PINR PREL
SUBJECT: BERTONE VISIT GENERATES BROAD DISAPPOINTMENT 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/13/2013 
TAGS: CU PGOV PHUM PINR PREL
SUBJECT: BERTONE VISIT GENERATES BROAD DISAPPOINTMENT 
 
REF: VATICAN 0031 
 
HAVANA 00000245  001.2 OF 002 
 
Classified By: DCM Buddy Williams for reason 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY:  The visit to Cuba of Vatican Secretary of State Cardinal Tarcisio Bertone was considered a disappointment by everyone USINT has spoken with, though presumably not by the GOC itself.  In a subsequent meeting with the COM, the Nuncio seemed especially disappointed.  But even normally cautious Cardinal Jaime Ortega cited several serious problems with the visit.  Nevertheless, the visit probably achieved the Church's principal objective of preserving, and even expanding slightly, its space on the island.  Cardinal Ortega is now focusing his attention on convincing the Vatican that a papal visit in January 2009 would be a good idea.  
END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (C) The February 20-26 visit to Cuba of Vatican Secretary of State Cardinal Tarcisio Bertone had been planned for months to coincide with the tenth anniversary of the visit to Cuba of Pope John Paul II.  The visit included the dedication of a monument to the papal visit that was erected on the site of the papal mass celebrated during the 1998 visit in the central Cuban city of Villa Clara.  By coincidence, Bertone's visit began just as the Cuban National Assembly was electing Raul Castro president of the Council of State in place of his brother Fidel, who had withdrawn from consideration for the post the week before for health reasons.  Thus, Cardinal Bertone became the first official outside visitor to the new Raul Castro-led Cuba.  With that role in mind, the Bertone visit was an especially inauspicious event. 

3.  (C) Given the care with which the Church in Cuba approaches its relations with the regime, we did not expect Bertone to go beyond very circumspect diplomatic language. Instead, at a MINREX-sponsored press event he attacked U.S. policy towards Cuba, calling the embargo "ethically unacceptable and an oppression of the Cuban people."  He also lent his support to the GOC proposal to swap political prisoners for five Cuban spies held in the U.S., implicitly equating the convicted spies with prisoners of conscience. He further criticized the U.S. for the way its policies affected family reunification, but made no mention of restrictions placed on family reunification of its own citizens by the Government of Cuba itself.

4.  (C) Bertone's willingness to join with the GOC in bashing U.S. policy prompted one Cuban to comment to his parish priest that the Cuban Communist Party (PCC) would soon be issuing him a membership card.  Many Cubans with whom we have spoken expressed similar or stronger levels of disappointment with the visit.  Especially among practicing Catholic faithful, Bertone's visit had been anticipated as an opportunity to renew the spirit of hope that had come from Pope John Paul II's 1998 visit, and give a voice to the rising and unfulfilled expectations of the Cuban people to which the Cuban bishops had referred clearly in their Christmas message.  Those in and around Havana complained specifically about the heavy police presence at Cardinal Bertone's mass at the Havana cathedral that seemed designed to exclude the rank and file faithful.  Those excluded were relegated to viewing the mass on television (the broadcast of which was considered a success of the visit by the local church) where they could see the pews filled with foreign diplomats (though not from USINT, we were not invited), government officials, and members of the nomenklatura who normally take no part in church activities. 
 
5.  (C) COM called on the Papal Nuncio the week after the visit to raise the statements made by Cardinal Bertone.  The Nuncio defended Bertone's statement on the embargo strongly as consistent with the Vatican's position, and refused to be swayed on the question of swapping Cuban political prisoners for five Cuban spies held in the U.S., saying all are prisoners who suffer and the Church must defend the rights of all. The Nuncio seemed literally to be stricken that the USG  would be offended by Bertone's comments.  He did allow that he thought it was unfortunate that the Cardinal had decided to speak in Spanish, a language in which he is not comfortable, at the news conference.  That decision may have induced Bertone to use the Spanish phrasing he had heard most recently, that of the senior officials of the Cuban Foreign Ministry who used their customary loaded language to describe relations with the U.S.  The Nuncio cited some things he saw as successes coming from the visit, including progress on 
HAVANA 00000245  002.2 OF 002 
allowing the Church to have regular radio broadcasts and permission for construction on churches (though not to build entirely new churches).
 
6.  (C) In a subsequent meeting, the usually cautious and circumspect Cardinal Jaime Ortega, the archbishop of Havana, told COM and PolEcon Counselor that he was disappointed with the visit as a whole.  Ortega complained about the level of Cardinal Bertone's homilies, which he described as doctoral-level essays on the theology of relativism--a worthy subject, but not what the Cuban people needed or wanted to hear about at this time.  Ortega also was very unhappy about the decision to have the Cardinal visit the ELAM (Escuela Latino-American de Medicina or Latin American School of Medicine).  There he met with foreign students dressed in native dress who extolled the benefits of being brought to Cuba to study medicine.  The event was a blatant propaganda exercise directed at individuals who are not in any way related to the Cuban Catholic Church.  Presumably, it was the price that had to be paid to allow the construction and dedication of the papal monument in Villa Clara to go forward. 

7.  (C) While disappointed in the visit of Cardinal Bertone, Ortega is already focused on a larger goal--another papal visit.  He said that he hoped to convince the Vatican that it will be possible for the Pope to stop in Cuba upon his return from an already scheduled visit to Mexico in January 2009. Ortega expects that the Vatican will argue that the Pope will be too exhausted to do another visit, but he plans to argue that the flight to Cuba from Mexico is short; the visit would consist only of the dedication of the new seminary now under construction near Havana and a large, open-air mass; and that the Pope can then fly directly to Rome.  As Ortega faces mandatory retirement for age at the end of 2009, this will be his last chance to get the Pope to Cuba.  He hopes that a papal visit will help to fill the newly-opened seminary with Cuban candidates for the priesthood. 

8.  (C) The most positive reports regarding the Bertone visit came from outside of Havana.  Santiago-based priest, Fr. XXXXXXXXXXXX, described the Catholic faithful in eastern Cuba as excited by the visit, and enthusiastic participants in the mass Bertone celebrated in the city of Guantanamo and his visit to the Basilica of the Copper Madonna near Santiago. XXXXXXXXXXXX thought the Cardinal's homilies on those occasions were appropriately directed to the interests of the local people and well-received.  He agreed, however, with the overall assessment that the visit had not addressed the broader expectations of the Cuban people. 

9.  (C) COMMENT:  The Cuban church hierarchy has been famous (or infamous) for taking a very mild stance relative to the Castro regime.  Their goal, and that of the Vatican as well, has been to preserve and nurture back to health an institution that had been battered by the revolution.  To achieve that goal, their center of gravity has been the regime, since it has always represented the biggest threat to the existence of the church as an institution.  Through keeping the regime friendly, the Church hopes to build on small successes, like access to the airwaves and permission to construct Church-related buildings like the seminary.  In the sense of achieving the goal of keeping the regime friendly, the Bertone visit could be considered a great success, therefore.  However, it is a success that could come at the cost of a loss of confidence in the Church among the Cuban faithful.  If those faithful feel the Catholic Church is not sensitive enough to their expectations, they may begin to drift away, perhaps to be picked up by the burgeoning evangelical and pentecostal movements on the island. Parish-level priests we spoke with in Havana are aware of this threat and were even more vocal in their disapproval of the Bertone visit.  It goes without saying that we too are extremely disappointed by the fact that the Cardinal allowed himself to be used by the regime as a propaganda tool to bash U.S. policy.  If an early-2009 papal visit is a viable option, the way might still be clear to recuperate some of the ground lost through Bertone's visit.  But that will only happen if the Vatican has a change of heart about how it deals with this regime. 
 


PARMLY