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C O N F I D E N T I A L BRASILIA 000343 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR PM, WHA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/12/2018 
TAGS: BR MARR PREL PTER
SUBJECT: 2008 U.S.-BRAZIL POLITICAL-MILITARY CONSULTATIONS 
AGENDA 
 
REF: SECSTATE 20259 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Stephen Liston 
 
 ¶1.  (U)  Mission delivered the reftel agenda to Foreign 
Ministry Special Advisor Marcos Pinta Gama who indicated that 
Brazil would be prepared to host AA/S Mull for this year's 
political military consultations April 15.  Pinta Gama said 
that he needed to consult other members of the Brazilian 
delegation before providing specific comments on the proposed 
agenda, but offered several preliminary thoughts on agenda 
items. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) DEFENSE COOPERATON AGREEMENT:  Pinta Gama claimed 
that the MRE was awaiting an "official" version of the text 
from the MOD.  (Note: Poloff had visited the MOD three days 
early and saw a copy of the memo that had been sent to the 
MRE.)  As yet there had been no internal discussion of the 
DCA, so Pinta Gama was unable to offer any idea as to how 
long MRE clearance might take.(Comment: MRE has had an 
unofficial copy of the DCA since the Ambassador provided it 
to U/S for Political Affairs Everton Vargas on January 11. 
End comment.) 
 
¶3.  (SBU) GSOMIA/GSOIA:  The MRE believes that a GSOIA would 
be far more useful than a GSOMIA as it would have broader 
application and would be more consistent with Brazil's system 
of having one government agency in the lead for protecting 
classified information.  Pinta Gama said he strongly supprted 
a GSOIA and recommended consulting with the GSI, Brazil's 
information security agency on a way forward. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) SOFA:  Pinta Gama was cautious on the idea of a 
SOFA.  He said he believed the one signed with France was 
more limited than the SOFA the U.S. had proposed.  The 
problem, he stated, with the U.S. SOFA was that it would 
confer "diplomatic-like" status on U.S. forces, and this 
would be impossible under Brazilian law.(Comment: this is the 
standard retreat of Itamaraty when faced with accords not to 
their liking; the French were also told by Itamaraty that the 
SOFA they sought would be unconstitutional. End comment.) 
 
¶5.  (U) NONPROLIFERATION:  Pinta Gama welcomed further 
consultations noting Brazil's "good credentials" with global 
nonproliferation regimes.  He cited the proliferation of 
small arms and light weapons as the biggest threat to global 
security. 
 
¶6.  (C) COMMENT: Pinta Gama, who is chief of staff to the 
fervently anti-American MRE Secretary General (Deputy 
Minister) Samuel Pinheiro Guimaraes, is also Itamaraty's 
recognized pol-mil expert and designated liaison with the 
MOD.  A firm defender of Itamaraty's interests, he 
nonetheless believes the bilateral consultations are useful 
and notes that it would be positive to build upon the good 
relations between the U.S. and Brazilian militaries.  Despite 
having accompanied Defense Minister Jobim to France in 
February, he avoided the popular rhetoric trumpeting the 
"strategic partnership" with France and was clearly 
interested in Jobim's upcoming Washington trip as a possible 
means of opening new possibilities for cooperation. 
SOBEL