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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BRASILIA 000304 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA AND WHA/BSC 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/04/2018 
TAGS: PREL BR VE IS IR BL JO SA EG MO SY
SUBJECT: BRAZIL: IRAN, ARAB WORLD, ON AMORIM'S MIND IN 2008 
 
REF: A. A. BRASILIA 002132 
     ¶B. B. BRASILIA 001278 
     ¶C. C. BRASILIA 001252 
     ¶D. D. BRASILIA 001230 
     ¶E. E. BRASILIA 001231 
 
Classified By: DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION PHIL CHICOLA FOR REASONS 1.4 B A 
ND D 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorim's 
recent visit to five Middle Eastern countries continues a 
renewed focus on the Middle East that began with Amorim's 
participation at the Annapolis meetings in November of last 
year.  Since Annapolis, Foreign Ministry (Itamaraty) Middle 
East hands have missed no opportunity to reiterate their 
satisfaction with Brazil's participation in the conference 
and cite it as a good start to a year they expect to be full 
of energetic diplomatic activity in the region.  As often in 
the past, during the trip Amorim did not miss an opportunity 
to take some shots at US policy in the Middle East, 
criticizing the US and the West's efforts to isolate 
"parties" to the peace process, such as Hizballah and HAMAS. 
Considering the multiple platforms Brazilian officials will 
share with Arab leaders this year and Brazil's tendency to 
cater to perceived Arab grievances, such criticism is likely 
to turn into a running feature throughout the year. 
Nevertheless, Itamaraty officials emphasize that their 
priority is to remain a credible interlocutor and a viable 
participant in any peace process, and that they have been and 
will continue to be critical of both sides when necessary. 
End Summary. 
 
---------------------------- 
Amorim in the Middle East 
---------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Following on what is widely seen within Itamaraty as 
Brazil's successful participation at the Annapolis meetings 
in November, Amorim went on a tour of the Middle East, which 
included stops in Syria, Saudi Arabia, Israel, the 
Palestinian territories, and United Arab Emirates, to follow 
up on its engagement at Annapolis and to set up Brazil's 
Middle East agenda for 2008.   Minister Rodrigo do Amaral of 
Itamaraty's Middle East Division I told poloff the trip 
helped consolidate Brazil's role as a player in the Middle 
East peace process and also advanced Brazil's trade agenda. 
Amaral repeated a line heard from Amorim in the press, that 
Brazil's role in the peace process was to be part of the 
chorus in a Greek play, standing outside the main action, but 
clarifying and criticizing when necessary. 
 
¶3. (C) Although not the central focus, trade accounted for a 
significant component of Amorim's trip, according to Amaral. 
Middle Eastern countries represent one of the fastest growing 
regions, percentage-wise, for Brazilian exports.  Since Lula 
took office, these have grown by almost 130% (from US$2.8 
billion in 2003 to US$6.4 billion in 2008), with Brazil 
running a US$3.1 billion surplus with the region.  Amaral 
noted that they were pleased with how quickly they were able 
to work out the Israel-Mercosul trade deal and have hopes to 
sign further trade deals this year.  News reports also 
indicate that, in addition to a potential Lula visit to the 
region, several Brazilian governors, including Aecio Neves of 
Minas Gerais and Sergio Cabral of Rio de Janeiro, are 
planning trade-related visits to the Middle East. 
 
 
BRASILIA 00000304  002 OF 004 
 
 
¶4. (C) Asked to comment on Amorim's statements criticizing 
U.S.-imposed isolation of Syria and signaling that Hizballah 
and HAMAS needed to be part of any peace process, Amaral 
indicated that it was Itamaraty's view that President Asad is 
signaling openness to the West by taking steps to secure its 
border with Iraq and taking other measures, although he 
declined to provide specifics.  For Brazil, Amaral added, 
Syria represented a complicated problem policy-wise due to 
the strong influence of the large Syrian community in Brazil, 
which was partially counterbalanced by the anti-Syrian 
elements of the Lebanese community.  With regards to 
inclusion of Hizballah and HAMAS in a peace process, Amaral 
claimed that Amorim was not necessarily referring to 
inclusion of these groups in international peace efforts, but 
peace efforts within their own countries.  He further 
reiterated Brazil's longstanding view that it does not 
condone the most extreme actions of those organizations, but 
that they are the legitimate representatives of substantial 
portions of the public in their respective countries and 
cannot be brushed aside. 
 
--------------------- 
Next Up: Iran Talks 
--------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) In a separate meeting with Itamaraty's Middle East 
Division II, which handles the Persian Gulf states, 
Secretario Carlos Goncalves de Oliveira discussed next steps 
 
SIPDIS 
in the bilateral agenda with Iran.  In the first week of 
March, Itamaraty will host vice-ministerial level political 
talks with Iranian officials.  Secretario Goncalves indicated 
that these are necessary to balance Brazil's high-level 
engagement with the Arab countries.  When pressed for 
specifics on the bilateral talks, Goncalves demurred and 
sought to downplay their significance.  At the same time, he 
stressed that Iran is the largest importer of Brazilian goods 
in the Middle East, accounting for more than 35% of Brazilian 
exports to the region.  As a result of what he claimed was a 
failure to open up Western markets due to the unfinished Doha 
round, Brazil is forced to find alternative markets and the 
Middle East represents an increasingly important one for 
them. 
 
¶6. (C) Goncalves did note that Itamaraty expects the Iranian 
delegation to press for more political and economic 
engagement on Brazil's part, as it is a source of resentment 
for Tehran that Brazil does not reciprocate the ministerial 
level visits made 3 to 4 times a year by Iranian officials. 
In addition, Itamaraty expects a push by the Iranian 
delegation for a meeting between Lula and Ahmadinejad, 
although Goncalves stressed that he thought it was highly 
unlikely to take place this year. In a separate meeting, 
Minister Rodrigo do Amaral confided that they were trying to 
stall such an encounter but that sooner or later they would 
run out of pretexts and a meeting would become inevitable. 
(Comment: according to ref A, presidential advisor Marco 
Aurelio Garcia has been supportive of such an encounter, 
while it remains unclear if Amorim favors it.  End comment.) 
 
¶7. (C) Turning the topic to Iran's growing interest in Latin 
America, Goncalves stressed Brazil remains unconcerned. 
"Bolivia has nothing to offer Iran, commercially or 
politically", Goncalves stated, and with regards to Venezuela 
added, "we see the growing alliance with Venezuela, but there 
is no substance to it".  On Iran, he further added that 
Brazil believed that Ahmadinejad was similar to Chavez in 
 
BRASILIA 00000304  003 OF 004 
 
 
that both were more bluster than anything.  He added that it 
was Brazil's view that an easing of pressure on Iran would 
actually give space for the regime to open up.  The more the 
nuclear program is attacked, the more support for the regime 
hardens, and the easier it is to crack down on dissidence, he 
added.   When pressed for what, if anything, Brazil would 
tell the Iranians during their bilateral talks regarding UNSC 
and IAEA demands for compliance, Goncalves added that Brazil 
would, as always, urge Iran to be transparent and accountable 
while defending their right to have a peaceful nuclear energy 
program. 
 
------------------------ 
Year of the Middle East 
------------------------ 
 
¶8. (C) Minister Amaral spoke at length to poloff about 
Brazil's expected agenda for the year following Amorim's trip 
and the bilateral talks with Iran.  On deck for this year, 
according to Amaral:  the late February Arab-South American 
foreign ministers' meeting in Buenos Aires; likely state 
visits by Syrian president Asad and the King of Jordan; a 
probable trip to the Middle East by President Lula; opening 
of new embassies in Oman and Qatar; potential trade accords 
with Egypt, Jordan and Morocco and the hope of finishing the 
long-delayed trade accord with the Gulf Cooperation Council; 
possible Brazilian participation at the Arab League summit; 
and capping off the year, the Arab-South American Summit in 
Qatar.  Asked if Israel would be included in a potential Lula 
Middle East visit--a first of any Brazilian head of 
state--Amaral stated that it was a priority.  Right now, 
according to Amaral, Israel, the Palestinian territories and 
Saudi Arabia were shaping up as the countries likely to be 
visited.  Amaral also indicated that Itamaraty intended to 
follow up on Lula's August 2007 letter to Palestinian leader 
Mahmoud Abbas offering to form a Friends of Peace group with 
other interested countries, such as those in IBSA (India and 
South Africa), to seek further engagement in the peace 
process. 
 
---------- 
Comment: 
---------- 
 
¶9. (C) After Brazil's bumbling performance during the 
inaugural Arab-South American Summit in 2005 (refs B through 
E), Itamaraty is once again ramping up its Middle East 
diplomacy.  Itamaraty's Middle East personnel, although 
visibly overworked, are clearly enthusiastic about the growth 
stock that is the Middle East agenda once again and they are 
making no bones about the possibilities it will offer for 
advancing Brazil's prestige and global ambitions.   Although 
Brazil often tilts uncomfortably towards the anti-US view of 
things in the Middle East (e.g. Amorim's recent criticisms of 
the U.S.) and engages in more wishful thinking than is 
warranted (e.g. Lula's assertion last year that Iran's 
nuclear program was not in violation of any international 
accord), they might be evincing some understanding that 
visible signals of evenhandedness are critical to remain a 
credible player.  Avoiding a presidential-level meeting 
between Ahmadinejad and Lula, at least in the near term, and 
undertaking a presidential visit to Israel in his third 
Middle East jaunt could be positive signals that Brazil 
understands its responsibility as a self-proclaimed neutral 
player in Mideast peace talks.  Whether that is truly the 
case, a year packed with Middle East-related activity should 
 
BRASILIA 00000304  004 OF 004 
 
 
give us a clearer view.  End Comment. 
 
Chicola 
CHICOLA