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DE RUEHBO #1167/01 0882113
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 282113Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2134
INFO RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0164
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ MAR LIMA 6039
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA 1433
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 6693
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//USDP ADMIN/CHAIRS//
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL

UNCLAS BOGOTA 001167 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER MARR CO
SUBJECT: PLAN COLOMBIA: NATIONALIZATION OF FMF/DOD FUNDING 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1.  In keeping with expected cuts in U.S. military 
assistance, post has drafted a nationalization plan that 
steadily transfers current USG funded programs to the GOC. 
The strategy identifies eight funding priorities aimed at 1) 
achieving the "irreversibility" of Colombian military 
momentum against illegal armed groups in the near term; and 
2) maintaining the influence needed to lock in the GOC as a 
strategic regional partner in the long term.  The plan 
proposes to manage the transition to achieve a "soft 
landing," providing continuity in key programs that safeguard 
USG counternarcotic and counterterrorism interests.  End 
Summary. 
 
------------------------------ 
The Nationalization Imperative 
------------------------------ 
 
¶2.  The U.S. Congress has asked the Departments of State and 
Defense for a strategy which gradually reduces military 
assistance under Plan Colombia, while boosting spending on 
governance, humanitarian, and development programs.  Both 
Foreign Military Funding (FMF) and Department of Defense 
(DOD) assistance will sharply decline in FY-2008 due to 
shifting U.S. priorities and the GOC's enhanced capacity to 
assume more of these costs.  Per the Congressional tasking, 
post's plan to transfer programs funded by FMF and DOD to the 
GOC aims to manage the transition in a transparent, 
predictable manner that minimizes disruptions and ensures 
continuity in key programs vital to USG counternarcotics and 
counterterrorism policies. 
 
Past Plan Colombia Funding: FY'03 - FY'08 
----------------------------------------- 
(in USD millions) 
 
        FY'03   FY'04   FY'05   FY'06   FY'07   FY'08 
        -----   -----   -----   -----   -----   ----- 
FMF      14.2    99.7    91.7    90.8    87.2    55.0 
DOD      25.0    36.0    48.0    70.2    54.7    47.7 
         ----   -----   -----   -----   -----   ----- 
Total    39.2   135.7   139.7   161.0   141.9   102.7 
 
--------------------------- 
FMF/DOD Phased Funding Plan 
--------------------------- 
 
¶3.  Post has divided its engagement with the Colombian 
military from 2003-2013 into three phases: build, 
consolidate, and strategic partnership. 
 
-- Phase I: FY'03 - FY'07 -- "Build Phase" 
This phase aimed to build the Colombian military's 
capabilities, allowing it to project power into unsecured 
areas and to establish government presence.  It enabled the 
Colombian military to transition from a defensive approach to 
a mobile offensive strategy.  Funding in this phase supported 
the Colombian military's "Plan Patriota" campaign plan. 
 
-- Phase II: FY'08 - FY'10 -- "Consolidate Phase" 
This phase aspires to help the Colombian military consolidate 
recent gains and to ensure the irreversibility of 
territorial, security and infrastructure advances.  During 
this period FMF/DOD funding will decline.  Still, Phase II 
funding must remain as level as possible over the FY'08 - 
FY'10 period so as not to threaten gains made to date by the 
Colombian military. 
 
-- Phase III: FY'11 and beyond -- "Strategic Partnership 
Phase" 
This phase will work to ensure that the Colombian military 
remains a U.S. strategic regional partner.  Funding during 
this phase will reduce to its lowest levels since FY'03, but 
must continue at a sufficient level to maintain U.S. 
influence and to protect core counternarcotics and 
counterterrorism interests. 
 
-------------------------- 
Forward Funding Priorities 
-------------------------- 
¶4.  Post's proposed funding strategy continues cuts in U.S. 
military assistance begun in Phase II, but suggests a more 
gradual approach that ensures the "irreversibility" of 
Colombian military gains and will maintain a Colombian 
"strategic partnership" with the U.S. in Phase III.  The 
strategy builds around maintaining USG funding for those 
programs which are necessary to both phases.  Post identified 
20 of its 60 FMF/DOD funded programs as "Golden Threads" - 
programs vital to "irreversibility" and essential for 
"strategic partnership".  The twenty "Golden Thread" programs 
are divided below into eight program areas (with the 
approximate percentage of FY'08 funds (FMF/DOD) dedicated to 
each program also shown): 
 
- Rotary Wing Operations (30%): to support vital air mobility 
with a training center and a depot, also bridging sustainment 
costs (for pilots and mechanics) of nationalized helicopters; 
 
- Ground Operations (20%): for special operations against 
high value targets (HVTs), a joint training center for jungle 
operations, and liaison teams for interservice 
interoperability; 
 
- Riverine Operations (12%): to boost the riverine 
interdiction and counterguerrilla effort with a Marine 
training facility, and sustainment costs for riverine forces; 
 
- Governability (6%): to fortify GOC presence in all the 
national territory through civil affairs, countermining 
operations, and humanitarian assistance programs; 
 
- Fixed Wing Operations (10%): for direct air support to 
military operations through a pilot training school, 
precision armaments, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and 
sustainment of attack and transport aircraft; 
 
- Naval Interdiction (7%): to support counterdrug efforts 
through Coast Guard operations and training, Navy maritime 
operations, and interoperability among military branches; 
 
- Intelligence and Communications (5%): intelligence 
integration and joint communications networks for secure 
sharing of information across service branches; 
 
- Joint Initiatives (10%): a set of projects to modernize and 
transform the armed forces in the areas of logistics, 
military justice, personnel management, mobile training 
teams, and academic education (e.g. English). 
 
---------------------------- 
Near Goal: "Irreversibility" 
---------------------------- 
 
¶5.  From FY'08 to FY'10, the emphasis will fall into three 
categories--rotary wing, ground, and riverine 
operations--which remain key to making Colombia 
self-sufficient in fighting narcoterrorism, per the original 
aims of Plan Colombia.  As articulated by Minister of Defense 
Juan Manuel Santos, the goal is to reach a tipping point, or 
a point of irreversibility, in the GOC's fight against the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and other 
illegal armed groups.  In this scenario, the GOC will have 
established sufficient territorial control, governance, and 
military capacity to prevent a weakened FARC or other 
criminal groups from ever again threatening the Colombian 
state, military, or civilian population.  To help Colombia 
achieve this goal, post proposes that FMF funding remain 
roughly constant at the FY-08 level through the end of 
President Uribe's term in 2010.  This will enable a 
predictable, smooth transition through the first year of the 
new administration, as well as allowing for a final 
assessment of the political and security situation before 
implementing further budget cuts. 
 
Proposed Plan Colombia Funding: FY'08 - FY'12 
--------------------------------------------- 
(in USD millions) 
 
         FY'08   FY'09   FY'10   FY'11   FY'12 
         -----   -----   -----   -----   ----- 
FMF       55.0    66.4    65.0    55.0    45.0 
DOD       47.7    45.0    43.0    35.0    25.0 
         -----   -----   -----   -----   ----- 
Total    102.7   111.4   108.0    90.0    70.0 
 
--------------------------- 
FY'09 and FY'10 FMF Caveats 
--------------------------- 
 
¶6.  The FY-09 request closely tracks the FY-08 request, but 
calls for USD 11 million of additional FMF that would fund 
aviation repairs, fuel truck support, and counter mine 
equipment.  In FY'10, as detailed in the Mission Strategic 
Plan (MSP), post seeks USD 65 million in FMF to sustain these 
activities.  Still, to preserve key rotary airlift 
capability, post recommends that an additional USD 20 million 
in FMF be included to implement joint sustainment and 
training programs such as the Joint Rotary Wing School, as 
well as procure 12 training helicopters and UAVs for enhanced 
interdiction, river, and border security. 
 
-------------------------------- 
End State: Strategic Partnership 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  From FY'11 onward, the plan moves toward a long-term, 
steady-state relationship with the Colombian military.  The 
envisioned end state consists of a strategic partnership that 
works together to achieve bilateral regional security 
objectives.  The relationship will focus on finding 
value-added ways the U.S. can uniquely support the GOC to 
strengthen its institutions and skills, as well as its 
capacity to sustain bi/multilateral operations against 
narcoterrorists.  The vision contemplates an eventual 
post-conflict scenario, in which the GOC and USG frees its 
resources from operations against FARC terrorists and can 
dedicate them to counternarcotics.  Ultimately, long-term 
projects such as training facilities aim to maintain U.S. 
influence needed to lock the GOC in as a strategic partner 
supporting U.S. interests in Latin America. 
 
------------------------- 
Coordination with the GOC 
------------------------- 
 
¶8.  Post has coordinated the "Golden Thread" nationalization 
strategy with the Colombian military at all levels.  Since 
November 2007, MILGRP officials have met on several occasions 
with Minister of Defense Santos, Vice Minister of Defense 
Pinzon, Chief of Defense General Padilla, and all Colombian 
Service Chiefs.  MILGRP met with General Padilla on March 6 
to discuss the lower FY'08 FMF funding level.  Santos stated 
that the USG strategy supports the Colombian military's 
"Consolidation" strategy, as long as funding cuts remain 
predictable and gradual, especially in Phase II.  A 
well-planned transition and nationalization in Phase II will 
allow the Colombian military to gradually boost its funding 
to compensate, thus ensuring irreversibility of GOC security 
gains by 2010. 
 
 
BROWNFIELD