Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 143912 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AORC AS AF AM AJ ASEC AU AMGT APER ACOA ASEAN AG AFFAIRS AR AFIN ABUD AO AEMR ADANA AMED AADP AINF ARF ADB ACS AE AID AL AC AGR ABLD AMCHAMS AECL AINT AND ASIG AUC APECO AFGHANISTAN AY ARABL ACAO ANET AFSN AZ AFLU ALOW ASSK AFSI ACABQ AMB APEC AIDS AA ATRN AMTC AVIATION AESC ASSEMBLY ADPM ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG AGOA ASUP AFPREL ARNOLD ADCO AN ACOTA AODE AROC AMCHAM AT ACKM ASCH AORCUNGA AVIANFLU AVIAN AIT ASECPHUM ATRA AGENDA AIN AFINM APCS AGENGA ABDALLAH ALOWAR AFL AMBASSADOR ARSO AGMT ASPA AOREC AGAO ARR AOMS ASC ALIREZA AORD AORG ASECVE ABER ARABBL ADM AMER ALVAREZ AORCO ARM APERTH AINR AGRI ALZUGUREN ANGEL ACDA AEMED ARC AMGMT AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL ASECAFINGMGRIZOREPTU ABMC AIAG ALJAZEERA ASR ASECARP ALAMI APRM ASECM AMPR AEGR AUSTRALIAGROUP ASE AMGTHA ARNOLDFREDERICK AIDAC AOPC ANTITERRORISM ASEG AMIA ASEX AEMRBC AFOR ABT AMERICA AGENCIES AGS ADRC ASJA AEAID ANARCHISTS AME AEC ALNEA AMGE AMEDCASCKFLO AK ANTONIO ASO AFINIZ ASEDC AOWC ACCOUNT ACTION AMG AFPK AOCR AMEDI AGIT ASOC ACOAAMGT AMLB AZE AORCYM AORL AGRICULTURE ACEC AGUILAR ASCC AFSA ASES ADIP ASED ASCE ASFC ASECTH AFGHAN ANTXON APRC AFAF AFARI ASECEFINKCRMKPAOPTERKHLSAEMRNS AX ALAB ASECAF ASA ASECAFIN ASIC AFZAL AMGTATK ALBE AMT AORCEUNPREFPRELSMIGBN AGUIRRE AAA ABLG ARCH AGRIC AIHRC ADEL AMEX ALI AQ ATFN AORCD ARAS AINFCY AFDB ACBAQ AFDIN AOPR AREP ALEXANDER ALANAZI ABDULRAHMEN ABDULHADI ATRD AEIR AOIC ABLDG AFR ASEK AER ALOUNI AMCT AVERY ASECCASC ARG APR AMAT AEMRS AFU ATPDEA ALL ASECE ANDREW
EAIR ECON ETRD EAGR EAID EFIN ETTC ENRG EMIN ECPS EG EPET EINV ELAB EU ECONOMICS EC EZ EUN EN ECIN EWWT EXTERNAL ENIV ES ESA ELN EFIS EIND EPA ELTN EXIM ET EINT EI ER EAIDAF ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECTRD EUR ECOWAS ECUN EBRD ECONOMIC ENGR ECONOMY EFND ELECTIONS EPECO EUMEM ETMIN EXBS EAIRECONRP ERTD EAP ERGR EUREM EFI EIB ENGY ELNTECON EAIDXMXAXBXFFR ECOSOC EEB EINF ETRN ENGRD ESTH ENRC EXPORT EK ENRGMO ECO EGAD EXIMOPIC ETRDPGOV EURM ETRA ENERG ECLAC EINO ENVIRONMENT EFIC ECIP ETRDAORC ENRD EMED EIAR ECPN ELAP ETCC EAC ENEG ESCAP EWWC ELTD ELA EIVN ELF ETR EFTA EMAIL EL EMS EID ELNT ECPSN ERIN ETT EETC ELAN ECHEVARRIA EPWR EVIN ENVR ENRGJM ELBR EUC EARG EAPC EICN EEC EREL EAIS ELBA EPETUN EWWY ETRDGK EV EDU EFN EVN EAIDETRD ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ ETEX ESCI EAIDHO EENV ETRC ESOC EINDQTRD EINVA EFLU EGEN ECE EAGRBN EON EFINECONCS EIAD ECPC ENV ETDR EAGER ETRDKIPR EWT EDEV ECCP ECCT EARI EINVECON ED ETRDEC EMINETRD EADM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID ETAD ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA EMINECINECONSENVTBIONS ESSO ETRG ELAM ECA EENG EITC ENG ERA EPSC ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EIPR ELABPGOVBN EURFOR ETRAD EUE EISNLN ECONETRDBESPAR ELAINE EGOVSY EAUD EAGRECONEINVPGOVBN EINVETRD EPIN ECONENRG EDRC ESENV EB ENER ELTNSNAR EURN ECONPGOVBN ETTF ENVT EPIT ESOCI EFINOECD ERD EDUC EUM ETEL EUEAID ENRGY ETD EAGRE EAR EAIDMG EE EET ETER ERICKSON EIAID EX EAG EBEXP ESTN EAIDAORC EING EGOV EEOC EAGRRP EVENTS ENRGKNNPMNUCPARMPRELNPTIAEAJMXL ETRDEMIN EPETEIND EAIDRW ENVI ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC EDUARDO EGAR EPCS EPRT EAIDPHUMPRELUG EPTED ETRB EPETPGOV ECONQH EAIDS EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR EAGRBTIOBEXPETRDBN ESF EINR ELABPHUMSMIGKCRMBN EIDN ETRK ESTRADA EXEC EAIO EGHG ECN EDA ECOS EPREL EINVKSCA ENNP ELABV ETA EWWTPRELPGOVMASSMARRBN EUCOM EAIDASEC ENR END EP ERNG ESPS EITI EINTECPS EAVI ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID ELTRN EADI ELDIN ELND ECRM EINVEFIN EAOD EFINTS EINDIR ENRGKNNP ETRDEIQ ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD EAIT ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ EWWI ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEAIR ECONEFIN EHUM EFNI EOXC EISNAR ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM EMW ETIO ETRDGR EMN EXO EATO EWTR ELIN EAGREAIDPGOVPRELBN EINVETC ETTD EIQ ECONCS EPPD ESS EUEAGR ENRGIZ EISL EUNJ EIDE ENRGSD ELAD ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO ENTG ETRDECD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS
KPKO KIPR KWBG KPAL KDEM KTFN KNNP KGIC KTIA KCRM KDRG KWMN KJUS KIDE KSUM KTIP KFRD KMCA KMDR KCIP KTDB KPAO KPWR KOMC KU KIRF KCOR KHLS KISL KSCA KGHG KS KSTH KSEP KE KPAI KWAC KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KPRP KVPR KAWC KUNR KZ KPLS KN KSTC KMFO KID KNAR KCFE KRIM KFLO KCSA KG KFSC KSCI KFLU KMIG KRVC KV KVRP KMPI KNEI KAPO KOLY KGIT KSAF KIRC KNSD KBIO KHIV KHDP KBTR KHUM KSAC KACT KRAD KPRV KTEX KPIR KDMR KMPF KPFO KICA KWMM KICC KR KCOM KAID KINR KBCT KOCI KCRS KTER KSPR KDP KFIN KCMR KMOC KUWAIT KIPRZ KSEO KLIG KWIR KISM KLEG KTBD KCUM KMSG KMWN KREL KPREL KAWK KIMT KCSY KESS KWPA KNPT KTBT KCROM KPOW KFTN KPKP KICR KGHA KOMS KJUST KREC KOC KFPC KGLB KMRS KTFIN KCRCM KWNM KHGH KRFD KY KGCC KFEM KVIR KRCM KEMR KIIP KPOA KREF KJRE KRKO KOGL KSCS KGOV KCRIM KEM KCUL KRIF KCEM KITA KCRN KCIS KSEAO KWMEN KEANE KNNC KNAP KEDEM KNEP KHPD KPSC KIRP KUNC KALM KCCP KDEN KSEC KAYLA KIMMITT KO KNUC KSIA KLFU KLAB KTDD KIRCOEXC KECF KIPRETRDKCRM KNDP KIRCHOFF KJAN KFRDSOCIRO KWMNSMIG KEAI KKPO KPOL KRD KWMNPREL KATRINA KBWG KW KPPD KTIAEUN KDHS KRV KBTS KWCI KICT KPALAOIS KPMI KWN KTDM KWM KLHS KLBO KDEMK KT KIDS KWWW KLIP KPRM KSKN KTTB KTRD KNPP KOR KGKG KNN KTIAIC KSRE KDRL KVCORR KDEMGT KOMO KSTCC KMAC KSOC KMCC KCHG KSEPCVIS KGIV KPO KSEI KSTCPL KSI KRMS KFLOA KIND KPPAO KCM KRFR KICCPUR KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KFAM KWWMN KENV KGH KPOP KFCE KNAO KTIAPARM KWMNKDEM KDRM KNNNP KEVIN KEMPI KWIM KGCN KUM KMGT KKOR KSMT KISLSCUL KNRV KPRO KOMCSG KLPM KDTB KFGM KCRP KAUST KNNPPARM KUNH KWAWC KSPA KTSC KUS KSOCI KCMA KTFR KPAOPREL KNNPCH KWGB KSTT KNUP KPGOV KUK KMNP KPAS KHMN KPAD KSTS KCORR KI KLSO KWNN KNP KPTD KESO KMPP KEMS KPAONZ KPOV KTLA KPAOKMDRKE KNMP KWMNCI KWUN KRDP KWKN KPAOY KEIM KGICKS KIPT KREISLER KTAO KJU KLTN KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KQ KWPR KSCT KGHGHIV KEDU KRCIM KFIU KWIC KNNO KILS KTIALG KNNA KMCAJO KINP KRM KLFLO KPA KOMCCO KKIV KHSA KDM KRCS KWBGSY KISLAO KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KCRI KX KWWT KPAM KVRC KERG KK KSUMPHUM KACP KSLG KIF KIVP KHOURY KNPR KUNRAORC KCOG KCFC KWMJN KFTFN KTFM KPDD KMPIO KCERS KDUM KDEMAF KMEPI KHSL KEPREL KAWX KIRL KNNR KOMH KMPT KISLPINR KADM KPER KTPN KSCAECON KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KCSI KNRG KAKA KFRP KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KQM KQRDQ KWBC KMRD KVBL KOM KMPL KEDM KFLD KPRD KRGY KNNF KPROG KIFR KPOKO KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KHIB KOEM KDDG KCGC
PGOV PREL PK PTER PINR PO PHUM PARM PREF PINF PRL PM PINS PROP PALESTINIAN PE PBTS PNAT PHSA PL PA PSEPC POSTS POLITICS POLICY POL PU PAHO PHUMPGOV PGOG PARALYMPIC PGOC PNR PREFA PMIL POLITICAL PROV PRUM PBIO PAK POV POLG PAR POLM PHUMPREL PKO PUNE PROG PEL PROPERTY PKAO PRE PSOE PHAS PNUM PGOVE PY PIRF PRES POWELL PP PREM PCON PGOVPTER PGOVPREL PODC PTBS PTEL PGOVTI PHSAPREL PD PG PRC PVOV PLO PRELL PEPFAR PREK PEREZ PINT POLI PPOL PARTIES PT PRELUN PH PENA PIN PGPV PKST PROTESTS PHSAK PRM PROLIFERATION PGOVBL PAS PUM PMIG PGIC PTERPGOV PSHA PHM PHARM PRELHA PELOSI PGOVKCMABN PQM PETER PJUS PKK POUS PTE PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PERM PRELGOV PAO PNIR PARMP PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PHYTRP PHUML PFOV PDEM PUOS PN PRESIDENT PERURENA PRIVATIZATION PHUH PIF POG PERL PKPA PREI PTERKU PSEC PRELKSUMXABN PETROL PRIL POLUN PPD PRELUNSC PREZ PCUL PREO PGOVZI POLMIL PERSONS PREFL PASS PV PETERS PING PQL PETR PARMS PNUC PS PARLIAMENT PINSCE PROTECTION PLAB PGV PBS PGOVENRGCVISMASSEAIDOPRCEWWTBN PKNP PSOCI PSI PTERM PLUM PF PVIP PARP PHUMQHA PRELNP PHIM PRELBR PUBLIC PHUMKPAL PHAM PUAS PBOV PRELTBIOBA PGOVU PHUMPINS PICES PGOVENRG PRELKPKO PHU PHUMKCRS POGV PATTY PSOC PRELSP PREC PSO PAIGH PKPO PARK PRELPLS PRELPK PHUS PPREL PTERPREL PROL PDA PRELPGOV PRELAF PAGE PGOVGM PGOVECON PHUMIZNL PMAR PGOVAF PMDL PKBL PARN PARMIR PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PDD PRELKPAO PKMN PRELEZ PHUMPRELPGOV PARTM PGOVEAGRKMCAKNARBN PPEL PGOVPRELPINRBN PGOVSOCI PWBG PGOVEAID PGOVPM PBST PKEAID PRAM PRELEVU PHUMA PGOR PPA PINSO PROVE PRELKPAOIZ PPAO PHUMPRELBN PGVO PHUMPTER PAGR PMIN PBTSEWWT PHUMR PDOV PINO PARAGRAPH PACE PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOVAU PGOF PBTSRU PRGOV PRHUM PCI PGO PRELEUN PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PMR PRTER PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PRELNL PINOCHET PAARM PKPAO PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA POPDC PRELC PHUME PER PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PAUL PHALANAGE PARTY PPEF PECON PEACE PROCESS PPGOV PLN PRELSW PHUMS PRF PEDRO PHUMKDEM PUNR PVPR PATRICK PGOVKMCAPHUMBN PRELA PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PBT PAMQ

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 08BELGRADE309, SERBIA: PARTIES' IDEOLOGIES GIVE WAY TO "MATHEMATICAL

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08BELGRADE309.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08BELGRADE309 2008-03-31 10:12 2011-08-26 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Belgrade
VZCZCXRO8808
PP RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLN
RUEHLZ RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHBW #0309/01 0911012
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P R 311012Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0113
INFO RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 0169
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BELGRADE 000309 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KPAO PBTS PGOV PHUM PINR PREL SR
SUBJECT: SERBIA: PARTIES' IDEOLOGIES GIVE WAY TO "MATHEMATICAL 
REALITIES" 
 
REF: 08 BELGRADE 275, 08 BELGRADE 273 
 
BELGRADE 00000309  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Summary 
 
------- 
 
 
 
1.  (SBU) Leaders of Prime Minister Kostunica's Democratic Party 
of Serbia and failed presidential candidate Nikolic's Radicals 
are openly discussing a likely post election coalition. 
President Tadic's Democratic Party has apparently seeks to keep 
all post election options open, though increasingly a coalition 
with the Socialists may be the most viable.  The Liberal 
Democrat Party says it will not join, but would support a 
Democrat-Socialist coalition, if needed.  In this campaign, 
parties are ditching ideology and considering mathematical 
realities needed for any future coalition government.  We 
believe this may blur the sharp distinctions between the two 
major blocs, and confuse voters.  End Summary. 
 
 
 
DSS Predictions 
 
--------------- 
 
 
 
2.  (SBU) Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica's Democratic Party 
of Serbia (DSS) should win enough seats to be viable partner in 
a post election coalition, DSS Vice President Milos Aligrudic 
predicted.  In a March 19 meeting with the DCM, Aligrudic said 
that the DSS coalition would win between 10-11% of the vote, 
yielding them around 30 seats which was "not much, but we must 
be realistic."  The Democratic Party (DS) coalition "may win 
40%" and the Radicals (SRS) would win 37%, he predicted. 
Aligrudic was not sure the Socialists (SPS) would make the 5% 
threshold, and he thought the DSS would pick up a few more seats 
if the SPS failed to win seats.  Aligrudic thought the Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP) would definitely not win 5%, the 
threshold for a non-minority party to enter the parliament. 
 
 
 
Possible SRS-DSS Coalition 
 
-------------------------- 
 
 
 
3.  (SBU) The natural outcome, Aligrudic said, was a DSS-SRS 
government.  The DCM raised the tragic irony of the DSS, led by 
Kostunica who was the face of the anti-Milosevic movement in 
October 2000 joining forces with a Milosevic relic.  Aligrudic 
said the DSS alliance with SRS was "risky" and he understood the 
Radicals were "not our friends," but said that the DSS had to 
consider "mathematical realities" and shared Kosovo policy.  Now 
that the DS had shown it was "willing to give up Kosovo" for EU 
membership, any DSS-DS alliance would be "too unstable" to 
function.  Saying there was "free media" and "free elections" in 
Serbia, Aligrudic said it would be up to the people to decide 
whether to support DSS policy on Kosovo and the EU. 
 
 
 
4.  (U) The Radicals have also opened the door for a coalition 
with the DSS, possibly even with Kostunica as prime minister. In 
March 28 interview with daily Vecernje Novosti, Radical Party 
(SRS) vice president Tomislav Nikolic reversed earlier comments 
and said Kostunica could lead a DSS-SRS government because there 
is "virtually no difference" between the parties' political 
programs.  Nikolic said the SRS will likely offer coalition to 
Kostunica's DSS even if the SRS has more votes because 
"everything is possible" in politics.  Nikolic said his party is 
opposed to signing an SAA with the EU unless EU countries which 
have recognized Kosovo withdraw those decisions.  Nikolic added 
that Serbia will never join NATO. 
 
 
 
DS:  Slow to Start and Wanting Options 
 
-------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
 
BELGRADE 00000309  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
5.  (SBU) Marko Djurisic, Member of the DS Presidency, said DS 
hoped to begin its campaign around April 5.  DS Advisor Ivan 
Vejvoda told the Ambassador on March 28 that Defense Minister 
Sutanovac had emerged as the leader of the campaign.  Djurisic 
said one reason for the slow campaign start was a split within 
the DS as who the party should chose for its potential prime 
minister candidate and whether the party should publicly 
announce that person at the start of the campaign.  Djurisic 
said DS was hoping both SPS and LDP would cross the threshold, 
but realized both could be in danger of not reaching 5%.  He 
said having both LDP and SPS in parliament "would give DS 
options to form a government."  He was willing to point out, 
however, that personally he would prefer to see another DS-DSS 
coalition government, "but this time without Kostunica as Prime 
Minister."  He recognized, at this stage, such a coalition would 
be, "a distant reality." 
 
 
 
Possible DS-SPS Coalition 
 
------------------------- 
 
 
 
5.  (SBU) Analysts and contacts are starkly divided on the 
possibility of a DS-SPS government.  Publicly, the Socialists 
have denied such a possibility, but Belgrade is abuzz with talk 
of a backroom deal between the parties.  Leon Kojen, former 
advisor to Tadic and Kosovo negotiator, told poloff on March 20 
that the DS would "certainly try" to make SPS leader Ivica Dacic 
an offer.  Kojen pointed out that Tadic advisor Miki Rakic and 
Dacic are originally from the same village and "there is a 
connection there."  (One should be careful of Kojen's judgments, 
as he has offered himself as a potential foreign minister to the 
Radicals.) Many contacts report that Dacic and some SPS members 
want to transform the party form the Milosevic era hardline 
nationalist, pensioner party to an acceptable social democratic 
grouping.  DS, a member of the Socialist International, could 
open the door for the SPS to join that organization as part of 
this transformation. 
 
 
 
6. (SBU) Nenad Canak, leader of the Vojvodina League of Social 
Democrats (LSV) and member of Tadic's DS coalition told the DCM 
on March 21 that he recently talked with Dacic, whom he cast as 
a "political businessman, buying and selling votes." Dacic 
reportedly said to Canak: "I don't give a damn about Milosevic, 
but I can't say that publicly otherwise I give up my 
electorate." He also said Dacic was starting to talk more about 
Serbia's EU future.  Novi Sad Mayor and former Radical Maja 
Gojkovic told the DCM on March 21 that she saw no issue with 
Dacic distancing himself and the party from Milosevic: "Dacic 
was 16 when Milosevic was in power. I see no problem with 
change, or not identifying with Milosevic," she said.  She 
thought a pro-EU integration stand was a good thing for the 
Socialists and good for Serbia. "You can be married, divorce, 
and marry again. People can change. I didn't want to wear the 
young pioneers red scarf when Tito was in power but I did," she 
said. 
 
 
 
7.  (SBU) Political party observers remain skeptical.  Canak 
told the DCM that a DS-SPS deal was impossible.  On whether 
Socialists could ever become a pro-European force and join a 
coalition, Canak said they would not be good partners (as they 
were mainly elderly, Milosevic sympathizers, devoid of a youth 
movement) but said they were still "professional politicians" 
who wanted to be in power. Nevertheless, Canak said, there was 
"no chance" of a DS-SPS coalition although Tadic would make 
"pragmatic" efforts to try.   However, Kojen said that Dacic 
lacked the control over his party that Kostunica, Tadic or LDP's 
Cedomir Jovanovic enjoyed, and would not be able to make the 
deal.  Similarly, Aligrudic dismissed talk of a DS-SPS coalition 
to the DCM, saying that Dacic would not be able to convince his 
supporters to make such a move.  "It would be his last act" as 
SPS leader, Aligrudic said. 
 
 
 
LDP: Would Not Join SPS-DS Coalition But Would Support It 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
 
BELGRADE 00000309  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
 
 
8.  (SBU) Zoran Ostojic, Member of the LDP Presidency,  told 
poloff on March 26 that the party  was confident it would clear 
the 5% threshold, saying he thought LDP could get "6, 7 or maybe 
even 8%" of the vote.  Ostojic thought it was probable DS would 
try to form a coalition with the SPS, since LDP would not be 
sufficient for a government coalition.  If the DS had the 
mandate to form a new government, and it chose a coalition with 
SPS, LDP would not join the government, but would give it 
minority support, Ostojic said.  He said, however, that LDP's 
continued support would be contingent upon DS meeting certain 
timelines, such as handing over of Mladic to ICTY.  Ostojic said 
LDP would not put other requests "or blackmail" on the DS to 
form a government. 
 
 
 
Comment 
 
------- 
 
 
 
9.  (SBU) In the upcoming parliamentary elections, mathematical 
reality will trump ideology.  There is no better proof of this 
than the fact that the two possible governing coalitions that 
will emerge from the election results.  One will pair the face 
of the October 2000 democratic revolution (Kostunica's DSS) with 
Milosevic's political creation (Seselj's Radicals).   The other 
means a coalition between the flagship of the anti-Milosevic 
Democratic Opposition (Tadic's DS) with Milosevic's own party. 
No matter how much each party will try to spin the ideological 
basis for their alliances to their supporters and the 
international community, the cold, hard math dictates one of 
these two coalitions will be necessary to form a new government. 
 While this parlor game of counting parliamentary seats has 
energized the political class, the voters are less likely to be 
so excited.  The clean distinction between Tadic's message of a 
European future and Nikolic's yearning for justice for 
transition's losers may be lost as parties line up for the May 
11 showdown.  This is a pity, considering what is at stake in 
post-Kosovo Serbia: programs and policies, not personalities, 
should be in the spotlight. End Comment. 
MUNTER