VZCZCXRO3012
RR RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLN
RUEHLZ RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHBW #0279/01 0841709
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 241709Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0073
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 0122

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 BELGRADE 000279 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KPAO PBTS PGOV PHUM PINR PREL SR
SUBJECT: SERBIA:  LORD, HOW THIS SANDZAK IS GIVEN TO LYING 
 
REF: A) ZAGREB 197; B) BELGRADE 104; C) 07 BELGRADE 1627; D) 07 BELGRADE 1394 
 
BELGRADE 00000279  001.2 OF 005 
 
 
Summary 
 
------- 
 
 
 
¶1.  (SBU) The ethnically-Muslim region of Sandzak remains a 
tense volatile area, prone to sporadic violence as a result of a 
feud between two rival Islamic associations.  The May 11 
parliamentary and local elections in Sandzak provide both an 
opportunity to vote out a particularly distasteful local leader, 
Novi Pazar Mayor Sulejman Ugljanin, and an opportunity for the 
100,000 ethnic Muslim electorate to vote against a Radical 
government.  During a March 17-18 visit to Serbia's ethnically 
Muslim Sandzak region, locals told an international U.S., German 
and OSCE delegation enough variations on the March 7 shooting in 
Tutin to ensure that the real truth behind the shootings would 
remain in Sandzakian obscurity, and also that tension, violence 
and intimidation would remain a way of life at least through the 
May 11 national and local elections.  Local ethnic Muslim 
"Bosnjak" entrepreneurs, accustomed to being accepted equally by 
Serbs and Albanians (or at least equally mistrusted by both) in 
Kosovo, claim cross-border trade has dropped precipitously since 
Kosovo declared independence on February 17.  End Summary. 
 
 
 
Zilkic Vantage Point 
 
-------------------- 
 
 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Eyewitnesses, politicians, religious representatives 
and NGO's can only agree that in the obscure Sandzak 
municipality of Tutin, on March 7, crowds from both of the two 
schisms of the Serbian Islamic Community fought over the laying 
of a corner stone for a new medresa, shots were fired and riot 
police broke up the group.  Requests for details on the cause of 
the fight, who shot first, why the ceremony was planned for 
March 7, why Tutin needed a medresa, and even why there is a 
schism to begin with, evoked a wide-range of emphatic responses 
and accusations of mendacity thrown at anyone else with a 
different view.  DCM's delegation could only conclude that the 
intra-Islamic community dispute was far from resolved and would 
likely serve to inflame passions again in the future.  The 
delegation also concluded that the dispute had nothing to do 
with religious doctrine and everything to do with politics and 
money, and was also being driven by the split between Prime 
Minister Kostunica and President Tadic. 
 
 
 
¶3.  (SBU) The chronology of Serbia's Islamic Community schism 
has been outlined in reftels.  Though Sandzak had been largely 
violence-free since the November 16, 2007 shooting  around Novi 
Pazar's Central Mosque, the two groups have continued to take 
potshots at each other and maneuver for position as Serbia's 
legitimate heir to Islamic land-holdings nationalized after 
World War II.  The urgency of establishing one or the other 
group as the political successor is all the more acute as Serbia 
moves to implement a restitution law in October that will return 
significant real estate to the Islamic Community. 
 
 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Upstart Islamic Community Reis-ul-Ulema (Head) Adem 
Zilkic is supported by Novi Pazar Mayor Sulejman Ugljanin, who 
is in political alliance with Prime Minister Kostunica. 
Ugljanin's Democratic Action Party of Sandzak (SDA) General 
Secretary Nermin Bejtovic told DCM's delegation on March 17 that 
 
SIPDIS 
the creation of the new community was necessitated by Serbia's 
new religious law and that it was intolerable for Serbia's 
Islamic Community to be subordinate to the Sarajevo Reis 
(located in another country -- Bosnia-Herzegovina) precisely 
because of land restitution issues.  Serbian land could not be 
returned to a foreign owner.  He blamed Sandzak Grand Mufti 
Zukorlic for continuing to instigate violent incidents and 
complained that Sandzak's police and judiciary were failing in 
their duties to contain Zukorlic.  "It's not normal for one 
group to continuously disrupt the police and for the police to 
not respond," he said.  According to Bejtovic, Zukorlic's "band 
of 20 bodyguards" were freely roaming the streets of Sandzak, 
fully armed with unregistered weapons, and the police did 
nothing to stop them. 
 
 
 
 
BELGRADE 00000279  002.2 OF 005 
 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Bejtovic was backed up by Tutin Mayor Semsudin 
Kucevic, who met with the delegation in Tutin on March 18. 
Kucevic also complained bitterly about the incompetence of his 
local police and judiciary saying that they knew full well that 
Zukorlic was arming his supporters and trying to exert his 
control over Tutin, which clearly was Zilkic territory. 
"Zukorlic has no local support among the Islamic faithful in 
Tutin, and he knows it."  Kucevic claimed Zukorlic instigated 
the March 7 violence when his people threw rocks at locals 
trying to block the corner-stone laying.  Kucevic added that the 
medrese issue was not new, that Zilkic's people had clear claim 
to the medrese construction site as was documented from permits 
from the Ministries of Religion, Infrastructure and Internal 
Affairs.  (Note:  All run by DSS coalition ministers.  End 
Note.). 
 
 
 
¶6.  (SBU) More lurid details to Zukorlic's alleged fall from 
holiness were offered by Zilkic's Chief of Staff Jakub ef. 
Lekovic and Deputy Mufti Hasib ef. Suljovic, who met with the 
delegation on March 17.  They described themselves and Zilkic's 
community as the rightful authority for Islam in Serbia, because 
they had filed all their papers legally, and had a constitution 
and statute, per the new law on religion.  Zukorlic refused to 
acknowledge this new legal reality which made him disrespectful 
of local law.  Though Suljovic claimed he had been Novi Pazar's 
Central Mosque's Mufti for 20 years, Zukorlic took over the 
mosque by force in November, 2007.  "Now I can't even get into 
my own mosque!"  Furthermore, Suljovic claimed, when police 
finished their investigation of the March 7 event in Tutin, they 
found that Zukorlic had hidden plastic coated steel pipes under 
the makeshift stage, as proof Zukorlic's people had planned to 
beat Zilkic's.  Zukorlic had not always been such a bad guy, 
Suljovic said, but turned political in the mid-nineties and had 
even tried to start his own political party.  Suljovic noted 
Zukorlic's charm but said he lost the respect of his 
parishioners when, after getting rid of wife number two, wife 
number three gave birth to a child less than nine months after a 
wedding ceremony.  Unprompted, Lekovic added that the need to 
decide on a legitimate authority for Serbia's Islamic Community 
was acute because of the upcoming implementation of the 
restitution law and the need to return Islamic lands to the 
rightful authority. 
 
 
 
Zukorlic Vantage Point 
 
---------------------- 
 
 
 
¶7.  (SBU) "Liars, thugs, and criminals," Zukorlic thundered when 
the delegation met with him on March 17.  "Ugljanin and his dupe 
Zilkic are determined to violate our personal and collective 
rights; this situation is only going to get worse."  Also 
referring to the new law on religions, Zukorlic complained that 
the law elevated the Serbian Orthodox Church to national church 
status and relegated Serbia's other religions to second class 
status.  In order to further weaken the Islamic community, 
Zukorlic said, Kostunica ordered the creation of a parallel 
Islamic organization, headed by Zilkic.  According to Zukorlic, 
Zilkic earned his title by telling locals at Friday prayer that 
they were not good Muslims if they didn't vote for Sulejman 
Ugljanin. 
 
 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Zukorlic defended his decision to hold the 
corner-stone laying ceremony on March 7 saying "it's spring, 
time to build."  He claimed considerable work already had been 
done on the medrese's foundation and that the corner-stone 
ceremony should not have been a provocation.  He said Zilkic's 
armed thugs started coming after the ceremony attendees, but 
left when the riot police showed up, thereby giving the picture 
that the conflict was solely between Zukorlic's "unarmed" 
faithful, and fully kitted-out riot police.  He claims his 
driver was shot three times by the police.  Zukorlic said he 
agreed to give up further work on the medrese when he heard that 
the next day 1000 riot police were scheduled to descend on Tutin 
and also that Novi Pazar military barracks had been put on alert 
to deploy to Tutin. 
 
 
 
¶9.  (SBU) If surroundings signal any kind of legitimacy, 
Zukorlic clearly is the best ensconced.  His offices occupy a 
number of buildings on a fenced in compound and his office is 
 
BELGRADE 00000279  003.2 OF 005 
 
 
paneled by hard-carved wood from the famous Bosnian Konjic 
woodworkers and silk pillows.  Zilkic works out of a storefront. 
 Zukorlic has served as Serbia's chief mufti since 1993 when he 
was appointed by Sarajevo's Reis-ul-Ulema Ceric to whom the 
ex-Yugoslav Islamic communities still report.  During DCM's last 
visit he gave her a copy of a letter signed by Ceric to 
President Tadic requesting that Tadic acknowledge Zukorlic as 
Serbia's Chief Mufti.  In response to DCM's question, Zukorlic 
said Tadic had never responded to Ceric, but that he had quietly 
lent his support by paying a visit on Zukorlic when he visited 
Novi Pazar during his election campaign.  Tadic had requested no 
press for the visit.  During the delegation's next day visit to 
Tutin, Mayor Kucevic also cited this "secret" meeting with 
Tadic, as well as a subsequent meeting with Defense Minister 
Sutanovic as "proof" Zukorlic had the support of DS and the 
Serbian military 
 
 
 
NGO Vantage Point 
 
----------------- 
 
 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Many of Sandzak's prominent NGOs/civil society groups 
have formed a local political action group called "Political 
Front for Change."  Representatives of this group told the 
delegation on March 17 that the Zilkic-led Islamic Organization 
was clearly designed by Prime Minister Kostunica to keep the 
Bosjnak community off balance and to keep Sandzak at a simmer, 
if only to demonstrate Serbia's political instability.  They 
linked this to Kostunica's Kosovo policy saying the Prime 
Minister was determined to show the world how Kosovo 
independence further destabilized the Balkans.  Zukorlic was no 
innocent either, they insisted, and concurred that he had made 
himself vulnerable by building himself into a locally political 
figure as important as Ugljanin.  A requisite to any stability 
in Sandzak, they insisted, was getting rid of Ugljanin in the 
May 11 local elections.  The group said it would depend on an 
international presence during these elections because Ugljanin 
was sure to try to steal them.  He was not above arming his 
party's poll-standers and physically threatening those who would 
not vote for his party.  He could also be expected to create a 
significant number of new jobs before the elections, in order to 
"buy" the votes of new municipal employees and their extended 
families.  In spite of this tremendous pressure, these typically 
gloom-and-doom activists believed democratic forces had a good 
chance of voting out Ugljanin.  They feared, however, that he 
would not go peacefully, though they were not sure how he would 
fight to keep his position. 
 
 
 
Elections Maneuvering 
 
--------------------- 
 
 
 
¶11.  (SBU) In spite of the animosity between the two major 
Bosnjak parties - Minister of Labor and Social Policy Rasim 
Ljajic's Sandzak Democratic Party (SDP) and Mayor Ugljanin's 
Kostunica-backed Democratic Action Party (SDA) - the two went 
into a brief coalition on the eve of the second round 
presidential elections to support Tadic.  Though Prime Minister 
Kostunica did not endorse any candidate in the second round, 
even the SDA could not vote for the Radicals. 
 
 
 
¶12.  (SBU) SDA's Bejtovic and Kutevic (also a SDA VP) said they 
were calling on SDP to join a Sandzak Bosnjak "list," and said 
they might be reluctant to sign an electoral code of conduct if 
SDP were in coalition with Tadic's Democratic Party.  Bejtovic 
said a joint list could yield six parliamentary delegates 
(versus the current four held by SDP) and also the possibility 
of two minister positions. 
 
 
 
¶13.  (SBU) "Nonsense," SDP delegate Mujo Mukovic, told the 
delegation during a March 17 meeting, "SDA does not have enough 
votes to get more than one seat, maybe two; we're much better 
off sticking with the DS coalition and looking at a bigger pie 
to divide, if the coalition wins."  Mukovic and his SDP 
colleagues denied any role in the Islamic Community schism, 
saying although Zilkic clearly had less legitimacy, Zukorlic's 
increasingly more political role in Sandzak politics had made 
 
BELGRADE 00000279  004.2 OF 005 
 
 
him vulnerable.  SDP agreed, however, that the feud was cooked 
by Kostunica in order to keep the Bosnjaks divided.  In local 
elections, Mukovic said he would not rule out a coalition with 
the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), saying they were eager to 
cooperate, if it meant an end to Ugljanin's "dictatorship." 
 
 
 
¶14.  (SBU) Local LDP leaders, accompanied by Belgrade-based LDP 
Party Presidency member Zoran Ostojic, were not so enthusiastic 
about a coalition with SDP.  "Choosing between Ljajic and 
Ugljanin," local LDP leader Hajram Djekic told the delegation, 
"is like choosing between cancer and leukemia."  Djekic added 
that SDP needed LDP more than the reverse, noting that LDP's 
showing was strongest - sixteen percent - in the Sandzak in the 
first round of presidential elections in January, and that the 
percentage steadily was growing. 
 
 
 
Trade with Kosovo Dropping 
 
-------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶15.  (SBU) On March 18, DCM met with local entrepreneurs and 
recipients of USAID grants for developing small businesses.  The 
group represented a variety of enterprises ranging from computer 
services to dairy production to jeans manufacturing.  After 
discussing their business plans, the group noted that their 
trade had dropped significantly by the closure of the 
administrative line crossing points leading into 
Albanian-controlled Kosovo.  They said they still were able to 
get goods into Northern Mitrovica through the northern 
administrative line.  The problem with getting goods into 
Albanian-held territory, they said, was the Serbian 
administrative border line officials refused to acknowledge any 
documents, be it business registration licenses or import 
permits, from the government in Pristina.  These Sandzak 
entrepreneurs said that Bosnjaks had been able to play a 
middleman role - equally trusted and distrusted - by both 
Kosovar Albanians and Serbs.  In this way they had been able to 
provide both with much needed goods and services.  They said 
that Northern Mitrovica Serbs and Kosovar Albanians were not 
suffering so much from this disruption to trade, the former had 
effectively abolished the northern administrative line and the 
latter had effectively implemented trade workarounds by going 
through Montenegro and Macedonia.  Those suffering the most, 
they said, were the Serbs living in the enclaves who had to pay 
10 times more the market rate for basic goods, mostly as a 
result of mark-ups for tycoon/Mafia-backed Serbs beating the 
trade embargo by establishing a high-priced smuggling network. 
 
 
 
¶16.  (SBU) Equally, Sandzak Bosnjaks said they were reluctant to 
reach out to Kosovar Albanians with whom they had had trade 
relations because of "the message from Sombor."  By this they 
were referring to the boycott of Albanian bakeries by Serbs in 
the Vojvodina municipality of Sombor (reftel A).  From these 
incidents, Bosnjaks said the signal was clear that anyone doing 
business with Albanians would pay a price.  They said they had 
sympathy for the Albanian businesses that were affected by this 
action, saying many had been peacefully living in Vojvodina for 
generations.  They noted that by this apparently 
government-supported act, Kostunica's government was sending out 
the clear signal it had no respect for minority rights - just as 
the government simultaneously was decrying "lack" of minority 
rights for Serbs in Kosovo. 
 
 
 
Comment 
 
------- 
 
 
 
¶17.  (SBU) Historically a powder keg, Sandzak remains in a slow 
simmer, intentionally heated by Prime Minister Kostunica's 
ethnic games.  Having long ago given up aspirations of 
unification with Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sandzak remains a test case 
for Serbia's respect for minority rights, an exam Serbia 
continues to fail dismally.  Local and parliamentary elections 
in Sandzak are likely to be as dirty as anywhere in Serbia, 
thereby requiring special attention.  Potential for outside 
Islamic influence to grow in Sandzak rises in proportion to the 
degree that the Serbian central government in Belgrade either 
 
BELGRADE 00000279  005.2 OF 005 
 
 
ignores Bosnjak minority rights or continues to manipulate 
intra-Bosjak differences.  End Comment. 
MUNTER