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Viewing cable 08BAGHDAD767, 2008 IAGGA: IRAQ'S Anti-Corruption Efforts in 2006-2007

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08BAGHDAD767 2008-03-14 13:57 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Baghdad
VZCZCXRO5244
PP RUEHBC RUEHDA RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #0767/01 0741357
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 141357Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6240
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000767 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
STATE FOR INL/C/CP, INL/I, NEA/I and S/I 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: IZ KCOR KCRM PGOV EAID PREL
SUBJECT:   2008 IAGGA:  IRAQ'S Anti-Corruption Efforts in 2006-2007 
 
REF:  A.  State 18836, B.  07 Baghdad 3992 
 
1.  Summary.  While the corrosive effects of public corruption 
continue to plague Iraqi society, the Government of Iraq (GOI) 
recently has taken a number of positive steps aimed at ameliorating 
this problem.  Cognizant of the fact that corruption endangers the 
stability and security of the state, GOI has strengthened its 
anti-corruption agencies and moved toward improving overall 
governmental transparency and accountability.  Moreover, U.S. 
government-funded assistance programs have been a crucial factor in 
the progress that GOI has made in combating corruption.  Post 
continues to liaise with its Iraqi counterparts as part of its 
ongoing support for Iraq's anti-corruption efforts and broader civil 
society initiatives.  End summary. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
GOI Anti-Corruption Achievements 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
2.  On May 3, 2007, GOI committed itself to a collection of 
anti-corruption measures with its formal adoption of the 
International Compact with Iraq.  These commitments including: 
-- developing merit-based practices for public sector employment, 
-- launching an anti-corruption public education campaign, 
-- establishing a unit to recover assets that are the proceeds of 
corrupt dealings, and 
-- developing comprehensive internal and external controls within 
the government. 
 
3.  On January 3, 2008, GOI convened its first conference dedicated 
to fighting public corruption.  At this event, Deputy Prime Minister 
Barham Saleh noted that Prime Minister Maliki has described 
corruption as "a great challenge" that must be the "first and basic 
priority for the government."  The Deputy Prime Minister then 
presented a comprehensive year-long initiative to strengthen Iraq's 
resistance to corrupt practices and promote efficient and effective 
investigation and prosecution of corruption charges.  The GOI 
Anti-Corruption Initiative includes the following key benchmarks: 
-- improving public access to information on the expenditure of 
state funds, 
-- enacting clear guidelines for public contracting, amending the 
enabling legislation for Iraq's anti-corruption agencies:  (the 
Iraqi Inspectors General - IGs, the Board of Supreme Audit - BSA, 
and the Commission on Integrity - COI) to ensure inter-agency 
cooperation, 
-- ensuring public access to reports and audits by the 
anti-corruption agencies, and 
-- drafting a new law on administrative corruption. 
 
Post is monitoring progress on all these benchmarks and working with 
its GOI partners to support these initiatives. 
 
4.  At the heart of the GOI's anti-corruption efforts lie Iraq's 
three primary anti-corruption institutions: the IGs, BSA, and COI. 
While the still-challenging security situation impinges on their 
ability to function, all three have improved certain aspects of 
their operations over the past two years. 
-- All GOI ministries now have an Office of the Inspector General. 
This accomplishment is worthy of note, as the concept of independent 
Inspectors General was only introduced into Iraq's political culture 
in 2003. 
-- BSA continues to grow its audit capacity and has increased its 
presence in the provinces.  BSA is also working more closely with 
COI and the IGs, and often provides audit training for new IG 
staffers. 
-- In 2006, COI rolled out a financial disclosure program, which 
requires all mid- and high-level GOI officials to enumerate their 
assets.  COI is addressing concerns voiced by some ministries and 
actively working to make the program more effective and less 
burdensome.  COI's recently appointed Commissioner has also 
broadened the institution's focus; rather than concentrate solely on 
enforcement, he has repeatedly stressed his intention to 
reinvigorate COI's public education and transparency departments. 
-- All three anti-corruption agencies currently are working with the 
UNDP to design comprehensive, long-term training programs for their 
employees. 
--   The Council of Representative's Committee on Integrity also 
takes an active role in addressing public corruption issues. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
U.S. Anti-Corruption Assistance Programs 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
5.  U.S. officials - civilian and military - regularly engage GOI on 
the urgent need to attack corruption in the public sphere.  The U.S. 
supports Iraq's struggle against corruption through assistance 
programs that: 
-- train auditors, inspectors, and investigators in Iraq's 
anti-corruption agencies to recognize and investigate fraud, waste 
and abuse; 
-- mentor Iraqi criminal investigators on the Major Crimes Task 
Force who are assigned to high-profile corruption cases; 
 
BAGHDAD 00000767  002 OF 002 
 
 
-- mentor prosecutors and judges who manage corruption-related cases 
in the judicial system; 
-- build technical capacity and procedural safeguards in ministries 
and provincial and local governments to defend public resources 
against the threat of corruption; 
-- support hotlines, which allow Iraqi citizens to report instances 
of public corruption without fear of reprisal; and 
-- facilitate local partnerships on a neighborhood level to promote 
and monitor delivery of essential services. 
 
Additionally, the Embassy's Public Affairs Section and Political 
Section, through its DRL-funded programs have conducted an array of 
programs geared toward exposing Iraqi journalists, editors, GOI 
officials, and journalist syndicates and unions to the styles and 
norms of a free press. 
 
6.  USAID continues to implement programs whose focus is on capacity 
development and civil society.  The anti-corruption component of 
USAID's Tatweer project concentrates on professional training that 
is designed to enhance the skills of Iraq's IGs.  On the civil 
society front, USAID's Local Governance Program II works closely 
with Iraq's provincial governments and the PRTs in order to promote 
good government and transparency.   The Political Section also 
oversees other DRL-funded programs which provide substantial 
institutional training to the GOI, political parties, and civil 
society organizations, all of which promote good governance by 
strengthening the linkage between government and political party 
officials and staff with the Iraqi population, with an emphasis on 
transparency and accountability. 
 
7.  U.S. diplomatic engagement has concentrated on improving 
coordination among various Iraqi anti-corruption stakeholders.  In 
2007, post worked with GOI partners to facilitate the creation of 
the Joint Anti-Corruption Committee (JACC).  The JACC constituted 
the first time GOI's main anti-corruption agencies formally 
coordinated their efforts both with each other and with 
representatives from the Council of Representatives and the Prime 
Minister's Office. 
 
8. In late 2007, following an internal assessment of existing USG 
anti-corruption programs and policies, Ambassador Crocker solicited 
the Department's support for an Embassy initiative designed to 
strengthen USG programs and outreach to combat corruption. (Ref B) 
The Ambassador proposed a restructuring of the Embassy's approach to 
public integrity and anti-corruption issues, including the creation 
of a new senior-level Coordinator for Anti-Corruption Issues.  On 
March 11, 2008, the State Department announced the appointment of 
Ambassador Lawrence Benedict as Embassy Baghdad's Anti-Corruption 
Coordinator.  He will be responsible for assisting the GOI with its 
battle against governmental waste, fraud, and abuse.  The 
appointment of an Anti-Corruption Coordinator and the revitalized 
efforts of the Embassy's interagency Anti-Corruption Working Group 
demonstrate the Embassy's commitment to combating public corruption 
in Iraq.  Ambassador Benedict will arrive at post in late March 2008 
and will play an integral role in designing and implementing the 
Embassy's anti-corruption strategy. 
 
------------------------ 
Challenges Remain 
------------------------ 
 
 9.  Despite the GOI's tangible progress in many areas, much work 
remains to be done.  Iraq still does not possess the capacity to 
recover public assets stolen by corrupt actors.  Furthermore, the 
anti-corruption agencies lack the funds and trained personnel 
necessary to implement their mandates.  These are but two of the 
myriad areas in need of improvement.  Recent events, however, have 
demonstrated commitment within the government to pursue the fight 
against corruption in the years to come. 
 
CROCKER