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O 130931Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY ANTANANARIVO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1065
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ANTANANARIVO 000195 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/FO, AF/E AND AF/RSA MBITTRICK 
PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS KDEM PHUM PINR CN
SUBJECT: Why We Should Help the Comoros with Maritime Logistical 
Support 
 
REF:  A) ANTAN 186 
      B) 3/12 Marquardt-Beyzerov/Bittrick/Orth telcon 
 
¶1.  (SBU)  As I write this, AU troops from Tanzania and Senegal, and 
perhaps also Sudan and Libya, are arriving in Moroni, on Grande 
Comore Island, by various means.  According to the Union government, 
over 1,000 foreign troops are expected to come augment their own 
"Army of National Development" (AND) force of perhaps 400; about 400 
Tanzanian and Senegalese have already arrived.  While the Union 
government has now met repeatedly with defense counterparts of the 
other four nations and the AU, and reportedly developed an 
operational plan for the Anjouan mission, it seems clear that they 
cannot execute their plan without additional maritime lift 
capability for these soldiers and their equipment. 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  Given this situation, twice in the past five days Comoran 
Foreign Minister Jaffar has phoned me to request U.S. military 
logistical/maritime lift support (REF A).  His second request came 
on Tuesday, March 11, after I had informed him that no U.S. naval 
vessel is within reasonable steaming distance of the Comoros at this 
time; this time, he requested our help in locating and contracting 
for a commercial vessel somewhere in the sub-region that would be 
capable fulfilling their mission. 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  Following reftelcon, I informed the Comoran Defense and 
Foreign Ministers that we were attempting to respond positively to 
their second request for maritime logistical support, but that to do 
so we would need considerable, additional, detailed information 
about their plan.   Defense Minister Dossar told me he would provide 
that "precious information" on March 13 (to be transmitted 
separately).  Additionally I told him that Defense Attache Bridges 
will arrive in Moroni on March 14 to assist in their planning and 
preparations.  Both Ministers were relieved and appreciative of the 
prospect of this support. 
 
--  (SBU)  I greatly appreciate Washington agencies' willingness to 
consider positively this Comoran request for support; without our 
support, I fear this mission will not succeed.  As we take the next 
steps in responding to their request, I wanted to provide the 
following input on why I think that it is in our national interest 
to provide U.S. logistics support to the Union of the Comoros and 
African Union to transport troops and equipment from friendly 
nations to and/or within the Comoros: 
 
--  (SBU)  American involvement in this action generally, and U.S. 
logistics participation specifically, raises considerably the 
possibility that, when they realize they truly are facing an 
overwhelming force, Colonel Bacar and his associates will throw in 
the towel and end this crisis without further bloodshed.  With U.S. 
military support in the form of an amphibious vessel, surface 
combatant, or even a contracted commercial vessel, its mere presence 
would signify a powerful commitment of the U.S. military to assist 
in the current crisis.  This may finally convince Colonel Bacar that 
he has absolutely no chance to win and that his fall is imminent and 
inevitable. 
 
--  (SBU)  Success of the mission will help establish much-needed 
credibility for the African Union; failure here will have exactly 
the opposite effect.  This would negatively impact U.S. interests in 
places like Darfur, where we are counting on the AU for serious 
support.  Tanzanian Foreign Minister Membe told us as much, "As AU 
President, Tanzania will see to it that this organization is 
relevant and effective.  If we cannot solve this tiny problem in 
Anjouan, what hope do we have in other crises in Africa?" 
 
--  (SBU)  As we struggle on a global basis to convince Muslim 
audiences that we are not against them in the War on Terror, here is 
a rare opportunity, at low cost and low risk, to respond to an 
invitation from a friendly Muslim democracy to cooperate militarily 
with a largely Muslim, multinational force intervening to restore 
democracy on their territory.  The Arab League participated with the 
U.S. and others in the recent ultimatum mission to see Colonel Bacar 
and remains engaged in the Comoros in support of President Sambi. 
The Muslim world will not soon forget this positive American reply 
to the cry for help from one of their own. 
 
--  (SBU)  Iran's influence in the Comoros remains a wild card. 
Recent unconfirmed press reports indicate Comoros has "opened an 
Embassy" in Tehran.  U.S. logistics support for Sambi will be 
greatly appreciated by the already pro-American President; to the 
detriment of Iran's influence in the Comoros.  The opposite also 
holds true; the longer Comoros looks for friends, the further they 
 
ANTANANARI 00000195  002 OF 002 
 
 
may look. 
 
--  (SBU)  For several years, the Comoros has been an ally in the 
war on terrorism.  They cooperate with DAO and RSO on 
counterterrorism training, information-sharing, border controls, and 
the Rewards for Justice program.  Harun Fazul, born in the Comoros 
but radicalized elsewhere, is the shame of moderate Comorans.  U.S. 
logistics support for the legitimate President Sambi, and in defense 
of Comoros' unity and stability, will both reinforce their 
motivation to cooperate on terrorism and actively prevent the 
country from becoming a haven for terrorist activity.  Bringing 
Anjouan back in to the Union will help us address concerns there 
about drug smuggling, money laundering, shell banking, and other 
rule of law issues. 
 
--  (SBU) We also will have demonstrated a sensitivity for the 
uncomfortable French position in the Indian Ocean, where they 
continue in a touchy situation given their continuing control of the 
fourth Comoran island of Mayotte.  Giving them political cover to 
date has permitted their own limited support of the Union 
government, which otherwise they probably would have avoided.  Our 
intervention gets them off the hook from providing something of 
which they are capable technically, but not politically.  This in 
turn gives us leverage the next time we need their help elsewhere in 
Africa where they have capabilities that we do not. 
 
--  (SBU)  Finally, on a purely bilateral basis, this support will 
leave no doubt in the minds of Comorans (and their neighbors) that 
we truly are their friends and allies.  We will have demonstrated 
that we are willing to step up when a democratically-elected Islamic 
government is challenged by a despotic thug.  Clearly this is what 
President Sambi was looking for in his historic January meeting in 
Moroni with Ambassador Frazer.  Even if the Comoros is one of the 
world's smallest countries, this will pay dividends for us far into 
the future. 
 
MARQUARDT