VZCZCXYZ0004
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHIN #0462/01 0910858
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 310858Z MAR 08
FM AIT TAIPEI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8601
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 8113
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 9353

UNCLAS AIT TAIPEI 000462 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD - NIDA EMMONS 
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS 
 
 
¶1. Summary:  Taiwan's major Chinese-language dailies focused their 
March 29-31 news coverage on their interviews with 
president-election Ma Ying-jeou Friday, who talked about his views 
on the future of cross-Strait relations, Taipei-Washington 
relations, and Taiwan's domestic policies; on AIT Chairman Raymond 
Burghardt's visit to Taiwan Friday; on Ma's interest in visiting the 
United States; on the "1992 consensus"; and on personnel changes in 
the defeated DPP. 
 
¶2. In terms of editorials and commentaries, an op-ed in the 
mass-circulation "Apple Daily" discussed several possible pressures 
that Ma's election might bring about with respect to Beijing, even 
though Ma has promised to reduce the tensions and to reconcile with 
China.  An editorial in the centrist, KMT-leaning "China Times" 
urged both sides of the Taiwan Strait to resume dialogue with 
prudence and patience.  An editorial in the conservative, 
pro-unification, English-language "China Post" questioned why U.S. 
President George W. Bush sent a garbled message to Taipei -- namely, 
Bush urged Beijing and Taipei to resume dialogue in his telephone 
conversation with Chinese President Hu Jintao, but when AIT Chairman 
Burghardt was in Taipei over the weekend, he told Taipei that the 
United States does not want to mediate in the Taiwan issue.  An 
editorial in the pro-independence, English-language "Taipei Times," 
on the other hand, called the "1992 consensus" a lie created by 
Legislator Su Chi of the KMT,  which is now able to trick the Bush 
administration into thinking that it ever existed.  End summary. 
 
 
A) "Ma Ying-jeou Brings International Pressure to Beijing" 
 
Litai Xue, a research associate in the Center for International 
Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, opined in the 
mass-circulation "Apple Daily" [circulation: 520,000] (3/29): 
 
"...  First, in the wake of [Taiwan's] presidential election, the 
relations between Washington and Beijing will tend to stabilize for 
a certain period of time.  Changes that are expected to follow 
closely will be the possibility for the United States to adjust its 
Taiwan policy.  Previously, [Washington] tended to focus on 
stabilizing the cross-Strait situation and encouraging contact 
between the two sides.  From now on, perhaps it will put special 
emphasis on preventing the momentum of quick improvement in terms of 
across-Strait relations.  Henceforth, Washington will likely adjust 
its policy depending on the development of the situation and start 
to prevent the cross-Strait status quo from having a dramatic 
shake-up as a result of the increasingly intimate contact between 
the two sides.  As a result, Beijing will inevitably face new 
pressure from the Western world. ... 
 
"The Western countries used to be able to tolerate China's sharp and 
continuous increase in its military budget because Beijing had to 
strengthen its military buildup in preparation for the contingencies 
in term of cross-Strait situation.  In the foreseeable future, if 
the threat of de jure Taiwan independence is diminished while China 
continues its sharp increase in its military budget to boost its new 
and advanced naval and air force capabilities, the United States 
will surely believe that the trend will sooner or later constitute a 
threat to the U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific region. 
... 
 
"Consequently, the pressure [that Beijing will face] may come from 
the overseas Chinese community.  Over the recent years, quite a few 
overseas Chinese tended to support Beijing's policy against Taiwan 
independence primarily because of their pro-China mentality.  That 
was partially because the DPP administration only paid attention to 
overseas Taiwan people and disregarded overseas Chinese.  Now that 
the KMT has regained power, Taipei will naturally change the 
original nearsighted policy toward overseas Chinese. ...  Taipei 
will continue to emphasize the huge differences between Beijing and 
Taipei with regard to democracy and human rights, which will be very 
convincing for the overseas Chinese community. ...  All these will 
form a situation in which Beijing and Taipei are vying with each 
other for the centripetal force of overseas Chinese.  A certain 
number of overseas Chinese will change their minds and take a 
position in favor of Taipei.  As a result, Beijing will face 
challenges on two separate fronts when handling cross-Strait 
relations. ...  This might be another kind of pressure Beijing will 
face from the outside world." 
 
B) "Resume Dialogue across the Taiwan Strait with Prudence and 
Patience" 
 
The centrist, KMT-leaning "China Times" [circulation: 400,000] 
editorialized (3/31): 
 
"... The Beijing authorities should be clearly aware that Taiwan, 
after being ruled by Ma Ying-jeou, will no longer manipulate 
cross-Strait issues in a provocative manner.  In other words, at 
least for the next four years, the island will not frequently use 
 
such means as writing a new constitution, rectifying the island's 
name, or bundling referenda with the presidential election to 
'create trouble' and deliberately generate tension in the region. 
But for Ma, no matter how 'pragmatic' he seeks to be, cannot 
possibly 'turn a blind eye' to the hundreds of missile deployed by 
Beijing targeting Taiwan.  Nor can he possibly 'sit back and watch' 
Taiwan's long-term situation of being excluded by international 
organizations.  Surely he will not 'seal his lips ' with regard to 
mainland China's human rights measures. ... 
 
"One can say that, should the Beijing authorities expect to see any 
breakthroughs in the future development of cross-Strait relations, 
it cannot just have its leaders express goodwill via well-disposed 
speeches.  If the military still insists on increasing the number of 
missiles targeting Taiwan and conducting exercises with the intent 
to use force against Taiwan, and if Beijing's agency in charge of 
foreign relations insist on luring away Taiwan's allies and 
continues its suppression of Taiwan's attempt to participate in the 
international community, the chances are slim for Beijing to expect 
Ma to act and think magnanimously in terms of his future 
cross-Strait policy." 
 
C) "How China Can Be Reunited" 
 
The conservative, pro-unification, English-language "China Post" 
[circulation: 30,000] editorialized (3/30): 
 
"Uncle Sam is sending a garbled diplomatic message to Taiwan again. 
President George W. Bush had a telephone conversation with his 
Chinese opposite number Hu Jintao last week and they were agreed 
Taipei should start dialogue with Beijing right away on the basis of 
what is known as the consensus of 1992. Then Raymond Burghardt, 
chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan, rushed to Taipei to 
meet President Chen Shui-bian and president-elect Ma Ying-jeou. 
Burghardt told President Chen how Taipei wants to resume dialogue 
with Beijing is "your own business" and reiterated the U.S. policy 
of playing no mediator role in talks across the Taiwan Strait at a 
roundtable discussion organized by the local press. ... 
 
"All this means there's no need whatsoever for Hu and Bush to beat 
about the bush. Unless President Bush wanted to play mediator, he 
had no reason for making mention of the consensus of 1992 together 
with Hu Jintao. Yet Bush sent Burghardt to Taipei to make it crystal 
clear that the United States will never mediate. ... 
 
"So far Beijing has refused to accept the commonwealth idea. But the 
time seems to have come for an increasingly confident China to 
change its mind. For one thing, it's up to Beijing to determine if 
the people of an area or region of China are accustomed to 
"parliamentary rule" and to grand dominion status after it has so 
determined. It doesn't have to fear Taiwan may set a precedent for 
Tibet or Chinese Turkistan or Hong Kong that may clamor for similar 
status. They have to take more, much more, time to get accustomed to 
democracy. On the other hand, it will be really cost-effective to 
have them join a future commonwealth. The People's Republic doesn't 
have to deploy huge armies in those regions, while enjoying all the 
economic benefits that accrue when the commonwealth is formed. ..." 
 
D) Hypnotism and the '1992 Consensus'" 
 
The pro-independence, English-language "Taipei Times" [circulation: 
30,000] editorialized (3/29): 
 
"If you tell a lie big enough and keep repeating it, White House 
security advisers will eventually come to believe it.  So it is with 
the stubborn myth of the '1992 consensus' between Taiwan and China, 
which now has the distinction of tricking Stephen Hadley, national 
security adviser to US President George W. Bush, into thinking that 
it ever existed. ...  The '1992 consensus' has new impetus today 
partly because of its utility for the incoming administration of 
president-elect Ma Ying-jeou and partly because the DPP has been 
characteristically inept in highlighting its fictional birth.  With 
the highest US officials now subscribing to this mythology, the 
ramifications of this ineptitude are plain to see. ... 
 
"These days, it seems, fiction has a role to play in cross-strait 
affairs if it fits the template of peaceful deference to Chinese 
sensibilities.  For Hadley's benefit, it should be said that Su 
[Chi] is no stranger to creative tweaking of reality.  He had a role 
to play in the dissemination to the US Congress of the 'Bulletgate' 
leaflet composed by KMT think tank members.  This ham-fisted 
propaganda campaign meant to serve as a framework for the 
pan-blue-camp fantasy that the assassination attempt on Chen and the 
vice president on the eve of the 2004 presidential election was 
staged. ..." 
 
YOUNG