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Viewing cable 08AITTAIPEI451, MEDIA REACTION: U.S.-CHINA-TAIWAN RELATIONS, CROSS-STRAIT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08AITTAIPEI451 2008-03-28 08:38 2011-08-23 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
VZCZCXYZ0007
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHIN #0451/01 0880838
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 280838Z MAR 08
FM AIT TAIPEI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8576
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 8096
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 9340
UNCLAS AIT TAIPEI 000451 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD - NIDA EMMONS 
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: U.S.-CHINA-TAIWAN RELATIONS, CROSS-STRAIT 
RELATIONS 
 
 
1. Summary:  Taiwan's major Chinese-language dailies focused their 
March 28 news coverage on U.S. President George W. Bush's call to 
his Chinese counterpart Hu Jintao Wednesday, in which Hu mentioned 
that China is willing to resume dialogue with Taiwan based on the 
"1992 consensus;" on the chances for president-elect Ma Ying-jeou to 
visit the United States before his inauguration on May 20; on Ma's 
visit to former President Lee Teng-hui; and on defeated DPP 
presidential candidate Frank Hsieh's meeting with President Chen 
Shui-bian Thursday.  The pro-unification "United Daily News" ran a 
banner headline on page two that said "Hu Mentions the 1992 
Consensus; U.S.: Very Interesting."  The pro-independence "Liberty 
Times," however, ran a banner headline on page three that read "The 
KMT is Going to Let China Define the 1992 Consensus?" 
 
2. In terms of editorials and commentaries, an editorial in the 
mass-circulation "Apple Daily" speculated on the possible 
development of Washington-Beijing-Taipei relations in the wake of 
Ma's election.  The article said the route from Taipei via 
Washington to Beijing will rapidly shorten the distance between Ma 
and China, and an enormous breakthrough in cross-Strait relations 
will likely emerge.  A "United Daily News" editorial discussed the 
1992 consensus and said it "takes two to tango" for cross-Strait 
relations to improve.  A "Liberty Times" editorial, however, 
exclaimed that the "1992 consensus" marks the beginning of a serious 
crisis for Taiwan's survival.  An op-ed in the pro-independence, 
English-language "Taipei Times" also chimed in by urging Taiwan not 
to use the "1992 consensus" as the foundation for resuming dialogue 
with China, or  Taiwan will end up like Tibet.  A separate "Taipei 
Times" op-ed, written by an Australian-based writer, said China is 
still skeptical about president-elect Ma Ying-jeou.  The op-ed said 
it remains an open question whether Ma is able to work out a clear 
strategy and resolve the difficulties pose to Taiwan and China.  End 
summary. 
 
3. U.S.-China-Taiwan Relations 
 
""Bush, Hu [Jintao], and Ma [Ying-jeou] Triangle" 
 
The mass-circulation "Apple Daily" editorialized [circulation: 
520,000] (3/28): 
 
"... China's attitude is the key factor as to whether [U.S. 
President George W.] Bush allows [Taiwan's president-elect] Ma 
[Ying-jeou] to visit the United States.  It is likely that Bush 
called Hu Jintao to test the latter's attitude and to persuade Hu to 
show some flexibility.  If Hu wants to give Ma Ying-jeou a 
congratulatory gift, the first gift should be his tacit agreement to 
let Washington consent to Ma's visit to the United States.  It 
appears that Hu is not against Ma's visit to the U.S.  If it is 
true, it is very likely that Ma will soon receive an invitation from 
Washington. 
 
"The route [from Taipei to Beijing] via the U.S. will rapidly 
shorten the distance between Ma and China.  A major breakthrough in 
cross-Strait relations will likely emerge.  If China recedes from 
'one China' to 'both Mainland and Taiwan belong to one China,' then 
to the 1992 consensus, there will be a solid foundation for peaceful 
cross-Strait dialogue.  The 1992 consensus (one-China with 
respective interpretations), is the KMT's bottom line, and the KMT 
cannot recede beyond it.  The bottom line of China is one China 
without interpretation, which means everyone recognizes one China 
but does not need to define it explicitly.  There is not much 
difference between the two [the KMT's and China's bottom lines]. 
The 1992 consensus includes one China with respective 
interpretations and one China without interpretation, a foundation 
that both the KMT and the Communists can accept.  That is why 
Beijing feels relieved.  Before now, China has never recognized the 
existence of the 1992 consensus.  Now, 'pushing a boat along with a 
favorable current' is advantageous to both sides. ... 
 
"A third party can play as many as more than ten roles, including 
provider, instructor, bridge builder, mediator, arbitrator, 
balancer, healer, observer, judge and peacekeeper.  In the initial 
stage during the breakthrough of cross-Strait negotiations, the U.S. 
indeed needs to play a third-party role.  To Taiwan, the most 
important role the U.S. should play is peacekeeper, through [the use 
of] force.  With [U.S.] protection, cross-Strait negotiations will 
be nothing but negotiations on the terms of Taiwan's surrender.  Ma 
Ying-jeou's visit to the U.S. has to make the U.S. guarantee these 
roles mentioned above." 
 
4. Cross-Strait Relations 
 
A) "One China with Respective Interpretations; Tango across the 
Strait" 
 
The pro-unification "United Daily News" [circulation: 400,000] 
editorialized (3/28): 
RELATIONS 
 
 
"... First it is necessary [for both China and Taiwan] to establish 
an even structure.  The '1992 consensus/one-China with respective 
interpretations' should be a foundation that both [China and Taiwan] 
accept.  Beijing so far has recognized 'both sides interpreting one 
China' although Taipei keeps saying that it is 'one-China with 
respective interpretations,' Beijing, at least, does not need 
directly to deny Taipei's 'one-China with respective 
interpretations.'  Why not use the '1992 consensus' to envelop 
'one-China with respective interpretations' and 'both sides 
interpreting one China' and let each side say what it wants, as long 
as it does not disagree [with the other side]. 
 
"In this aspect, Beijing has to create more room.  Cross-Strait 
relations so far only use "maintenance of the status quo' as their 
crux.  'Anti-Secession Law' is only opposed to 'de jure Taiwan 
independence.'  [China] cannot avoid facing the existence of the 
Republic of China.  After nearly two decades of power struggle 
across the Taiwan Strait, Beijing has to recognize that there is no 
status quo without the Republic of China; to maintain the status quo 
has to maintain the Republic of China. ..." 
 
B) "'1992 Consensus' Is the Beginning of a Severe Crisis Concerning 
Taiwan's Survival" 
 
The pro-independence "Liberty Times" [circulation: 720,000] 
editorialized (3/28): 
 
"... It is obvious that the 1992 consensus referred to by Hu Jintao 
emphasizes that Taiwan is part of China, and that he does not 
recognize at all that the Republic of China (ROC) or Taiwan is an 
independent sovereign state.  For the 1992 consensus spoken of by Ma 
Ying-jeou, however, even though he stressed that the one China is 
the ROC, he actually lacks historical and legal evidence to prove 
that Taiwan is tantamount to the ROC.  One can say of the 1992 
consensus, be it of Hu or Ma, both regard Taiwan as a part under the 
jurisdiction of either the People's Republic of China or the ROC. 
Despite their differences, [Hu and Ma] both ultimately see Taiwan as 
part of China. ... 
 
"Evidently, the so-called 1992 consensus or one China with both 
sides of the Taiwan Strait agreeing to differ on its definition -- 
words that people are still talking about nowadays -- both deny the 
sovereign status of Taiwan.  China is bent on annexing Taiwan and 
refuses to see Taiwan as a sovereign nation.  Though we are against 
the view of the 1992 consensus, we are not surprised to see it 
[being brought up].  The weird thing is that president-elect Ma, who 
was elected by the Taiwan people, has forgotten Taiwan's sovereignty 
immediately after winning the election.  One can still recall that, 
during the last stage of his campaign, Ma emphasized that Taiwan's 
uture should and will be determined by the 23 million people of 
Taiwan.  One can hardly endorse Ma's political sincerity after 
having seen how he abandoned his promise like disposable utensils. 
 
 
"The UN General Assembly passed Resolution 2758 in 1971, 
acknowledging the PRC as the sole legitimate government representing 
China at the UN.  In this vein, there is hardly any room for the 
international community to imagine that both sides [of the Taiwan 
Strait] recognize that there is only one China but agree to differ 
on its definition.  As long as Taiwan accepts the so-called 1992 
consensus or different definitions of one China, it will be akin to 
accepting in the international community that Taiwan is part of 
China, whose sole legitimate government is the PRC government, and 
that the ROC actually does not exist.  As a result, Ma's wishful 
declaration that the one China is the ROC is nothing but a big joke. 
..." 
 
C) "Learning from Tibet's Experience" 
 
Ruan Ming, a consultant at the Taiwan Research Institute, opined in 
the pro-independence, English-language "Taipei Times" [circulation: 
30,000] (3/28): 
 
"... If Taiwanese can stand united to protect Taiwan's freedom, 
democracy, independence and sovereignty and reject the so-called 
"1992 consensus," the "one China" principle and a peace agreement, 
then China cannot turn Taiwan into another Tibet, and it will not 
dare invade Taiwan, turning Chinese President Hu Jintao's 
'Anti-Secession' Law into nothing more than a useless piece of 
paper. 
 
"But if Taiwan is internally divided and lets China apply pressure 
from the outside, while having the people who have joined up with 
China to suppress Taiwanese independence apply pressure from the 
inside, this double-edged pressure could force Taiwan's president to 
accept the so-called "1992 consensus" and the "one China" principle, 
muddle over Taiwan's independence, sovereignty and democracy, and 
RELATIONS 
 
instead sign a peace agreement with Hu. China is hoping for just 
such a historical opportunity to turn Taiwan into another Tibet. 
..." 
 
D) "Can [Taiwan's president-elect] Ma [Ying-jeou] Work Cross-Strait 
Miracles?" 
 
Sushil Seth, an Australian-based writer, opined in the 
pro-independence, English-language "Taipei Times" [circulation: 
30,000] (3/28): 
 
"... Of course, to mollify China, Ma has also said that his 
administration will not "support Taiwan's de jure independence." He 
believes that within the broad concept of "one China," both sides 
might be free to interpret it in their own way. In other words, 
Taipei will seek to deal with the political side of the relationship 
through creative ambiguity. 
 
"That means Taiwan will maintain its identity and de facto sovereign 
status without challenging the broad concept of "one China" - a 
status quo of sorts. 
 
"Ma might have his own reasons to believe that China will fall for 
this, though it didn't in the past. Either Ma is overestimating his 
reach or China somehow might agree to accommodate him. ..." 
 
YOUNG