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FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1125
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY

UNCLAS THE HAGUE 000180 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCA, L/NPV, IO/MPR, 
SECDEF FOR OSD/GSA/CN,CP> 
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC 
COMMERCE FOR BIS (ROBERTS) 
NSC FOR SMITH 
WINPAC FOR WALTER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP UP FOR 
WEEK ENDING FEBRUARY 22, 2008 
 
REF: A) STATE 17328 
 
This is CWC-09-08. 
 
--------- 
SUMMARY 
--------- 
 
¶1. (U)  The week of February 18 saw quite a number of 
meetings and consultations, several of which were 
convening for the first time this year ) Article X 
(February 18), the entire industry cluster followed 
by sampling and analysis and transfer discrepancies 
(February 19), the Host Country Committee (February 
20), Article VII (February 20), and the Open Ended 
Working Group on Terrorism (February 21). Discussions 
are detailed below.  The U.S. delegation also invited 
the Chinese delegation to a meeting to share views on 
the Review Conference; the productive discussion 
lasted more than two hours with a close convergence 
on key issues. 
 
¶2. (U) The Open Ended Working Group for the Review 
Conference met February 21 but failed either to agree 
on the preliminary agenda or to allow the chairman,s 
draft agenda to be forwarded to the Executive 
Council.  Informal meetings on the agenda followed, 
among the NAM and in an &informal informal8 meeting 
of interested delegations that Amb. Javits chaired on 
Friday afternoon and again on Monday morning. 
Meanwhile, Chairman Parker advised the group that due 
to the large number of comments on the draft report, 
the revised text would be distributed later in the 
week.  The new draft appeared at 6:00 p.m. on Friday 
after many delegations had gone home for the weekend. 
Del expects that this will limit discussion of the 
report at the next OEWG on February 27. 
 
¶3. (U) This cable also includes a scene setter for 
Executive Council 52 March 4 ) 7. 
 
----------------------- 
ARTICLE X CONSULTATIONS 
----------------------- 
 
¶4. (U) On February 18, facilitator Jitka Brodska 
(Czech Republic) chaired the first Article X 
consultations of 2008.  Agenda items included: 
submissions on national protective programs, the 
concept of qualified experts, and a general 
discussion of readiness to provide assistance 
(designed by the facilitator to broaden what was 
otherwise destined to be a monologue by the Iranian 
delegation on its proposal to establish a network for 
the victims of chemical weapons).  The consultation 
was well attended, with active participation from 
many delegations.  TS expertise present included 
International Cooperation and Assistance (ICA) 
Director Amb. Mworia and Assistance and Protection 
Branch (APB) Head Gennadi Lutay. 
 
¶5. (U) Under the first agenda item, the facilitator 
noted that the number of submissions on national 
protective programs actually dropped from 75 in 2006 
to 63 in 2007, a troubling reversal of a trend of 
gradually increasing numbers over the past several 
years.  Lutay expressed concern at this development 
and stressed that the TS is using every possible 
opportunity to encourage States Parties to submit 
this information.  Brodska suggested that perhaps an 
email reminder directly to National Authorities, 
copied to delegations, might be helpful.  Del Rep 
noted U.S. disappointment and recommended 
highlighting concerns in EC-52 and/or RevCon report 
language, a suggestion the facilitator took on board. 
In response to a U.S. query, APB staff assured 
delegations that national protective capacities (i.e. 
the existence or lack thereof of a program) are 
 
always assessed prior to provision of further 
assistance. 
 
¶6. (U) On the concept of qualified experts, the TS 
stated that 112 nominations were received and 
eighteen individuals finally selected as the core 
group of experts.  Experts were selected from three 
fields:  medical, chemical munitions/explosive 
ordnance disposal, and disaster management.  The 
first round of training was held at the OPCW from 28 
January to 1 February 2008.  Information provided on 
the nature of the training itself was limited; the TS 
explained that some administrative issues are being 
worked out but that trainees signed a secrecy 
agreement and received medical clearance, and that 
the group visited Rijswijk, where equipment set aside 
for their use is stored separately. 
 
¶7. (U) Experts are placed on SSA contracts, which 
have a maximum term of 24 months within a 36 month 
period.  When the prospect of additional training 
(e.g. toxic chemical training similar to that 
undergone by inspectors, at a sum of c. 5,000 Euros 
per person) was raised, this led to an interesting 
discussion regarding the potential waste of resources 
training a temporary employee who would have to 
separate from the OPCW for at least a year following 
the first two years of the contract.  The concept of 
temporary employment was, however, supported by NAM 
delegations who stressed the importance of regional 
representation in order to take advantage of training 
offered to the group which could, in turn, lend 
itself to building national and regional capacities. 
The TS explained that regional representation is 
taken into account to the extent possible, and that 
these experts can also participate in regional 
workshops, another way in which their expertise can 
contribute to capacity building. 
 
¶8. (U) Under the third agenda item, the TS was first 
to take the floor to provide an update on its program 
of paying visits to SPs to inspect their Article X 
offers of assistance.  In a welcome development from 
past presentations and discussions, Lutay 
acknowledged that the TS needs to prioritize these 
visits, focusing first on offers of actual equipment 
as opposed to more general offers, such as training. 
Several SPs later reiterated the importance of 
differentiating qualitatively between offers of 
assistance so as to use TS resources most 
effectively.  The TS also confirmed that whenever 
possible, these visits will be coupled with other 
training events or meetings, or be scheduled 
sequentially in a particular region.  In general, the 
TS briefing and responses to questions took a 
 
SIPDIS 
slightly defensive tone, whereas delegations clearly 
wanted evidence of the utility of this practice, to 
include transparent reporting and a possible 
assessment after one year. 
 
¶9. (U) Lutay also briefly mentioned the results of 
the TS participation in the TRIPLEX exercise last 
year, the scenario of which was a natural disaster 
that led to the release of toxic industrial 
chemicals.  Germany pointed out that caution should 
be used to avoid straying from the basic mandate 
under Article X to provide assistance in the case of 
use or threat of use of chemical weapons, and not an 
industrial accident.  Lutay acknowledged this and 
explained that, scenario aside, the response training 
was still valuable.  In the context of such 
exercises, Del Rep noted that an update on TS 
readiness to provide assistance or to conduct an 
investigation of alleged use would be useful at the 
next meeting, as well as an outline of TS planned 
activities and/or areas of focus for the coming year. 
 
¶10. (U) Iran then presented its proposal (circulated 
 
separately to delegations) for establishment of a 
network for the victims of chemical weapons attacks. 
The Iranian delegate recalled his country's own 
experience, and the fact that many doctors expressed 
regret that they had so little knowledge at the time 
of best practices for treatment (long and short 
term).  He added that victims may not realize at the 
time that they have been exposed to chemical agent, 
and that the need for assistance is not confined to 
the exposure scenario alone, but could extend to 
long-term disabilities and follow-up medical and even 
psychological care.  Iran acknowledged that the OPCW 
cannot provide for all of the possible needs of 
victims, but suggested that it might establish itself 
as a natural central point for the sharing of 
relevant expertise and information.  Iran then 
proposed that the Secretariat assess the likely 
immediate, short-term and long-term needs of victims, 
and also who in the international community might be 
able to provide expertise and assistance. 
 
¶11. (U) In an articulate and effective intervention, 
Italy noted that Iran itself has admitted that the 
Sec retariat has no inherent competence in many of the 
areas envisioned in the proposal, and that Italy's 
view is that any action taken would be an expression 
of goodwill on the part of member states, and not/not 
fulfillment of any mandate under Article X.  The 
Italian delegate used the topic of landmines as an 
example, noting that the support of victims in this 
and other areas has always fallen outside of the 
relevant treaty.  He added that his understanding is 
that this is essentially an effort to "attract 
sympathies" and noted the substantial amount of work 
that remains to be done within the Organization's 
actual competencies.  Switzerland and Germany 
supported this general assessment, with Germany 
adding its interpretation that paragraph 11 speaks to 
emergency assistance, which is by definition of an 
immediate nature. 
 
¶12. (U) This led to an unfortunate digression by Iran 
into questions such as how we define "emergency" and 
"victim," when one ceases to be a victim, and how to 
distinguish between immediate and other needs.  Iran 
agreed that some activities discussed are outside the 
mandate of the CWC, but reiterated that the 
Organization does have the mandate to assist the 
victims of CW attacks, and its view that the proposal 
is in line with the mandate of the Article X 
consultations.  Iran then recommended that the OPCW 
coordinate efforts and create a mechanism for the 
exchange of information on assistance to CW victims, 
adding that the OPCW could "take credit" with minimal 
effort.  The discussions concluded with a reference 
by Lutay to the fact that medical assistance or 
equipment has been offered by a number of SPs under 
Article X, and the facilitator's suggestion that the 
TS might provide a general assessment and legal 
 
SIPDIS 
opinion regarding further work. 
 
¶13. (SBU) Del comment:  Iran continues to demonstrate 
a good sense for tactics, although it may have 
overplayed its hand by referring too quickly to long 
term treatment.  The idea that the Organization has 
some inherent expertise in the treatment of chemical 
casualties is valid, and the Iranians were careful to 
cast the entire proposal as forward-looking.  (Had 
they not done so, the proposal might be more easily 
discredited as transparently self-serving.)  The 
overarching concept of providing assistance to the 
victims is a positive one, and the Del's initial read 
is that Iran will be able to keep the proposal on the 
table by tacking around this core concept while 
seeing how far the limits of goodwill can be pushed. 
The more immediate concern is that Article X 
consultations not become little more than a forum for 
lengthy Iranian interventions on this topic, a good 
 
reason to continue to provide concrete 
recommendations for other topics future consultations 
can explore.  End comment. 
 
¶14. (U) Under Any Other Business, the facilitator 
recommended the recently issued report on 
implementation of Article X in 2007 be discussed in 
the next meeting, which would necessitate deferral 
from EC-52 to EC-53, as the next meeting will be 
scheduled some time between EC-52 and the RevCon.  In 
addition to the U.S. request for information on TS 
readiness and training plans, the Netherlands 
recommended more information also be provided on the 
Voluntary Fund in advance of the next consultations. 
Brodska also announced that she would be stepping 
down as facilitator this summer. 
 
-------------------------- 
INDUSTRY CLUSTER ) GENERAL 
-------------------------- 
 
¶15. (U) On February 19, Amb. Dani (Algeria, Vice- 
Chair for the Industry Cluster) held a general 
consultation regarding the work of the Cluster and 
its future. 
 
¶16. (U) The DG took the floor first, giving some 
issues that might be looked into in the near future: 
continued monitoring of progress made under the EC-51 
decision on late declarations (Note: he mentioned 
that two SPs have submitted their declarations since 
the decision was taken); low concentration of 
Schedule 2A/2A* chemicals; OCPF site selection; risk 
assessment and inspection frequency; and improvements 
in the handling of industry declarations (e.g., the 
VIS project, expanding the information in OCPF 
declarations).  He later pointed to OCPF site 
selection as an issue of highest priority; he noted 
the need to give the current TS efforts time for 
evaluation, but said that results to date have been 
very positive. 
 
¶17. (SBU) Del comment: The DG mentioned in his 
intervention the TS paper regarding OCPF 
declarations.  Bill Kane (IVB) had previously told 
Delrep privately what the paper would contain 
generally and that TS staff would give the document 
to the DG by the end of January.  The expectation was 
that the document would then be released generally 
fairly quickly, so as to be further discussed in 
advance of the Review Conference.  In his 
intervention, the DG said that this paper would not 
be released until summer, well after the Review 
Conference.  Del is not aware of the reasons behind 
this change but will try to discretely find out why. 
End comment. 
 
¶18. (U) A number of delegations took the floor, 
pointing to those issues they consider to be of 
highest priority.  Those topics that were mentioned 
included: risk assessment and inspection frequency; 
low concentration of Schedule 2A/2A* chemicals; OCPF 
site selection (focusing on element (c) ) SP 
proposals); OCPF declaration improvements; evaluation 
of sampling and analysis as a tool for industry 
verification; continued monitoring of progress made 
under the EC-51 decision on late declarations (with 
both Germany and the Netherlands calling for further 
consideration of "nil" declarations); and transfer 
discrepancies. 
 
¶19. (U) Iran asked the TS to provide a paper that 
would give more details about the approximately 18 
issues that are shown as outstanding at this time. 
The DG agreed to this request and said it would take 
just a few weeks to prepare.  The UK pointed to these 
issues as areas industry depends on to strengthen 
their image to the public, while cautioning that this 
 
list will likely expand at the Review Conference. 
Australia noted that a recent meeting of IUPAC 
mentioned the increasing relevance of OCPF facility 
development to the CWC. 
 
¶20. (U) Amb. Dani closed the meeting with a general 
call for facilitators to take on as many of the 
topics mentioned as possible.  He also asked that 
delegations continue to prioritize their work on 
these matters. 
 
--------------------- 
SAMPLING AND ANALYSIS 
--------------------- 
 
¶21. (U) On February 19, Bill Kane (IVB) chaired a 
closed meeting of those countries who have hosted 
Schedule 2 inspections involving sampling and 
analysis to date.  The countries who were in 
attendance were Korea, Italy, France, India, Germany, 
Japan, China, the Netherlands, the UK, Australia 
(which was finalizing its inspection as the meeting 
was being held), Switzerland, and the U.S.  Kane said 
that the TS plans to carry out one more such 
inspection in March to close out the "trial period." 
However, the DG has requested the staff to prepare a 
report on this period and present it to him by the 
end of February.  Kane also mentioned briefly some 
areas they have identified to date as needing further 
work to ensure smooth operations in the future: 
realization that logistical issues create the biggest 
disruption to operations; the need to plan for 
equipment reliability issues (including the carrying 
of spares); the need to continually add to the 
analytical database (i.e., OCAD); and the TS 
perception of the benefits of working in the "open 
mode"; and the ability to provide technical 
explanations for the presence of low-level 
impurities. 
 
¶22. (U) The discussion then went around the room to 
allow each delegation to share something about its 
experience.  Delegations were generally positive 
about the experience, pointing to the work they did 
with the TS in advance as the reason for general 
success (although several delegations still found 
confusion with the TS during the inspection). 
Several delegations, however, noted their concern 
that smaller plant sites (which Schedule 2 sites tend 
to be) will generally not be able to lend the level 
of support (nor bear the cost) that these generally 
larger sites did during the trial period.  Many 
called for a general rationale or criteria for how, 
when, why, etc. these tools would be used at future 
Schedule 2 inspections, as more general application 
seems unfeasible.  Several delegations called for a 
process of evaluating the relative cost of using 
these tools against the verification benefit 
achieved.  Some delegations called for a careful 
evaluation of the trial period and future Schedule 2 
inspections before considering application of these 
tools during Schedule 3 or OCPF inspections.  A large 
number of the SPs noted that their "on-site" 
laboratory space was actually at a location sometimes 
at considerable distance (as much as two hours) from 
the plant site.  Similarly, many delegations noted 
that they designated a temporary point-of-entry just 
for this inspection to allow easier processing and 
inspection of the additional equipment. 
 
¶23. (U) More specifically, France suggested that the 
use of an auto-injector would improvement the 
analytical process.  Germany made a very detailed 
presentation about their experience (faxed to ISN and 
Commerce) which touched on: additional burden, 
conceptual doubts, technical problems, questionable 
verification benefit, and results.  (Del comment: 
This discussion also highlighted a number of 
 
technical issues that were unique amongst the group 
to the German experience but which, as they are 
resolved, should serve to be very educational to 
other delegations.) 
 
¶24. (U)Japan also pointed out that their industry is 
greatly concerned with the unwanted rumors these 
types of activities create and their potential damage 
to company reputations.  India and China both noted 
that transportation issues could be a significant 
hurdle in their countries during future inspections. 
The Netherlands noted that their National Authority 
was asked to procure solvents and carrier gases for 
the inspection team, and then the inspection arrived 
with its own supplies.  The UK, in its self-appointed 
role as the champion for sampling and analysis, noted 
for the group that it is not the role of SPs to 
approve the use these tools and that British 
industry supports the general use of these tools, 
including their expansion to Schedule 3 and OCPF. 
Australia echoed these thoughts.  Although pragmatic 
about the application, Switzerland stated their view 
that the TS is limited in what it can say about a 
plant site without the use of these tools. 
Switzerland also pointed out that their inspected 
site had been inspected five times before under 
various regimes and, thus, emphasized the need for 
applying logic to the selection of sites for these 
types of inspections.  Switzerland also called on the 
TS to find ways to be more self-sufficient. 
 
SIPDIS 
 
¶25. (U) During the open discussion, France asked if 
there were any plan or option of considering 
quantitative analysis in addition to qualitative. 
The TS pointed to the rough quantitative evaluation 
possible with the current methods (if needed to deal 
with an ambiguity) but did not indicate any plan to 
move beyond that.  As questions arose, Kane explained 
that the stock presentation the inspection team gave 
at most sites was introduced after the third or 
fourth inspection because sites had mentioned that 
some sort of primer by the inspection team might be 
useful. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
INDUSTRY CLUSTER ) TRANSFER DISCREPANCIES 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶26. (U) The new co-facilitator for this matter, 
Rebekka Wulliman (Swiss National Authority), chaired 
a consultation on February 19.  The focus of the 
meeting was to present the Co-Facilitators' Note and 
Draft Decision (both dated 1 February 2008 and are on 
the OPCW external server).  After a brief 
introduction of these new materials, the floor was 
opened for comments. 
 
¶27. (U) The Netherlands, U.S., UK, Italy, Germany, 
and Switzerland all spoke favorably of the draft 
decision.  Some offered minor editorial suggestions, 
while some specifically asked that the decision (OP- 
5) include a deadline for implementation so as to 
give the TS a vehicle to start assessing the 
effectiveness of the revised guidelines. 
 
¶28. (U) The Indian and Iranian delegations both 
stated they were awaiting instructions, although they 
were generally positive. 
 
------------------------------------- 
MEETING OF THE HOST COUNTRY COMMITTEE 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶29. (U) The Host Country Committee meeting February 
20 was dominated by discussion on delegates' access 
to the OPCW commissary.  Amb. Romeo Arguelles 
(Philippines) opened the meeting by stating that 
there appears to be two different ways to address 
 
commissary access for delegates: finalizing a formal 
agreement with the Government of the Netherlands, or 
simply implementing administrative measures. 
 
¶30. (U) Amb. Javits noted that entering into a formal 
agreement would provide clear guidelines and 
procedures.  Referring to a draft agreement put 
forward by the Dutch Government in September 2007, he 
asked for some points to be clarified and others to 
be changed.  There was general agreement on insuring 
access to the commissary for delegates -- without 
diminishing any existing rights and privileges -- and 
having clear procedures in place.  Amb. Dominik Alder 
(Switzerland) briefly shared details on the 
commissary in Geneva, which is open to staff and 
delegates from all international organizations there. 
Amb. Maarten Lak (Netherlands) was present and 
promised to communicate the views of the Committee to 
the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
 
¶31. (U) The Committee will have an informational 
meeting on 19 March with officials from the 
Municipality of The Hague.  Members will send 
suggested items for the agenda. 
 
----------- 
ARTICLE VII 
----------- 
 
¶32. (U) Facilitator Kimmo Laukkanen (Finland) chaired 
a meeting on February 20 and announced that this was 
likely his last formal meeting as facilitator.  He 
plans to continue through the March Executive Council 
and make his report there, but he will leave The 
Hague in the summer. 
 
¶33. (U) Legal Advisor Onate (LAO) made his usual 
report on progress that has been achieved, this time 
since the decision of CSP-12 in November.  Some of 
the highlights were: 
 
-  The total number of States Parties (SPs) has 
increased to 183 with the addition of Congo this 
month. 
-  176 SPs have National Authorities (NA). 
-  125 SPs have made an Article VII submission. 
-  80 SPs have reported the enactment of 
comprehensive legislation. 
-  On November 29, the Legal Office sent out notes 
verbale regarding the CSP-12 decision.  Since that 
time, one SP (Central African Republic) has 
designated their NA; two SPs have informed the TS of 
the enactment of legislation (Cook Islands and 
Qatar); six SPs have submitted to the TS the text of 
their implementation legislation (which LAO is now 
reviewing), administrative regulations, and adoption 
measures; and 35 SPs have informed the TS of the 
steps they have taken to date. 
-  Five other SPs have asked LAO for assistance in 
reviewing existing legislation with an eye toward 
recommendations on what else needs to be done. 
 
¶34. (U) Turkey followed this presentation by 
announcing that its government had adopted 
implementing legislation and corresponding 
regulations on December 19, 2007.  A notification to 
the TS will follow soon. 
 
¶35. (U) India and Iran raised a series of questions 
about the presentation, basically trying to put as 
positive as spin on the progress made as possible. 
Given that these two countries have been vocal in the 
past about their desire to mark the Article VII 
progress made to date and move on to focus on other 
matters (e.g., Article XI), it seemed fairly 
transparent that this effort was made to set the 
stage for the discussion on this subject at the 
Review Conference. 
 
 
¶36. (U) Del rep deployed the guidance provided and 
also cautioned delegations that any effort to 
marginalize the focus on Article VII will result in 
marginalizing discussions on other areas in which 
 
legislation and administrative measures are 
fundamental ) for example, declarations and 
verification, transfer of Schedule 3 chemicals to 
States not Party to the CWC, and Article XI. 
 
¶37. (U) Amb. Mworia (ICA) made a detailed 
presentation on the outreach efforts of her group in 
Article VII assistance to SPs.  These efforts 
include: technical assistance visits, bilateral 
visits with delegations in Brussels and London, 
National Authority meetings, parliamentarian 
meetings, thematic workshops, and training sessions. 
(An electronic copy of this presentation was e-mailed 
to ISN and Commerce).  These efforts are being funded 
through the general funds, as well as voluntary 
contributions by the European Union, Japan, and 
Korea.  The Dutch delegation encouraged continued 
work to combine efforts and look for other 
efficiencies. 
 
------------------------------- 
MEETING WITH CHINESE DELEGATION 
------------------------------- 
 
¶38. (U) As part of our series of pre-RevCon bilateral 
meetings with key delegations, Amb. Javits and Del 
reps met with Chinese Ambassador Xue Hanqin and three 
members of the Chinese delegation on February 20. 
Amb. Xue announced that she will be departing just 
before the RevCon for a posting back in Beijing.  She 
also speculated that Cheng Jingye, the new Director- 
General for Arms Control in the Chinese Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, might head the Chinese RevCon 
delegation.  Amb. Xue suggested arranging a bilateral 
meeting with Mr. Cheng on the sidelines of the 
RevCon. 
 
¶39. (U) The Chinese del asked about the provisional 
agenda.  Amb. Javits stressed the need for a balanced 
agenda that would allow discussion of all states, 
issues.  Amb. Xue responded that China has no 
difficulty with the agenda as it stands and is 
flexible with regard to inclusion and phrasing of 
particular points, specifically terrorism.  At Amb. 
Javits, suggestion, Amb. Xue said that she could 
encourage the NAM to be flexible on the agenda.  She 
commented that resolving the current impasse over the 
agenda should not be difficult but that it is 
important to look at the background motivators to 
discover the real points of contention. 
 
¶40. (U) Turning to the Chairman's draft report text, 
Amb. Xue said that while dividing it into four blocks 
was procedurally convenient, they want to see "the 
forest as a whole" and are awaiting the complete 
version.  Her deputy, Li Hong, noted that some NAM 
delegations feel there is a lack of transparency 
regarding inclusion of their comments and proposals. 
Amb. Xue said that some other ambassadors feel that 
things are out of control and that they are 
frustrated with the process.  She once again 
suggested moving to a "rolling text" to keep track of 
all suggested edits, additions and deletions.  Amb. 
Javits explained that a "rolling text" would be too 
unwieldy at this point in the process. Amb. Xue 
stated that China has one substantive concern 
regarding the final text: the Convention's objectives 
need to be maintained in a balanced manner. 
Specifically, the main task of the OPCW is 
destruction; everything else should be kept in 
balance. 
 
¶41. (U) Speaking about Article XI, Amb. Xue said that 
 
some States Parties feel that they should be rewarded 
for their commitment to the Convention, noting that 
industry-related assistance is of little interest to 
them.  Turning to OCPFs, she stated China's concern 
with the increasing number of inspections.  While 
Chinese industry and local government positively view 
inspections as a form of external control and seal of 
approval, on a national level China has limited 
resources to support inspections.  Both delegations 
agreed that the RevCon will only be able to have a 
general discussion of OCPF site selection and of 
sampling and analysis in the absence of the TS papers 
expected on these issues. 
 
¶42. (U) Amb. Xue expressed her appreciation for Amb. 
Javits' remarks on U.S. destruction.  She noted that 
it is too soon to look at shifting the OPCW's focus 
and that the priority of destruction (including of 
old and abandoned chemical weapons) needs to be 
reiterated.  Amb. Xue also said that possessors 
should try to stick to their deadlines but agreed 
that it is too early to assess the situation or 
discuss how to react if they do not complete 
destruction in time. 
 
¶43. (U) Briefly touching on challenge inspections, 
Amb. Xue and Amb. Javits agreed that they are a good 
tool and should be ready for use if needed.  However, 
Amb. Xue suggested that full-scale exercises should 
be used sparingly in order to not diminish the 
deterrent effect of challenge inspections. 
 
----------------------------------- 
OEWG: REVIEW CONFERENCE PREPARATION 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶44. (U) Discussion during the February 21 OEWG 
meeting focused primarily on procedure for forwarding 
the provisional agenda to the Executive Council.  Of 
note were the increasingly polarized positions of the 
NAM and the EU, whose members supported one another 
with nearly identical talking points.  Cuba, speaking 
on behalf of the NAM and China, stated that the rule 
of consensus had been violated as the draft 
provisional agenda forwarded for EC-52 consideration 
was not a consensus document.  Slovenia, speaking on 
behalf of the EU, responded that many delegations had 
made compromises on the agenda in order to reach 
consensus and called on remaining delegations to do 
so, too.  Slovenia specifically noted that there had 
been no substantive dissent in previous meetings to 
discussing science and technology, terrorism, or 
external relationships. 
 
¶45. (U) Amb. Javits spoke in favor of keeping the 
agenda simple and suggested convening informal 
consultations with interested delegations to iron out 
differences.  He went on to say that the agenda 
should not force discussion on any favored topic but 
should also be broad enough not to suppress or 
preclude discussion. 
 
¶46. (U) After protracted debate, during which the 
meeting recessed to allow the NAM to caucus, Amb. 
Parker agreed to hold an informal OEWG on Tuesday 
(February 26) to discuss the substance of the agenda 
in hopes of reaching consensus on that before moving 
to discussion of the consolidated draft text on 
Wednesday (February 27).  Supported by the TS, he 
made clear that, if no consensus is reached on the 
agenda, he is prepared to move forward with sending a 
chairman,s draft to the EC for consideration. 
 
¶47. (U) On February 22 and 25, Amb. Javits chaired 
&informal informal8 consultations with interested 
delegations (Algeria, Canada, China, Cuba, France, 
Germany, Guatemala, India, Iran, Italy, Mexico, 
Morocco, the Philippines, Russia, Saudi Arabia, 
 
 
Slovenia, South Africa, and the U.S.).  He urged 
delegations to pledge to one another that all states, 
issues would be discussed at the Review Conference, 
and that the agenda would not limit discussion in any 
way and stated that this informal group would take no 
decisions, but merely share views. He stressed that a 
simple agenda would cover everyone,s issues better 
than specific textual additions of favorite items. 
The NAM had met at length before the first 
&interested party8 meeting and planned to meet again 
on Monday after the broader group.  While the NAM 
agreed to drop &full implementation of Article XI,8 
at issue are whether items on terrorism (on which the 
NAM is split), the OPCW,s relationships with external 
bodies, and science and technology should be 
included. The U.S. (represented by del rep with Amb. 
Javits in the chair) continued to object to the 
disarmament clause added to &international peace and 
security8 (item 9a), urging simplification and noting 
that terrorism would naturally come under that item. 
Through both meetings, Amb. Javits reminded 
delegations that the agenda will disappear and that 
the final report and political declarations will be 
the living products of the RevCon.  All delegations 
present generally agreed that the agenda should not 
suppress or preclude discussion of any relevant 
issues during the RevCon. 
 
--------------- 
OEWG: TERRORISM 
--------------- 
 
¶48. (U) On February 21, Annie Mari (France) chaired 
the first meeting of the Open Ended Working Group on 
Terrorism of 2008.  The meeting focused primarily on 
a presentation by Amb. Dato Hussin Nayan, Director 
General of the South East Asia Center for Counter 
Terrorism (SEACCT) in Kuala Lumpur.  The presentation 
was followed by some questions, and the expected 
implication from India and Iran that efforts against 
terrorism were outside the mandate of the OPCW. 
 
¶49. (U) The Chair opened by reminding delegations of 
the utility of the OEWG as a forum for exchanging 
experiences, and the fact that the OEWG is in no way 
intended to indicate that the OPCW is an anti- 
terrorist organization.  Mari recalled that previous 
meetings had involved speakers from UNICRI, the 1540 
Committee, and the African Center for Study and 
Research on Terrorism in Algeria, and in that vein 
welcomed the presentation from South East Asia.  Mari 
noted that the work of the group tapered off last 
year, as the Office of Special Projects (TS office 
with primary responsibility for this subject) was 
focused on Tenth Anniversary Activities.  She 
expressed her intent to re-invigorate the 
consultations this year, focusing on three main 
areas:  strengthening relations with other relevant 
organizations, building on the role that national 
implementation and assistance and protection play in 
preventing or mitigating the effects of terrorism, 
and establishing closer links with chemical industry. 
 
¶50. Amb. Nayan provided an overview of the founding 
and funding of SEACCT, which was established in 2002 
and is fully funded by the Government of Malaysia, 
endorsed by ASEAN.  He emphasized that the vision of 
SEACCT is to become an effective counter-terrorism 
training and research center, not an operational 
counter-terrorism unit.  The center's mission is 
based on four general goals:  to develop and conduct 
training programs, to promote public awareness, to 
advise and assist the Government of Malaysia, and to 
network with similar institutions. 
 
¶51. A number of details were provided on the size of 
the center's staff (45 personnel), past and planned 
training courses, and countries who partnered with 
 
the center to provide training, including the U.S., 
U.K., Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Japan.  Amb. 
Nayan noted that the closest ties to the OPCW existed 
in CBRNE specific training, and pointed to the 
implementation of the CWC as one of the topics 
covered in this training.  He listed the following as 
possible areas of cooperation: 
- the prevention, response to and investigation of 
chemical incidents; 
- strengthening practices governing industry and 
professionals; 
- emergency response (best practices, exercises, 
training for first responders); and 
- investigation and prosecution. 
 
¶52.  The speaker concluded by noting that SEACCT and 
the OPCW do have opportunities for cooperation, and 
that the stability fostered by vigilance in counter- 
terrorism is key in creating an environment conducive 
to economic development.  Delegations had relatively 
few questions, the most relevant of which came from 
the Algerian Ambassador, who asked for the speaker's 
assessment of the new threat of chemical terrorism 
and his expectation of the OPCW's role.  Amb. Nayan 
stated that in his view the active threat of chemical 
terrorism is negligible, but that a real passive 
threat exists in the lack of comprehensive industry 
regulations.  He noted that the greatest resource the 
OPCW can provide is its expertise. 
 
¶53. Iran and India both attempted to call into 
question the mandate of the OEWG and the OPCW's role 
in the fight against terrorism, with Iran going one 
step further with a clumsy attempt to turn the 
discussions toward its proposal for a "CW victims 
network."  Del Rep, drawing on the Revcon Objectives 
Cable (Ref A), noted the U.S. view that the OPCW can 
contribute to the fight against terrorism in a number 
of ways that clearly fall within the scope of the 
CWC, and encouraged further work and the continued 
use of the OEWG as a useful forum for exchanging 
ideas on the increasingly relevant topic of chemical 
terrorism. 
 
--------------------- 
SCENESETTER FOR EC-52 
--------------------- 
 
¶54. (U) On destruction issues, Del expects deferral 
of documents and possible trouble on the report of 
the EC visit to Anniston.  Following a meeting with 
the Russian delegation early in the EC week, Del 
expects the U.S. and Russia will agree to mutual 
deferral (preferably done from the EC Chair) of the 
facility agreements and verification plans for 
Maradykovsky, Leonidovka and Newport.  On Newport, 
Del has already advised deferral due to changes 
necessitated by emergency destruction at Blue Grass; 
Del will script remarks for the EC Chair.  The Pine 
Bluff Binary (PBBDF) documents have also remained on 
the agenda for consideration, despite the fact that 
PBBDF completed secondary treatment operations in 
December 2007.  Del has noted this during the EC 
Chair's preparatory meeting February 25, and expects 
to request from the floor that these items be removed 
from the agenda. 
 
¶55. (U) Del expects minimal comment on the third 
round of quarterly destruction updates submitted by 
the possessor states which requested extensions to 
their final destruction deadlines.  However, the U.S. 
update, as well as the DG's semi-annual note on 
progress in meeting revised deadlines, have been the 
victim of Iranian posturing during previous sessions. 
It is more likely, though, that the Iranians will 
focus on finding fault with some aspect of the report 
of the EC visit to Anniston, one possible outcome of 
which would be an Iranian request to "receive" the 
 
report instead of "noting" as indicated by the 
agenda. 
 
¶56. (U) As noted above, the facilitator for Article X 
intends to request deferral of consideration of the 
report on implementation of Article X to the 
following EC, to allow for discussion in the next 
round of consultations.  During the EC Chair's 
preparatory meeting, South Africa recommended similar 
steps be taken with the Article XI report; 
facilitator Li Hong (China) requested this be 
postponed until after this week's Article XI meeting 
(scheduled for February 29). 
 
¶57. (SBU) Del comment:  With the deferral of Newport, 
the removal of Pine Bluff Binary documents, the 
likely deferral of the Maradykovsky and Leonidovka 
documents, and the deferral of the Article X report 
and possibly the Article XI report, the agenda for 
EC-52 is rapidly losing substance.  It is too soon, 
however, to predict a short EC, given the continued 
lack of consensus on a provisional agenda for the 
RevCon.  It is also possible that deferral of Article 
X will only build a stronger Iranian case for 
immediate action on a "victims network" at the 
RevCon.  End comment. 
 
¶58. (U) Javits sends. 
Schofer