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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1080
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
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RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY
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UNCLAS THE HAGUE 000152 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
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STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCA, L/NPV, IO/MPR, 
SECDEF FOR OSD/GSA/CN,CP> 
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC 
COMMERCE FOR BIS (ROBERTS) 
NSC FOR SMITH 
WINPAC FOR WALTER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP UP FOR TWO 
WEEKS ENDING FEBRUARY 15, 2008 
 
 
This is CWC-08-08. 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (SBU) This report covers the first two weeks in 
February and quite a number of meetings at the OPCW 
and behind the scenes.  The Open Ended Working Group 
for the Review Conference met on February 8 and 14, 
primarily to review the final three blocks of draft 
text for the conference report, but the group failed 
to come to consensus on the provisional RevCon 
agenda, which will be discussed once again on 
February 21.  Ambassador Javits began actively 
reaching out to a variety of delegations to discuss 
issues related to the RevCon, and he hosted lunch and 
an afternoon discussion with close allies on February 
¶11.  The facilitator for Universality convened a 
meeting on February 13 to discuss progress.  At the 
request of the Netherlands, a group of donor 
countries met February to compare notes on activities 
funded and priorities for the next year.  The U.S. 
delegation also met with the new Head of Media and 
Public Affairs in the Technical Secretariat, American 
Michael Luhan, who is taking a very pro-active 
approach to his new job. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
OEWG: PREPARATIONS FOR THE SECOND REVIEW CONFERENCE 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶2. (U) In the Open Ended Working Group meetings on 
February 8 (which lasted all day) and 14, Amb. Lyn 
Parker (UK) marched the group through the three 
remaining blocks of draft text for the Review 
Conference Report.  A businesslike atmosphere 
prevailed through most of the sessions, with each 
section of text taken in turn and delegations 
presenting their comments.  As with the first 
discussion of the text in January, delegations are 
sending textual changes to the chair via e-mail. 
Iran, Cuba and other NAM members were noticeably 
silent during most of the debate, noting that they 
had only "preliminary" comments; there were not many 
of those.  (Del comment:  This could spell trouble 
ahead with very late interventions from NAM states, 
or the excuse that the revised draft report 
represents only western input ) which may well prove 
true if only western countries provide comments to 
the chair). 
 
¶3. (U) GENERAL DISCUSSION OF THE DRAFT TEXT: Cuba's 
preliminary comments included their belief that the 
text should be a "rolling draft" reflecting all 
proposed changes, along with a request for additional 
time for consideration of the text.  Chairman Parker 
responded that the next draft of the whole text will 
take into consideration all comments received, but 
that including all the comments as bracketed text at 
this point would be impossible tQwork with.  He said 
the goal was a clean baseline text for future 
discussion, as had been provided at the first RevCon. 
Iran, South Africa and China all spoke in favor of an 
immediate rolling text.  Amb. Javits spoke on the 
utility of bracketed text at the proper time in the 
process, including identification of the states 
proposing the changes, but not yet.  Mexico 
reiterated a proposal it had made earlier for a 
drafting group to assist the chair. South Africa 
noted that the NAM comments represent quite a number 
of countries.  Amb. Javits responded that, while it 
is useful to hear collective views in the general 
debate, states parties should be the actors in the 
decision making process, including approving the text 
and supporting amendments.  Cuba responded somewhat 
testily that the NAM operates on consensus, only 
representing common concepts and positions, and that 
E 
 
all members have the ability to state their national 
positions. 
 
¶4. (U) PROVISIONAL AGENDA: The NAM requested a break 
to caucus late in the afternoon of February 8 to 
discuss the provisional agenda.  Following the break, 
Cuba presented new additions from the floor, but 
admitted that the caucus had not agreed on the agenda 
item on terrorism.  (Del comment: This admission of 
division in the NAM was new and may have reflected 
the morning's discussion noted above, since only a 
handful of NAM members were present by the afternoon 
session.  Del later learned that the split on 
terrorism was between African and Asian delegations). 
Several delegations (Germany, U.S. and other WEOG 
members) objected to the "full implementation of 
Article XI" as an agenda item, and questions were 
raised (Russia, US and others) on the focus on 
"complete disarmament" added to the agenda item on 
international peace and security.  Russia questioned 
whether we were now to discuss small arms as well as 
chemical weapons.  Chairman Parker stated that he 
would provide a compromise draft agenda based on the 
new input and the working group's discussion. 
 
¶5. (U) At the February 14 meeting, Amb. Parker 
presented the new draft agenda for discussion.  Cuba 
stated on behalf of the NAM that they had not reached 
a common position and member states needed more time 
to consider the text; he noted that some might speak 
to their concerns.  Iran intervened to note that, as 
there was no consensus agenda from the working group, 
it should not be forwarded to the Executive Council. 
Director for the Policy Making Organs Alexander 
Khodakov explained the procedural rule that the EC 
should prepare the draft agenda for the RevCon, but 
that it could be amended until the Review Conference 
itself approved it.  Amb. Parker agreed to keep the 
draft agenda open for discussion at the February 21 
OEWG, but that if there is no consensus then, he will 
send it forward as a chairman's draft to the EC. Del 
has faxed the new draft agenda to ISN and requests 
guidance for the February 21 meeting. 
 
¶6. (U) OPEN FORUM: The forum, which will include 
NGOs, industry representatives and "eminent 
individuals" is tentatively scheduled for the 
afternoon of April 10, and the TS will send out 
invitations and organize the event's program and 
agenda.  At the February 8 OEWG, after Del privately 
noted to the chair the incorrect footnote in the TS 
paper, Amb. Parker clarified that the ICRC had 
participated in the Open Forum at the First RevCon. 
The TS also noted that the Sunshine Project was no 
longer operational, and that UNPO had no association 
with chemical weapons, and neither would be invited. 
There were no objections from the working group to 
four additions to the list of participants:  Ian 
Kenyon and Shakut Umer (put forward by the Del), and 
Amb. Von Wagner and the Berlin-based Stiftung 
Wissenschaft und Politik (put forward by Germany). 
 
¶7. (U)  BLOCK 2 TEXT: The February 8 discussion of 
this section highlighted differences among 
delegations on the role of the Scientific Advisory 
Board, the status of its report, and how the report 
should be cited in the text.  Japan proposed that the 
SAB report be treated all together, rather than 
selectively quoting from it through the different 
sections.  The Chair agreed that the SAB is one of 
the issues that needs to be considered "horizontally" 
in the report as a whole once the draft is complete. 
Also of note, Russia stated its preference not to 
include any reference in the report text to the EC 
visit to Anniston, stating that it viewed the visit 
as an "additional transparency measure" rather than 
oversight. 
 
¶8. (U) BLOCK 3 TEXT: The February 8 discussion of 
this section again included input mostly from WEOG 
delegations, Japan, South Africa and India.  The 
interventions were primarily focused on textual 
changes eliciting few responses or comments from 
delegations.  In its only intervention, Iran stressed 
that destruction is the central issue and should be 
the focus of the RevCon. 
 
¶9. (U) BLOCK 4 TEXT: The February 14 discussion of 
this section again was dominated by the same 
delegations as the previous two sessions.  A notable 
exception was the call by both Sudan and Algeria for 
giving preference to African nationals in staffing. 
Algeria specifically called for "positive 
discrimination in favor of Africa," to which the 
Director-General noted the Convention's emphasis on 
qualifications. Discussion also highlighted 
differences among delegations on linking Article VII 
and Article XI: EU delegations and Russia supported 
the linkage and referring to the interdependence of 
the two articles; Mexico, Algeria, Sudan and China 
spoke up against making Article VII compliance a 
prerequisite for receiving Article XI-related 
assistance. 
 
------------ 
UNIVERSALITY 
------------ 
 
¶10. (U) On February 13, the facilitator for 
Universality, Said Moussi (Algeria), held a meeting 
for the TS and delegations to share information on 
recent activities.  Malik Elahi (Head, Government 
Relations and Political Affairs Branch) gave an 
overview country-by-country of TS efforts to engage 
non-States Parties.  The TS is planning upcoming 
visits to two African countries, Guinea-Bissau (the 
end of February) and Angola (June).  Elahi noted that 
contacts with the Angolan government have been 
facilitated by the German Ambassador in Luanda.  He 
also said that Guinea-Bissau's law on ratifying the 
CWC is currently awaiting final presidential 
approval. 
 
¶11. (SBU) The Netherlands and the UK both shared 
recent high-level contacts with the Bahamas 
(Netherlands), and Syria and Egypt (UK).  However, 
only the Dutch push seems to have borne fruit, with 
the Bahamas very close to finalizing ratification of 
the CWC.  Del rep noted continued U.S. engagement 
with the Bahamas and the Dominican Republic. 
Slovenia said that the EU is planning to deliver a 
joint demarche to the Dominican Republic in the 
coming weeks; Canada indicated interest in supporting 
the push on the Dominican Republic. 
 
------------------------- 
MEETING WITH CLOSE ALLIES 
------------------------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) On February 11, Amb. Javits hosted a lunch 
for the Close Allies.  All delegations participated 
at the ambassadorial level, with Germany, France and 
the U.S. including representatives from capital.  The 
primary purpose of the lunch was to provide a venue 
for discussions on the RevCon early enough to be 
influential in the drafting process.  U.K. Amb. Lyn 
Parker provided an update from his position as Chair 
of the RevCon Working Group.  Discussions also 
included a proposal by the U.S. for revisions to the 
Russian Federation,s verification plan for the 
Maradykovsky CW destruction facility. 
 
¶13. (SBU) PREPARATIONS FOR THE REVCON:  Several 
issues were highlighted as challenges/priorities. 
U.K. Amb. Parker noted that the topic of CW 
destruction will present a significant challenge, 
 
even if efforts to actually dominate RevCon 
discussions with talk of destruction delays and 2012 
will probably be limited to a handful of problematic 
delegations.  Germany in particular was very 
concerned as to how the U.S. intended to handle the 
topic of 2012 at the RevCon, particularly if the NAM 
focuses on the U.S. inability to meet 2012.   Parker 
also noted the need for further work on Article VII, 
and the danger that this will be brushed aside by the 
NAM. 
 
¶14. (SBU) Germany noted its view that despite a need 
to adapt the organization to a shift in priorities 
over time, destruction is the number one priority, 
followed by non-proliferation.  The Germans shared 
thoughts on getting away from the term &non- 
proliferation8 (which elicits a negative reaction 
from much of the NAM) and focusing on phrases like 
&confidence in compliance.8  The U.K. later added 
that the safest option would obviously be to stick to 
treaty language, or at least to concepts like &non- 
acquisition8 that are clearly consistent with 
existing CWC obligations.  Germany also noted the 
importance of supporting the provisions of Article VI 
with the provisions of Article IX. 
 
¶15. (SBU) France highlighted the need to set a course 
for the shift in verification, and the importance of 
non-proliferation, as well as the need to avoid 
undermining the Australia Group. 
 
¶16. (SBU) Amb. Parker reminded delegations that the 
mandate of the OEWG is only until EC-52; the EC will 
need to extend the mandate to the beginning of the 
RevCon.  Apparently the TS needs both the draft 
report and the political declaration by March 21 for 
translation and distribution before the RevCon. 
Parker hopes to shift focus after the EC from the 
Chair,s text to the political declaration, although 
he thought one more meeting on the consolidated text 
might be necessary following EC-52. 
 
¶17. (SBU) STRATEGIES FOR WORKING WITH LIKE-MINDED 
COUNTRIES, PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT OF IRAN AND THE NAM: 
There was general agreement that it will be very 
helpful to get like-minded smaller delegations to 
speak up, even if it is simply to reinforce an EU 
position.  Delegations also discussed the need to 
keep the Iranians from dictating the pace and end 
game of negotiations.  Suggestions included taking a 
harder position on questioning the credibility of 
eleventh hour, vague requests; and refusing to play 
into the Iranian desire to immediately whittle the 
negotiations down to a small group.  Parker and 
German MFA rep Beerwerth both talked about the 
possibility of isolating Iran and/or other 
troublemakers, and having the Chair deal with them 
one-on-one, and also discussed the value of keeping 
any negotiating group that may arise open to maintain 
better oversight. 
 
¶18. (SBU) OCPF INSPECTION FREQUENCY: The discussion 
was very similar to that of the German-led meeting of 
January 30.  The general German theme, as in their 
earlier paper, was whether further increases in OCPF 
inspection numbers could be justified given that the 
new methodology does not appear to result in 
significant inspection increases in some countries of 
greater concern.  The UK asserted again that the DG,s 
new methodology will not necessarily give us what we 
want in distributing inspections more broadly, but 
any additional numbers of OCPF inspections are of 
broad benefit.  The French were more supportive of 
the UK view. 
 
¶19. (SBU) U.S. Del suggested a possible way in which 
the EC could specify in the annual budget inspection 
intensity per category (given as a percentage range), 
 
thus giving the TS more flexibility in selecting 
sites of greater concern for inspection and how those 
inspections would be carried out.  Also, Del 
requested that delegations be careful to keep the 
matters of the OCPF site selection methodology and 
the annual budget for inspections as separate 
discussions.  Both of these Del suggestions are hoped 
to work as a safer argument against the general NAM 
concern over &hierarchy of risk.8 
 
¶20. (SBU) SAMPLING AND ANALYSIS:  This discussion was 
fairly brief, as delegations have often shared their 
experiences with each other in the past.  Delegations 
generally questioned each other on the types of 
issues they anticipate discussing during the February 
19 meetings on the topic of experiences during the 
trial period. 
 
¶21. (SBU) TERRORISM:  The French delegation spoke 
briefly about their upcoming seminar, and also their 
intent to play up the connection to Article VII and 
Article X in upcoming meetings of the OEWG on 
Terrorism.  Amb. Javits mentioned the possibility of 
tying in the provisions on Investigations of Alleged 
Use as related to combating terrorism. 
 
¶22. (SBU) RIOT CONTROL AGENTS AND INCAPACITATING 
AGENTS:  France referred to its previously stated 
concern that the ability of troops to use RCAs on 
peacekeeping missions not be restricted.  The French 
Del also made a passing reference to the importance 
of WEOG solidarity on this point.  Germany,s position 
seemed to be very similar to the U.S., in that Berlin 
believes substantive discussions on these and related 
topics should be avoided at the RevCon.  German MFA 
rep Beerwerth did, however, note that in internal 
discussions the concern has been raised that the 
provision on law enforcement not become a loophole 
(ref. the possibility of unscheduled chemicals of all 
sorts being passed off as law enforcement 
substances).  Informally, Beerwerth offered that one 
possible solution would be to clearly limit the scope 
of chemicals appropriate for law enforcement to riot 
control agents only. 
 
¶23. (SBU) U.S. Del made clear that the U.S. will not 
accept the establishment of follow-on processes or 
discussions, or any attempt to clarify terminology 
such as &method of warfare8 or &law enforcement.8 
The U.K. still seemed more focused on developing an 
effective strategy to contain the topic if it gets 
out of hand at the RevCon, and noted plans for a 
meeting in London later in the week to discuss this. 
 
¶24. (SBU) RUSSIAN CW DESTRUCTION:  U.S. Del presented 
the U.S. proposal for revisions to the Maradykovsky 
verification plan and accompanying draft decision. 
Reactions were mixed, and not entirely supportive; 
the concern expressed by all delegations was that 
there is simply no impetus for Russia to agree to any 
changes at this point and, as per discussions in 
Berlin, the next opportunity to apply any sort of 
political pressure will come with the 45 percent 
deadline. 
 
¶25. (SBU) The U.K. seems inclined to avoid pressing 
the issue, and expressed doubt that publicly 
highlighting the difference in interpretation between 
the DG and the Russians on the terms of the agreement 
would be constructive.  Germany was concerned at the 
lack of reference to Article IV, and the space that 
leaves for Russia to assert in the future that 
verification after the first stage actually means 
Article VI verification.  The U.S. noted that the 
text had been crafted to achieve shared objectives 
without getting into the fundamental difference in 
definitions of destruction.  France suggested simply 
welcoming or underscoring the DG,s interpretation of 
 
the &provisional8 counting arrangement, perhaps in 
report language.  Del reminded the French of 
previous, unsuccessful attempts along these lines. 
 
¶26. (SBU) Although there were a number of minor 
tactical questions raised, the other recurring theme 
in the discussion was the question of whether it 
might be the appropriate time to bring this 
discussion into the open by explaining concerns from 
the floor during the EC.  Germany seemed to be in 
favor of articulating the fact that interested States 
Parties have actually been quite flexible in not 
questioning the 20 percent accounting, a flexibility 
offered to take into account the political 
necessities of the Russian Federation, and that a 
number of concerns have not yet been addressed. 
Delegations agreed that most States Parties are 
largely unaware of the implications of the 
Maradykovksy documents, some of whom might be 
supportive if educated on the matter.  The U.K., 
however, expressed concern that this would only serve 
to undermine the DG,s &understanding.8  Del agreed to 
share the proposal with the DG to get his feedback 
before proceeding further. 
 
¶27. (SBU) On the following day, Amb. Javits met with 
the Director General and shared the draft text on the 
Maradykovsky documents.  The DG was not opposed to 
the proposal but questioned the timing, noting that 
it might be inadvisable before the Review Conference. 
He alluded to the fact that the text of the 
agreements was negotiated at length with the TS, 
which would have views on changes to that text.  He 
felt that the Executive Council session following the 
RevCon (June) would be a more opportune time to 
propose and debate the changes. 
 
 
¶28. (SBU) On Leonidovka, discussions were limited, as 
most delegations had not had the opportunity to 
review the recently distributed verification plan and 
facility agreement.  There was some speculation about 
whether the terms of these documents would provide 
more or less assurance than those for Maradykovsky, 
and general agreement that it is important to 
consider both sets of documents together, 
particularly given the role these two facilities will 
play in Russia,s 45 percent deadline. 
 
------------- 
WEOG MEETINGS 
------------- 
 
¶29. (SBU) The February 8 WEOG meeting immediately 
preceded the Open Ended Working Group meeting and 
focused on delegations' views on Blocks 2 and 3 of 
the draft report.  Of note, Canada cited the "two 
major possessor states" serious arrears in their 
Article IV and V obligations.  Del responded that the 
U.S. is current on those payments. 
 
¶30. (SBU) On February 12, the WEOG met at its usual 
time for a more general brainstorming discussion of 
positions on the Review Conference.  The Irish 
delegation first reported from the bureau meeting 
that Slovakia is in line to chair the Executive 
Council this year and other regional groups should be 
choosing their vice chairs, and that Brazil would be 
volunteering to facilitate the OPCW office in Africa. 
Russia had been asked by the bureau about timing of 
the EC visit to one of their chemical weapons 
destruction facilities; the Russian response quoted 
the decision language that it would be "no later than 
2008."  The UK del reported that the OEWG for the 
Review Conference should produce a chairman's text of 
the report by 21 March to allow translation and 
distribution before the Conference. A revised draft 
text based on the current discussions of the four 
 
blocks will be prepared for the meeting next week 
(February 21) with one additional meeting to discuss 
it before the EC.  The political declaration would be 
drafted after the consolidated report text, with 
discussion probably taking place after the EC. 
 
¶31. (SBU) The brainstorming portion of the meeting 
lasted over two hours, and while there were few 
surprises, it did provide a useful opportunity to air 
views on both substance and tactics.  Delegations had 
different views on how serious the NAM attack on non- 
proliferation is and whether and how it should be 
countered.  There were also differences of view on 
explicit linkage between Articles VII and XI, from 
the German statement that there should be no 
transfers if legislation is not in place in a state, 
to the Canadian advice that explicit linkage would 
likely backfire.  There was general agreement that 
the NAM is not unified and can be split.  One 
delegate noted that the current NAM delegates are 
easier to work with and more constructive than their 
predecessors.  On Article X, no one had further 
information on the Iranian proposal submitted before 
the Conference of States Parties in November. Germany 
advised that Iran is likely to raise Article X 
directly at the Review Conference despite the fact 
that the CSP reinforced the ongoing facilitation. 
The French delegate inquired about terrorism and 
outlined the OEWG on Terrorism's upcoming series of 
presentations.  Amb. Lak of the Netherlands noted 
that his delegation is developing a paper on outreach 
for the OPCW based on the successful academic and 
industry forums last year. 
 
¶32. (SBU) The WEOG met again on February 14 
immediately before the OEWG to consult on Block 4 of 
the draft report text.  The UK noted that NAM 
delegations had met the day before but many had not 
received instructions from capital and they had 
failed to agree on the provisional agenda. 
 
-------------------------- 
DONOR COORDINATION MEETING 
-------------------------- 
 
¶33. (SBU) On February 15, the Dutch delegation 
organized an informal meeting of donors as part of 
its effort to coordinate assistance and share 
experiences.  Amb. Maarten Lak (Netherlands) reviewed 
input received from a number of donors on their 
priorities for assistance in 2008.  Slovenia briefly 
described the current EU Joint Action voluntary 
contribution, which has been supporting eight 
projects focusing on outreach, universality, national 
implementation and technical assistance; it also 
provided support for the Academic Forum held in 
November 2007.  The Del circulated a paper on U.S. 
assistance activities and priorities. 
 
¶34. (SBU) Several delegations (Netherlands, Germany, 
U.S.) spoke to the need for more information from the 
TS, specifically for assessing the impact and results 
 
SIPDIS 
of assistance programs.  They also noted the need to 
look at funding comprehensively, taking into account 
both the regular budget and voluntary contributions. 
The facilitators for Articles X and VII promised to 
include discussion on article-specific assistance 
during upcoming consultations for each article (note: 
Article X consultations are scheduled for February 
18, Article VII for February 20). 
 
------------------ 
BILATERAL MEETINGS 
------------------ 
 
¶35. (SBU) Amb. Javits has launched active outreach to 
other delegations to share views and encourage close 
working relationships to resolve issues arising from 
 
the Review Conference.  With members of the 
delegation, the Ambassador has met with the Indian, 
Slovenian, Saudi, Costa Rican, Mexican and Slovakian 
delegations during the past two weeks.  The Mexican 
meeting will be reported septel. 
 
¶36. (SBU) INDIA:  On February 6, Amb. Javits hosted 
lunch for Indian Ambassador Neelam Sabharwal and her 
deputy Riva Das, along with del reps.  Amb. Sabharwal 
expressed support for broader views than the NAM 
position her deputy normally takes.  While stating 
that a basic discussion about CW destruction will be 
vital in the RevCon, she also noted that they wanted 
this discussion to be limited and focused on the 
situation at hand. On industrial topics, Das shared 
recent efforts by Indian industry to augment the 
implementation of the Convention.  In Gujurat, which 
has the most developed chemical industry of any 
region, the chemical association has set up a full- 
time "help desk" whose role is to advise individual 
companies so that they understand and meet their 
obligations under the Convention.  Amb. Javits and 
del reps encouraged her to share this experience with 
the OPCW and delegations as a way in which industry 
can take the lead in ensuring appropriate CWC 
implementation, along with programs like Responsible 
Care.  OPCW can assist such programs but the 
initiatives are much more successful when the 
chemical industry itself initiates something it can 
use.  Amb. Javits also emphasized the importance of 
individual States Parties being involved in the 
RevCon process and asked Amb. Sabharwal to consider 
organizing an informal meeting for some key Asian 
delegations to discuss how to ensure a positive 
outcome for this RevCon. 
 
¶37. (SBU) SLOVENIA:  On February 7, Amb. Javits and 
Delreps met with Amb. Tea Petrin and OPCW delegate 
Andreja Purkart Martinez at Slovenia's request. 
Slovenia, as current EU president, will be taking a 
more active role in OPCW matters and is focusing on 
coordinating a common EU position for the RevCon. 
Amb. Petrin and Martinez reported that a recent 
meeting in Ljubljana had been successful in this 
regard.  Describing the NAM's approach, Amb. Javits 
encouraged Slovenia and other smaller EU members to 
intervene and add their views during consultations 
instead of normally leaving the role to France, 
Germany and the UK.  In response, Amb. Petrin floated 
the idea of non-WEOG EU members sitting in on WEOG 
meetings as "observers."  Amb. Javits indicated that 
having "WEOG Plus" -- or "EU Plus" -- meetings on an 
ad-hoc basis would be preferable to a number of WEOG 
members and could insure coordination among like- 
minded States Parties.  Appreciating Amb. Javits' 
suggestion, Amb. Petrin said that she would plan to 
host a pre-RevCon "EU Plus" meeting. 
 
¶38. (SBU) SAUDI ARABIA:  On February 12, Ambassador 
Waleed Elkhereiji called on Amb. Javits; del rep sat 
in.  As the future chairman of the Review Conference, 
Amb. Elkhereiji asked for U.S. views on the issues 
and expressed his desire to stay in close touch with 
Amb. Javits as things progress.  He was particularly 
interested in why the U.S. might not meet the 2012 
destruction deadline and whether any other possessor 
states might be in the same position.  Amb. Javits 
explained the U.S. position and ongoing destruction 
efforts and expressed doubts about whether Russia can 
meet the 2012 deadline despite their assurances that 
they will.  He stressed that 2012 should not be the 
end of the work of the OPCW, whether or not all 
possessor states complete destruction.  The Saudi 
Ambassador described his experience in dealing with 
Iran in past negotiations and as a neighbor, and he 
said that his delegation would be attending the NAM 
meetings as an observer to understand better their 
positions.  He hoped that the report for the 
 
conference would be complete before it egins.  Amb. 
Javits suggested that a friends of he chair group, 
representing the five regional goups rather than the 
NAM or EU, could be helpfulin finding resolutions to 
contentious issues. 
 
¶39. (SBU) COSTA RICA:  Laer on February 12, Costa 
Rican Ambassador Jose Auilar called on Amb. Javits, 
with del rep sittin in.  Costa Rica will be joining 
the Executive Concil and will take the vice chair 
currently heldby Chile, although Amb. Aguilar was 
not sure he ould have the same cluster issues.  He 
describedthe polarizing split within GRULAC between 
Cuba nd Venezuela on one side and most of the rest 
holing very different views, with Cuba advocating 
te end of the Convention in 2012.  Amb. Aguilar sai 
the key issues for him and Costa Rica are modifying 
the convention to be relevant beyond 2012 and 
terrorism.  Amb. Javits outlined U.S. views, 
particularly on 2012 not being the end of the CWC or 
the OPCW, and urged Costa Rica and other smaller 
states to speak up in the working group and at the 
conference.  They agreed that delegations would stay 
in close touch both in the EC and the RevCon. 
 
¶40. (SBU) SLOVAKIA:  Ambassador Oksana Tomova and 
OPCW delegate Michal Komada met with Amb. Javits and 
del rep on February 13.  Amb. Tomova has been 
selected by the Eastern European regional group to be 
the next EC Chair and she is actively preparing for 
the role.  Amb. Javits described U.S. positions on 
key RevCon and EC issues, particularly the importance 
of active involvement by the chair and vice chairs in 
moving the work of he EC forward between sessions. 
Del rep noted U.S interest in finding ways to help 
delegates and acilitators improve their multilateral 
skills.  omada, as a delegate new to multilateral 
issues,said he would appreciate periodic workshops 
on isues and skills and thought the EU and Russia 
migt be able to provide expert speakers and 
trainer. Amb. Javits offered any help the del can 
provie to the Slovakian delegation on both issues 
andprocess. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
MEETING WITH OPCW MEDIA AND PUBLIC AFFIRS BRANCH 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶41. (U) On February 5, Amb. Javits nd Del reps met 
with Michael Luhan (U.S.), the new Head of Media and 
Public Affairs, and Aabha Dixit, Media and Public 
Affairs Officer.  The meeting's primary purpose was 
to introduce Luhan to the Del and to hear his views 
on how to promote the OPCW and raise awareness of the 
CWC.  These included finalizing a public service 
announcement to be aired on CNN; developing a media 
plan for the upcoming RevCon; distributing DVDs of 
the Columbia OPCW Symposium as teaching tools on 
successful multilateralism; and organizing a think 
tank seminar, most likely in Washington, on the CWC 
and its role in disarmament and global security. 
(Del comment:  Luhan has also been actively meeting 
with WEOG representatives, who are interested in 
scheduling a meeting of the WEOG with him in the next 
few weeks.) 
 
¶42. (U) Javits sends. 
 
Arnall