Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 64621 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 08TELAVIV392, COUNTRY CLEARANCE FOR STAFFDEL MORRISION, FEBRUARY

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08TELAVIV392.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08TELAVIV392 2008-02-16 12:16 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Tel Aviv
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTV #0392/01 0471216
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 161216Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5457
UNCLAS TEL AVIV 000392 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OREP AFIN ASEC IS
SUBJECT: COUNTRY CLEARANCE FOR STAFFDEL MORRISION, FEBRUARY 
16-18, 2008 
 
REF: A. STATE 13368 
 
     B. STATE 11915 
 
1. (SBU) Embassy Tel Aviv welcomes the February 16-18, 2008, 
visit of HPSCI Staff Members Brian Morrison, Eric Greenwald, 
Donald Viera and Jay Heath, and SSCI Staff Member Alissa 
Starzak. The visit officer is Political Officer Van Reidhead; 
phone 972-3-519-7565; cell 972-50-540-6667; email 
ReidheadVE@state.gov.  Hotel and other logistical 
arrangements have been communicated to the party via e-mail. 
 
2. (U) All USG visitors to Israel, Gaza and the West Bank are 
responsible for reading this message thoroughly and complying 
with its instructions, and are required to comply with U.S. 
policy contained in Department of State cable 342724 (100514Z 
OCT 90).  This classified cable is available for review 
through the office of Israel and Palestinian Affairs, 
Department of State (NEA/IPA, Room 6247, 202-647-3672).  All 
official visitors to Israel with s/ecret clearances or higher 
should review 12 FAM 262.3 prior to arrival.  Copies of this 
FAM are available in the Regional Security Offices in Tel 
Aviv and Jerusalem.  Since the opening of a new airport 
terminal in November 2004, Israeli security procedures have 
been significantly strengthened and formalized.  All official 
visitors, regardless of rank or means of transportation into 
and out of Israel, should expect to be questioned with 
respect to their luggage, purchases, and possibly with 
respect to their activities during their stay in Israel. 
 
3. (U) Threat assessment:  The threat of terrorism and 
violence in Israel, Gaza and the West Bank is high.  There is 
no information indicating that this particular visit is 
threatened or targeted.  Government employees should assume 
that they are subjected to technical and physical 
surveillance.  Visitors should be scrupulous in securing 
classified and sensitive information in the Embassy or 
Consulate General and assume that any materials left in hotel 
rooms or public or semi-private places may be compromised. 
 
4. (U) Travel Policy:  In light of the current security 
situation, the following measures are in effect for all U.S. 
Embassy Tel Aviv and Consulate General Jerusalem personnel, 
as well as all USG official visitors.  On the advice of the 
Regional Security Officer, exceptions to this policy may be 
granted on a case-by-case basis upon approval of the 
Ambassador in Tel Aviv or the Consul General in Jerusalem, 
respectively. 
 
 
A) Throughout Israel, travelers are strongly urged to avoid 
areas of public gathering or assembly, such as cafes, malls, 
restaurants, and movie theaters, especially during peak hours 
of business.  Discos and nightclubs are off-limits. 
 
B) The use of public buses and trains, and their respective 
terminals/stations, is prohibited. 
 
C) Travelers must exercise caution when out in public and 
should report suspicious activity to the police and RSO 
immediately. 
 
D) Official travel to the West Bank is authorized on a 
case-by-case basis when determined by the Consul General to 
be mission-critical.  For limited, personal travel, U.S. 
government personnel and family members are permitted to 
travel through the West Bank, using only Routes 1 and 90, to 
reach Galilee, the Allenby/King Hussein Bridge or the Dead 
Sea coast near Ein Gedi and Masada.  Each such transit 
requires prior notification to the Consulate General's 
security office and must occur during daylight hours.  U.S. 
Government personnel and family members are permitted 
personal travel on Route 443 between Modi'in and Jerusalem 
during the daylight hours only. 
 
E) Official and personal travel to the Gaza Strip, including 
to the Palestinian-controlled portions of entry/crossing 
points into the Gaza Strip, remains prohibited.  Under policy 
guidance issued by the Secretary of State, the Consul General 
may grant rare exceptions to this prohibition only for 
official, mission-critical travel by the named special envoys 
of the President. 
 
F) Jerusalem,s Old City is off-limits during the hours of 
darkness, and on Fridays between the hours of 1100-1400 hrs. 
 
G) Travelers to Jerusalem are urged to remain vigilant, 
especially in the commercial and downtown areas of West 
Jerusalem and the city center.  Israeli security services 
report that they continue to receive information of planned 
terrorist attacks in and around Jerusalem. 
 
H) Also in Jerusalem, the Tayelit or Haas Promenade (vehicle 
 
overlook) located in Armon Hanatziv and bordering the 
Palestinian Village of Abu-Tor is open for USG personnel 
during daylight hours only.  Both the area below the 
Promenade and the village of Abu-Tor remain off-limits.  In 
addition, due to reported increases in criminal activity, 
employees should avoid the outlying villages surrounding East 
Jerusalem. 
 
I) Northern Israel/Golan Heights: While there is a cessation 
of hostilities between Israel and Lebanon, the situation 
remains tense and a possible resumption of sporadic violence 
cannot be ruled out.  Visitors to the Golan Heights should be 
warned that due to unmarked or poorly marked minefields, they 
should walk only on established roads or trails and pay close 
attention to warning signs and notices in the area. 
 
J) Country clearance for official travel to post will be 
reviewed on an individual and mission-critical basis.  All 
TDY visitors at post for more than one week are required to 
attend the security newcomer briefing presented by the 
Regional Security Office (RSO).  Sponsoring offices will 
incorporate this briefing into visit schedules as required. 
Official visitors here less than one week are strongly 
encouraged to contact the RSO for the most recent security 
related information. 
 
5. (U) It has been longstanding USG policy for Administration 
officials not to travel to territories captured by Israel in 
the 1967 War (the West Bank, Gaza, the Golan Heights and East 
Jerusalem) escorted by Government of Israel officials, either 
civilian or military.  Overflights of these areas have been 
permitted in certain circumstances.  Security situation 
permitting, Administration officials may travel to the West 
Bank or Gaza in the company of Consulate General personnel. 
As noted above, however, due to the October 2003 attack on 
Embassy personnel in Gaza, all travel to Gaza has been 
suspended for the foreseeable future.  The Embassy recommends 
that Congressional and Staff delegations follow these USG 
guidelines when visiting Israel. 
 
6. (U) Support costs: Visitors or their agencies/bureaus must 
provide fund cites to cover requested commercial services 
such as equipment, supplies, and transportation, as well as 
required Embassy/Consulate General overtime.  In order to 
maintain their traditionally high standards of visitor 
support, Embassy Tel Aviv and Consulate General Jerusalem 
generally require an appropriate fund cite to cover per diem 
costs of control officers and motorpool personnel when 
assigned to visits.  If security personnel are required, the 
fund cite must cover their expenses as well.  The 
Embassy/Consulate General will provide estimated costs upon 
request. 
 
7.  Computer Access:  TDY visitors requiring computer network 
access should so inform their control officers at least five 
days in advance of their arrival in Israel and Jerusalem. 
 
-- SBU systems: Visitors who enjoy access to their home post 
SBU computer system via Outlook Web Access, and who have 
requested SBU computer access through their visit officer, 
will receive logons upon arrival allowing them to access that 
system from terminals at the Embassy and Consulate General, 
respectively.  Visitors who are unsure whether their home 
post supports Outlook Web Access should contact their local 
systems administrator before commencing travel.  Visitors who 
do not have access to their home post SBU systems via Outlook 
Web Access must provide the Embassy and Consulate General 
with the fully qualified domain name and the IP address of 
their home e-mail server.  That information is necessary for 
Embassy and Consulate General personnel to configure the 
visitor's access to his or her home post SBU account, and is 
available from the visitor,s home post SBU systems manager. 
 
-- Classified systems: Visitors requesting access to 
classified computer systems must provide front-channel 
confirmation that they possess at least a "secret" clearance. 
 No access to home post classified e-mail accounts is 
possible from either the Embassy or Consulate General. 
Accordingly, Embassy and Consulate General information system 
personnel will be able to provide only new, separate 
classified e-mail accounts accessible only at their 
respective posts. 
 
8. (U) Visas: Israel requires visas for holders of diplomatic 
and official passports.  All personnel visiting Israel on 
official business must obtain visas from the nearest Israeli 
Embassy or Consulate prior to arrival in Israel.  Sharing 
this information in advance with visit officers will assist 
us in expediting visitors arrival. 
 
********************************************* ******************** 
Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website: 
 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv 
 
You can also access this site through the State Department's 
Classified SIPRNET website. 
********************************************* ******************** 
JONES