VZCZCXRO2773
RR RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLN
RUEHLZ RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTL #0054/01 0381145
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 071145Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY TALLINN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0483
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
INFO RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO BRUSSELS BE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 TALLINN 000054 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PTER PREL NATO EN
SUBJECT: USG SUPPORT FOR ESTONIAN CYBER CENTER 
(CORRECTED COPY - ADDED ADDRESSEE) 
 
REF: A) 07 Tallinn 366  B) 07 Tallinn 374 
 
TALLINN 00000054  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: The experience of unprecedented and wide- 
spread cyber attacks in April/May 2007 prompted Estonia to 
accelerate its leadership efforts in promoting 
international cooperation on cyber security.  The 
Government of Estonia (GOE) is working with NATO to make 
its national Cooperative Cyber Defense Center (CCD) a NATO 
Center of Excellence (COE) and is actively seeking U.S. and 
other Allied sponsorship of the Center.  U.S. sponsorship 
of Estonia's CCD-COE would not only enhance Estonia's 
efforts to provide expertise and support to NATO's 
developing cyber security doctrine, but will also encourage 
other Allies to participate in the Center.  End Summary. 
 
Background 
---------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) In April/May 2007, cyber attackers targeted 
government and private sector websites in Estonia.  The 
attacks, which lasted for approximately one month and 
ranged from simple spam postings to coordinated DDOS 
(Distributed Denial of Service) attacks, caused severe 
service disruptions to websites, servers and routers linked 
to government, banking, media and other resources. (Refs A 
and B).  These highly coordinated cyber attacks captured 
widespread international media attention.  The United 
States and NATO quickly sent experts to Tallinn to observe 
and provide a summary of the attacks and the GOE response. 
Since the attacks, the GOE has actively sought a leadership 
role on cyber security within NATO, the European Union (EU) 
and other organizations.  As a result, Estonia has emerged 
as an important player in international cooperation on 
cyber defense. 
 
¶3. (SBU) The attacks on Estonia demonstrated the 
vulnerability of both government and private sector 
Internet infrastructure to cyber warfare and revealed the 
need for better international cooperation on cyber 
security.  The GOE has advocated in favor of the 
establishment of an international legal framework on cyber 
security.  Currently, cyber cooperation is done on an 
almost exclusively ad-hoc basis.  In January 2008, NATO 
approved a cyber-defense policy (Estonian and US officials 
at NATO worked closely as this policy took shape) that 
strengthens and streamlines NATO's internal cyber defenses 
and establishes a capability to assist Allies under cyber 
attack. 
 
¶4. (SBU) In 2004, the GOE offered to host the CCD COE in 
Tallinn.  Development was initiated in 2005 and NATO 
Supreme Allied Command Transformation (SACT) approval came 
in 2006.  The mission of the CCD COE is to enhance the 
cooperative cyber defense capability of NATO and to become 
an important source of expertise for NATO in cooperative 
cyber defense-related matters. Estonia is working to have 
the COE accredited by NATO by December 2008. 
 
¶5. (SBU) In November 2007, the USG was the first Ally to 
send a representative to the CCD - the Department of the 
Navy seconded a cyber security expert from the Naval 
Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) to the CCD for one 
year. (Note: The CCD NCIS representative's assignment to 
the CCD will be reevaluated by the Navy at the end of one 
year and may be transformed into a three year tour. End 
Note.) 
 
MOU Conference 
-------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) In late January 2008, the Estonian Ministry of 
Defense (MOD) hosted a conference in Tallinn to negotiate 
the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that will govern 
participation in the CCD-COE.  Representatives from NATO 
SACT and ten Allies took part in the conference.  Estonia, 
Italy, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Spain 
participated as likely 'sponsoring nations' (SNs) while the 
Czech Republic, Norway, Poland and the United States sent 
observers.  (Note:  Bulgaria's observer could not come as 
planned.  Denmark, listed as a sponsor nation on the MOU 
working documents, did not send a representative to the 
conference and has decided not to participate in the CCD- 
COE at this time. End Note.)  The NCIS Rep to the CCD and 
Poloff attended the conference. 
 
¶7. (SBU) The conference focused on finalizing the texts of 
the MOUs so that internal staffing could be completed in 
time for a May 2008 signing ceremony and NATO accreditation 
by December 2008.  Both Germany and Latvia commented they 
thought it would be difficult to finalize staffing 
according to the proposed schedule.  Slovakia also raised 
 
TALLINN 00000054  002 OF 002 
 
 
concerns about the stipulation in the draft MOU that all 
SNs must have at least one representative at the Center in 
Estonia and said this stipulation could result in 
Slovakia's withdrawal as a SN.  NATO SACT and Estonia said 
that the issue is non-negotiable:  to be a Sponsoring 
Nation, there is a requirement to have someone on the 
ground. 
 
¶8.  Conference participants also addressed budget and 
resources issues and discussed the extent to which NATO 
command would influence the Plan of Work and operations of 
the CCD-COE.  Estonia pledged to cover the EUR 300,000 
operating budget for 2008. Starting in 2009, however, each 
SN will be asked to contribute approximately EUR 20,000. 
 
¶9. (U) One issue still to be resolved is the level of 
access Allies who are not SNs will have to the CCD-COE's 
products and services.  Both Lithuania and Germany argued 
strongly against non-SNs being able to request assistance 
from the CCD-COE or benefiting from developments resulting 
from work conducted at the CCD-COE.  However, both NATO 
SACT and Estonia were adamant that the CCD-COE would serve 
to benefit all members of the Alliance and NATO partner 
nations, on a case by case basis through agreements, as 
well. 
 
¶10. (U) At the conclusion of the conference, participants 
agreed to a general time frame for finalizing the 
agreement.  The SNs agreed to submit staffing commitments 
to the CCD-COE by the end of February 2008.  The formal MOU 
signing will then take place in May 2008, with 
accreditation by the NATO occurring in November or December 
¶2008.  The GOE hopes to have the CCD-COE fully accredited, 
staffed and operational by January 2009. 
 
¶11. (SBU) The U.S. status as an observer and not an SN at 
the conference sparked considerable discussion among 
participants.  Representatives from Lithuania, Spain and 
Poland specifically asked whether the United States intends 
to sponsor the CCD-COE.  The Spanish representative noted 
that U.S. participation as a SN would lend credibility to 
the CCD-COE.  The Polish representative said he believed 
the U.S.'s quick decision to send an expert had given 
'energy and impetus to the project' and had encouraged 
other Allies to follow suit. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) Post understands that it has not yet been decided 
if the United States will become a SN of Estonia's CCD-COE. 
In our view, there would be several significant benefits to 
sponsorship: 
 
-- The Estonian CCD has the potential to become an 
effective tool in NATO's efforts to institute a coordinated 
cyber policy and help to ensure NATO and Allies are capable 
of defending themselves against cyber attacks. 
 
-- A well supported CCD-COE could be useful to NATO and 
U.S. interests in helping to implement NATO's cyber defense 
policy. 
 
-- Cyber security is an ideal niche for Estonia within 
NATO.  Internationally, Estonia is widely acknowledged as a 
leader in the high-tech industry and Internet innovation. 
Its small, highly educated and technologically savvy 
population is well suited for specializing in development 
of NATO's cyber dimension.  U.S. sponsorship would 
demonstrate our support for Estonia's efforts to take a 
leadership role in this area. 
 
-- U.S. participation will increase the potential for 
success of the CCD-COE.  Other Allies will likely follow 
the U.S. lead regarding support for the Cyber Center. 
 
END COMMENT. 
 
¶13. (U)  This cable was cleared by USNATO. 
 
 
DECKER