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OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #3105 0390413
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 072221Z FEB 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS STATE 013105 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
TOKYO FOR AYANNA HOBBS 
NSC FOR MARY ALICE HAYWARD AND PAUL BROWN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL ETTC KNNP CBW TRGY GM JA RS CA UK FR
SUBJECT: JANUARY 30 MEETING OF THE G-8 GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP 
WORKING GROUP IN TOKYO 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: The first G-8 Global Partnership 
Working Group meeting (GPWG) of the Japanese G-8 
Presidency, which took place on January 30, 2008 
in Tokyo, focused on expanding the geographic scope 
of GP activities and developing benchmarks to ensure 
that current pledges for GP projects in Russia and 
the former Soviet Union (FSU) are met by 2012. 
Except for Russia, all G-8 nations were supportive 
of GP geographic expansion, with some GP nations - 
such as Germany ) noting its need to obtain 
legislative authority to enable it to spend GP money 
outside Russia and other FSU nations. Russia 
strenuously objected to GP expansion, citing its 
strong belief that GP expansion will come at the 
expense of current GP commitments in Russia.  Japan 
continued to stress the importance of discussing 
GP expansion and also agreed to address the 
critical issue of new GP donor outreach during 
upcoming sessions.   Japan also accepted the U.S. 
offer of a threat briefing in March on specific 
areas of concern, while also agreeing to address 
implementation issues in Russia through a working 
paper outlining benchmarks for 2008-2012 and 
cataloguing specific implementation issues to spur 
project completion.  END SUMMARY. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
JAPAN PLANS TO LEND STRONG SUPPORT FOR DECLARING 
GP EXPANDED AT THE 2008 G-8 SUMMIT IN HOKKAIDO 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶2. (SBU) In a breakfast meeting prior to the GPWG, Director 
of Arms Control and Disarmament Yasanuri Morino spoke about 
extensive contributions GP nations are already making to 
reduce the WMD threat outside of Russia and Ukraine, the 
only two formal GP recipient nations.  He agreed with U.S. 
GPWG representative, NSC Director for Counterproliferation 
Strategy Mary Alice Hayward, stating that the GP has, in 
fact, 
already expanded.  Morino seemed to also support listing GP 
nation contributions beyond Russia and Ukraine in the 2008 
GP documents.  He further agreed that expansion should be 
extremely flexible and supported U.S. suggestions to reach 
out to new GP donors in 2008 and provide a threat briefing 
at the next GPWG. The intent of the threat briefing would 
be to highlight specific global WMD threats that could be 
addressed under an expanded GP, outlining, where possible, 
specific projects that could reduce the threat.  Finally, 
Morino gave preliminary consideration to the U.S. proposal 
for the G-8 to support the World Institute for Nuclear 
Security (WINS), a concept developed by the Nuclear Threat 
Initiative and Institute for Nuclear Materials Management 
(INMM), with support from the U.S. Department of Energy 
and the IAEA, for sharing nuclear security best practices, 
particularly among facility operators.  Morino said that 
he would consider a further briefing on WINS at a later 
GPWG meeting in 2008. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Canada and UK: Full Steam Ahead on Expansion 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Canada and the UK continue to strongly 
support GP geographic expansion and eventual extension 
beyond 2012.  The UK already has authority to spend GP 
funds beyond the FSU and partners with the U.S. to 
engage and redirect former WMD personnel in Iraq and 
Libya.  Canada does not yet have approval from its 
Treasury Board to spend GP funds outside the FSU, but 
is likely to receive that authority sometime in 2008. 
During a trilateral meeting with Canada and the UK prior 
to the GPWG, all delegates agreed with U.S. primary 
objectives for 2008, which are to:  1) Achieve concrete 
Leaders, language at the Hokkaido Summit declaring the 
geographic expansion of the GP; 2) Count GP contributions 
to global WMD threat reduction beyond Russia and other 
FSU nations in the 2008 GP Summit documents; 3) Add new 
GP donors for 2008; and 4) Continue to stand firm in our 
commitments to make good on current Kananaskis pledges 
in Russia/FSU.  In addition, Canada and the UK pressed 
for final Summit language to include mention of GP 
extension beyond 2012, recognizing that many nations 
will need a long lead time to amend legislation, to 
allow GP spending beyond Russia and the FSU. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
Russian Opposition Remains Strong; Japan Stresses 
GP has already Expanded in Fact 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶4. (U) Japan opened the GPWG meeting by outlining its 
planned program of GP work for 2008, 
which strongly supports two main focus areas: 1) Setting 
benchmarks for completion of Kananaskis goals by 2012; 
and 2) Expanding the geographic scope of the GP and 
counting current financial commitments beyond Russia 
and Ukraine. Prior to the January 30 GPWG, Japan began 
its GPWG chairmanship by asking GP nations to list WMD 
threat-reduction activities beyond Russia and Ukraine. 
In response, G-8 nations and the EU highlighted WMD 
threat reduction efforts beyond Russia and the FSU, 
providing momentum for the G-8 to declare that the 
GP has, in fact, already expanded.  Many nations are 
making modest contributions in the area of WMD threat 
reduction outside of the FSU, with the U.S., UK, and 
EU having the largest amount of activity.  In FY 2007, 
the U.S. committed approximately 350 million USD for 
global WMD threat reduction programs plus an additional 
70 million USD in support of international organizations 
such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons 
and other activities in support of international WMD 
nonproliferation regimes.  Japan laid out several 
questions for further consideration in the run-up 
to the Summit, including: 1) whether/how to invite 
new donors; 2) whether emphasis should be placed on 
any specific geographic region; 3) whether an expanded 
GP should place priority on specific areas of work; and 
4) how closely should an expanded GP be tied with other 
activities, such as United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 1540 and other multilateral instruments. 
 
----------------------- 
Don,t Blame Mr. Rozhkov 
----------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) The first half of the meeting focused on 
implementation of current GP projects.  Russian 
Representative Anatoliy Antonov strongly opposed 
expansion, harking back to Russia,s sentiments in 
the run-up to the 2007 Summit at Heiligendamm and 
in sharp contrast to Russia,s more laid-back approach 
toward expansion at the October 2007 GPWG in Berlin. 
While giving lip service to geographic expansion, 
Antonov took every opportunity to point the finger 
at G-8 nations, which have fallen short on their 
Kananaskis pledges for projects in Russia (Italy, 
Japan and France in particular) as a reason why Russia 
believes expansion is premature.  Antonov outlined 
specific conversations he had internally (with Rosatom 
and Rosprom) about the status of current GP-funded 
projects to complete nuclear submarine dismantlement 
and chemical weapons destruction, and he called on G-8 
nations to be honest with Russia about the reality 
of their outstanding commitments so that Russia can 
plan its own budget to complete this work, including 
work required under the Chemical Weapons Convention. 
Deputy Foreign Minister Kisylak had foreshadowed this 
stance in his January 24, 2008 letter to Japanese 
Deputy Minister and Political Director Sasae; however, 
it was clear that Japan was surprised by the 
strength of Russian opposition relative to 
previous bilateral meetings and milder 
Russian sentiment at the October GPWG in Berlin. 
In his opening remarks, Antonov also made 
it clear that Russia,s GPWG representative for the 
remainder of 2008 will be Oleg Roshkov (who Antonov 
said reports to him).  However, Antonov stressed that 
the GPWG should not &blame Rozhkov8, because he will 
be under very strict instructions from Moscow 
(presumably to place roadblocks to GP expansion). 
 
--------------------------------------- 
Russia: Show me the (rest of the) money 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) Antonov stated that the U.S. is clearly meeting 
its Kananaskis commitments, but noted that the U.S. had 
already been spending 1 billion USD per year prior to 
2002 and the GP was &supposed to be about new projects8. 
While the U.S., Canada and Germany largely escaped 
Russia,s criticism, Antonov stated that Russia has 
had &no cooperation at all8 with Italy on GP projects 
(NOTE: Italy has not obligated or spent most of its 
1 billion Euro GP Pledge.  END NOTE.)  Antonov also 
called Japan,s timeline for dismantling nuclear 
submarines into question, stating that Japan had 
dismantled only two submarines in five years. 
He also asked where the EU pledge money has gone 
and what France has done with its pledge. While 
not citing specific issues with the UK, Antonov 
also asked the UK to sit down with Russia to 
discuss differences. (NOTE: the UK recently 
told Russia it will not be able to conduct 
previously planned chemical weapons destruction 
work at Kizner, though the money set aside for 
Kizner would continue to be made available for 
other GP projects in Russia. END NOTE.) 
 
-------------------------------- 
Solutions, Please ) Not Problems 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (SBU) In a partially successful effort to bring 
Russia,s complaining during the first half of the 
meeting to a close, U.S. Representative Hayward 
called for all nations to submit a brief catalogue 
of implementation problems for consideration at the 
next GPWG, with an emphasis on how problems may be 
resolved.  Japan agreed to this action item, which 
will also include asking GP nations to agree on a 
list of benchmarks for 2008-2012 to ensure that 
current commitments are met.  On the meeting margins, 
Canada and the U.S. tried to underscore with Russia 
the importance of concrete solutions rather than 
non-specific roadblocks and also tried to emphasize 
the need for the GP to resolve implementation 
issues in parallel with expansion. These arguments 
appeared to fall on deaf ears. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
Germany: Unlikely to Obstruct Expansion 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) Germany disappointed the U.S. in the run-up 
to Heiligendamm by showing little to no support for 
immediate GP geographic expansion.  However, during 
the January 2008 GPWG, German representative Dietrich 
Becker stated that, while Germany does not have any 
immediate plans or authorities to spend GP funds 
outside of Russia, it is now prepared to not object 
to inclusion of new GP recipients worldwide under 
a flexible GP expansion.  Germany also noted the 
practical benefit of GP expansion in the near-term 
for nations that do not yet have authorization to 
spend GP funds globally.  Becker emphasized that the 
legislature in Germany (and in other nations) is 
already considering budgets for 2009 and 2010 and 
would need to consider adding funding for projects 
beyond Russia and other FSU nations as soon as 
possible.  USDEL notes that if nations are not 
prepared to provide funding for GP activities 
beyond 2012, the GP could face the possibility 
of addressing its expansion in 2012 with no real 
funding for global projects available until 2014 
or 2015. USDEL plans to meet with Germany bilaterally 
prior to the March GPWG to gain a better understanding 
of what Germany is prepared to support in terms of 
specific Summit deliverables on GP expansion and 
extension. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Italy: Not Opposed to Expansion, 
but no Additional Funds Likely 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) Italian delegate Gianluca Alberini, new to the 
GPWG this year, stated that Italy will make good on 
its heretofore not expended GP pledge.  He also made 
it clear on the margins that Italy does not oppose the 
concept of GP expansion, but that for Italy to fund GP 
projects outside of Russia/FSU would mean a dilution of 
Italy,s Kananaskis pledge.  USDEL plans to hold 
bilateral consultations with Italy in Washington 
prior to the March GPWG to gain a better understanding 
about the roadblocks to Italy spending its current 
pledge and financing additional projects worldwide 
to reduce the global WMD threat. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
EU: New Cash to Support Expansion; 
France: Supports flexibility in an expanded GP 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶10. (U) EU representative Luigi Narbone stated that 
the EU is already spending funds to reduce the global 
WMD threat in areas such as preventing nuclear 
trafficking and strengthening export controls. 
The EU is already planning beyond 2012 and is 
particularly interested in utilizing new funding 
under the EU stability instrument to deepen 
activities in other parts of the world, including 
specific focus in the area of biosafety and biosecurity. 
French representative Jean-Hugue Simon-Michel stated 
that new threats must be taken into account and 
stressed that the GP should avoid too rigid a 
framework for expansion. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
New Donors: Cash cows for an expanded GP 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) U.S. rep Hayward stated that most 
previous G-8 Leaders statements on nonproliferation 
prior to Heiligendamm included additional new donors 
for the GP.  Most nations agreed that new donors would 
be critical under an expanded GP. The UK floated a 
proposal where an expanded GP could include two 
classes of new donors: 1) Aspiring global players 
with increasing economic clout, such as Brazil, 
Mexico, China and India, and 2) Sovereign Wealth 
Fund nations, such as UAE, Kuwait, and Singapore. 
The U.S. plans to suggest a notional list of 
potential new GP donors to be invited to an 
expanded session of the April GPWG meeting to 
include: Spain, Saudi Arabia, India, China, 
United Arab Emirates, Turkey, and Morocco. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
Global Partnership: Synergy with Global Initiative 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶12. (U) During the course of the GPWG, Germany 
and Russia expressed their confusion about how 
an expanded GP would differ from or complement 
the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism 
(Global Initiative), which the U.S. co-chairs with 
Russia and which includes all G-8 nations plus 57 
others.  Germany proposed merging the two initiatives, 
and Russia mentioned their confusion about why GP 
geographic expansion would be needed in light of the 
global focus of the Global Initiative.  Hayward made 
it clear that, while activities financed by the GP 
could be complementary to meeting key objectives of 
the Global Initiative, the GP and Global Initiative 
should remain separate.  She went on to explain that 
the added value of an expanded GP is its mechanism 
for financing activities to meet key goals under 
 
the Global Initiative ) as well as activities to 
combat chemical and biological threats not 
addressed under the GI. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
Russia says &thanks, but no thanks8 to GP efforts 
to improve biosafety and biosecurity in Russia 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶13. (SBU) During the course of the GPWG, several 
nations mentioned the importance of funding projects 
to improve biosafety and biosecurity under the GP. 
Following a statement by the UK in support of 
consideration for new projects in Russia, including 
in the area of biosafety and biosecurity.  Antonov 
defiantly stated, &we have enough money for 
biosafety and biosecurity ) forget about it.8 
He then went on to assure the G-8 that there 
are no biological weapons in the Russian Federation 
and stated that these kinds of issues are serious 
and under the mandate of the United Nations Security 
Council.  (NOTE: Despite this and other strong 
statements from Russian MFA, the U.S. does have 
ongoing cooperation with Russian institutes on 
biosafety and biosecurity projects).  This issue 
again came up  in the January 31 Nonproliferation 
Directors Group meeting (NPDG) (septel), when 
Antonov referenced that Russia had not been 
admitted to the Australia Group, which may be 
a major reason for his reluctance to discuss 
these issues in either G-8 forum. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
February GPWG Cancelled; Next steps toward an 
expanded GP for March 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶14. (U) Japan wrapped up the GPWG by outlining 
a plan of action for the next GPWG, which 
representatives agreed should be on March 26 
prior to the next NPDG meeting, rather than 
at the end of February as previously agreed. 
In advance of the March 26 GPWG, which will 
include all GP nations, Japan asked G-8 participants 
to: 1) Contribute suggestions for new GP donors; 
2) Outline potential benchmarks for the GP to 
meet Kananaskis commitments by 2012; and 
3) Catalogue challenges to meeting current 
commitments in Russia and Ukraine.  Japan 
also called upon the U.S. and other nations 
to contribute threat briefings for the March 
meeting. 
 
¶15.  (SBU) Prior to the March 26 GPWG, the U.S. 
intends to encourage Japan to emphasize bilateral 
solutions for the catalogue of challenges, in 
order to ensure that the March GPWG is not diluted. 
The U.S also intends to offer Japan the concept 
of a web portal for the GP to catalogue achievements 
and needs ) an idea also supported by Canada and 
the UK. It will also revisit the question of a 
possible WINS briefing. The U.S. will also hold 
bilateral consultations with Italy, France, 
Germany and Russia in the upcoming weeks to 
explore ways to move ahead on stalled Kananaskis 
commitments, including offering U.S. expert 
assistance where appropriate.  Finally, the U.S. 
will prepare a threat briefing and will reach 
out to other nations (as appropriate and in 
consultation with Japan) for additional briefings. 
For example, Australia is spending WMD threat 
reduction funds in Southeast Asia and may be able 
to deliver an enlightening briefing on threat in 
that region. 
RICE