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C O N F I D E N T I A L SOFIA 000087 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/11/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR BU
SUBJECT: BULGARIAN MILITARY MODERNIZATION PLAN POSITIVE BUT 
MAY LACK LEADERSHIP TO IMPLEMENT FULLY 
 
REF: A. A) 07 SOFIA 1122 
     ¶B. B) 07 SOFIA 1219 
     ¶C. C) 07 SOFIA 1271 
 
Classified By: Ambassador John Beyrle for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1.  (C)  Summary: A new Bulgarian Ministry of Defense plan 
for military modernization calls for a reduction of 3,000 to 
5,000 service members, elimination or closure of certain 
unnecessary weapon systems and facilities, and the 
integration of the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff. 
 The full details of the plan have not been made public, but 
information provided to the Embassy reveals a more positive 
and ambitious plan than expected.  It is likely, however, 
that the Minister of Defense will not force difficult reforms 
on the services, and as a result, some recommended measures 
will be watered down and cuts may be made on the basis of 
political expediency rather than strategic rationale.  The 
reduction in troops, for instance, may be achieved through 
attrition rather than targeted cuts of obsolete systems. 
Integration of the top-heavy and stove-piped General Staff 
into the Ministry of Defense is also likely to be only 
cosmetic (or skipped entirely) due to the Minister's 
reluctance to challenge the generals.  The plan notably 
avoids taking a position on controversial procurements such 
as French Corvette-class ships or multi-role fighters.  A 
delegation led by Deputy Minister of Defense Sonya Yankulova 
will travel to Brussels for meetings with NATO defense 
planners on 11 FEB.  This is an important opportunity for the 
alliance to encourage Bulgaria to continue on the right track 
and to push for meaningful and targeted reforms, rather than 
unfocused cost-cutting.  End Summary. 
 
THE DEVIL IS IN THE DETAILS 
 
¶2.  (C)  Mid-level MOD experts involved with the development 
of the plan have told us that approximately 9,000 positions 
will be eliminated as a result of the reforms, with around 
8,300 of these cuts coming from the uniformed military and 
the bulk of these from the Land Forces.  (Bulgaria's current 
armed forces number approximately 37,000 with the Land Forces 
comprising around 20,000.)   The majority of the positions to 
be cut are currently unfilled.  In other words, although 
9,000 positions may be cut, only 3000-5000 actual service 
members would be let go. 
 
¶3.  (C)  What is most significant is where these cuts will 
fall.  The Embassy has made a steady push (Ref A, B) for 
Bulgaria to end its wasteful legacy programs such as 
submarines, coastal defense systems and out-dated air-defense 
systems that are incapable of differentiating between allied 
and enemy aircraft.  Our understanding is that some of these 
programs will be cut back in the course of the reform effort 
but there is the danger that the majority of the cuts in 
personnel will simply be achieved through attrition.  This is 
particularly problematic since our sources indicate that 
higher rates of attrition will occur at lower ranks, 
exacerbating an already top-heavy military structure. 
 
¶4.  (C)  The integration of the Ministry of Defense and the 
General Staff is the most ambitious portion of the MOD,s 
plan, drawn from, its authors say, the best practices of 
other nations, particularly the United States and New 
Zealand.  Clearly, a great amount of waste and redundancy 
could be reduced through this merger and the tremendous 
divide in culture and operations that currently exists 
between the two organizations could be narrowed or 
eliminated.  According to the plan, a procurement office and 
an audit office/inspectorate would be kept independent, while 
other offices from the two organizations such as 
communications, travel, protocol, human resources, planning, 
policy, etc. would be merged.  The new hierarchy is designed 
so that decision-making authority and consensus could be 
reached at lower levels.  The State Secretary for Defense (a 
civilian) and the CHOD would be equals and would represent 
the two highest ranking officials beneath the Defense 
Minister and a single Deputy Minister.  Predictably, the 
General Staff has opposed this plan, since it is seen as 
reducing the CHOD,s status in the Ministry.  The transition 
to a structure with a single Deputy Minister (versus six in 
the current format) also ruffled feathers since many DepMins 
would be forced to accept a demotion in name if not any 
actual reduction in authority. 
 
¶5.  (C)  Wisely, the authors of the plan did not make 
specific procurement recommendations in their plan, but 
 
rather focused on what capabilities Bulgaria needed to 
possess in order to be an effective participant in 
international security operations.  The stated goal is for 
40% of Bulgaria's forces to be deployable, with six to eight 
percent deployed at any given time.  (A rough estimate of 
Bulgaria's current situation is that two percent of its total 
or approximately 3.6% of its Land Forces are currently 
deployed overseas.)  The planners suggested that Bulgaria 
ultimately wants to be able to deploy a full battalion and 
one company, and to do this estimates it needs a Land Force 
strength of five battalions. 
 
WHAT IS THE MISSION:  MILITARY TRANSFORMATION OR COST CUTTING? 
 
¶6.  (C)  Prime Minister Stanishev ordered a revision of 
Bulgaria's "Plan 2015" for military modernization in October 
¶2007.  The public rationale was to re-energize the defense 
reform process and to update the five year-old plan which was 
seen as increasingly irrelevant.  But behind the scenes, it 
was clear that Stanishev ordered the review with an eye 
toward reducing the share of GDP allotted to defense and 
buying time to respond to mounting French pressure on 
Bulgaria to purchase an over one billion dollar package of 
French ships.  For the moment, it appears the PM has been 
successful in holding off the French.  In December 2007, 
Bulgaria bought two used frigates and a minesweeper from 
Belgium instead, and Defense Minister Bliznakov said publicly 
that the Corvettes were not in Bulgaria's near-term plans. 
Still it was made clear to MOD,s defense planning team that 
recommendations for transformation must involve troop cuts 
and base closures and should plan for shrinking resources. 
In its current form, the authors estimate the new plan will 
save approximately 70-120 million USD. 
 
¶7.  (C)  Bulgarian planners (reporting to DepMin Yankulova) 
prepared a surprisingly ambitious plan which calls for 
substantial troop cuts, an integrated MOD and General Staff 
(based on a hybrid of the US and New Zealand military 
organizations) and a move away from decade-spanning, 
procurement-centric planning toward a shorter-term, 
capabilities-based planning model.  While full details are 
not yet public, the thrust of the plan is forward-leaning and 
in line with Embassy advice to focus on interoperability, 
deployability, reducing waste, avoiding mega-procurements and 
maintaining niche capabilities. 
 
¶8.  (C)  Although the authors of the plan continue to lobby 
for full implementation of their work, they have expressed 
doubt that Defense Minister Bliznakov (who has drawn the ire 
of his party's leadership and is perennially rumored to be 
replaced in the next cabinet reshuffle) has the will to push 
forward with far-reaching reforms.  Others involved in the 
creation of the new plan suggest that, although Bliznakov is 
loath to make waves or push too strongly against the General 
Staff, he is also anxious for the plan to be viewed as a 
success.  The concern is that "success" will be judged by top 
political decision-makers solely in terms of finances, 
without regard for the long-term consequences for the 
military. 
 
THE ROAD AHEAD 
 
¶9.  (C)  A delegation led by Deputy Minister of Defense Sonya 
Yankulova will travel to Brussels for meetings with NATO 
defense planners on 11 FEB.  The following week the plan will 
be discussed in a Defense Council meeting of all Deputy 
Ministers and senior generals.  Depending on the degree of 
friction within the Ministry, the plan is expected to proceed 
to the Council of Ministers for final approval in March. 
 
¶10.  (C)  COMMENT:  While the thrust of the Bulgarian plan is 
positive, the measure of its success or failure will depend 
on the specifics of where troop reductions are made and which 
capabilities are maintained. The MOD appears to have 
internalized consistent embassy engagement on improving 
interoperability and deployability, reducing waste, avoiding 
mega-procurements and maintaining niche capabilities, as 
these themes are all echoed in the new plan.  We strongly 
recommend that these priorities be reinforced during Deputy 
Minister Yankulova's visit to Brussels this week.  Further 
embassy and NATO engagement will be necessary to present the 
strategic rationale for targeted cuts and to ensure that the 
positive measures outlined in the plan are not made 
meaningless or even counterproductive through poor 
implementation.  END COMMENT. 
Beyrle