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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 SAO PAULO 000066 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR WHA/BSC, INL, DRL 
DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR DS/IP/WHA, DS/IP/ITA, DS/T/ATA 
NSC FOR TOMASULO 
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD 
USAID FOR LAC/AA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PHUM SOCI KCRM SNAR ASEC BR
SUBJECT: POOR PRISON CONDITIONS FUEL GROWTH OF PCC CRIMINAL 
ORGANIZATION 
 
REF: A) 06 Sao Paulo 751 and previous B) Sao Paulo 56 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED - PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1.  (SBU) According to Sao Paulo-based public security analysts, 
poor prison conditions in the state are a major contributing reason 
for the expansion of the First Capital Command (PCC) network into 
one of the most powerful gangs in Sao Paulo's criminal world.  While 
state authorities argue that actual PCC strength is limited compared 
with the public's perception of its force, as penitentiary 
conditions continue to remain poor, the PCC is consolidating its 
control within corrections facilities and continuing to extend its 
reach beyond the prison walls.  The PCC has adopted the mantra of 
serving as a defender of prisoner rights and providing services to 
the jailed and their family members while simultaneously expanding 
its illegal activities beyond the drug trade.  This is the second 
cable in a three-part series on Sao Paulo's jails, the rise of the 
PCC as a by-product of the state prisons, and what actions Sao Paulo 
is taking to improve the penitentiary system.  Septel will address 
what the state government is doing to reform Sao Paulo's prisons. 
End Summary. 
 
Background: More Hardened, Repeat Criminals 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) The PCC's strength is directly linked to the poor state of 
prison conditions in Sao Paulo, according to public security 
contacts.  Local legend has it that the PCC was established as a 
direct inmate response to the 1992 Carandiru prison massacre in 
which 111 prisoners were gunned down by state military police that 
entered the facility to quell a riot.  Whether that is true or not, 
researchers and NGOs alike tell us that the misery experienced and 
anger fueled by daily life in the jails strengthen PCC recruitment 
and support.  Eloisa Machado, Program Coordinator for the human 
rights NGO "Conectas," stated that the penitentiary system is 
overcrowded and unsanitary and that prisoner abuse, lack of access 
to an attorney or medical care, and absence of post-incarceration 
rehabilitation programs exponentially increases the likelihood of 
repeat offenders (58 percent recidivist rate according to some media 
reports).  These "battle-hardened" criminals have not just a unique 
opportunity to get involved with the PCC, Machado indicated, but 
have a constantly reinforced motivation in joining the PCC due to 
the poor prison conditions.  Policy Coordinator Daniel Mack of Sou 
da Paz ("I am for Peace") Institute, an NGO focused on educational 
and conflict resolution programming to stem violence, said that 
prison abuses and overall conditions turn petty lawbreakers into 
hardened criminals because prisoners become aligned with gangs, 
learn better crime tactics, and come out of incarceration with an 
overwhelming hatred of the police and a propensity to feed this 
passion with violence.  These emotions and experiences naturally 
make the criminals gravitate towards the PCC, he noted. 
 
Prison Conditions Strengthen PCC 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Father Waldir Silveira, Sao Paulo State Coordinator and 
National Vice President of the Pastoral Commission for the 
Incarcerated, a Catholic Church organization that ministers to 
prisoners, said that the absence of the state within prisons has 
allowed the PCC as well as eleven rival gangs to flourish in Sao 
Paulo's jails.  When prisons do not provide adequate food or water 
for the incarcerated, the PCC bribes guards to supply nourishment or 
arranges for visitors to bring in aid.  Sao Paulo authorities are 
ineffectively monitoring family visits and thus failing to apprehend 
money and cell phones coming into the jails that strengthen the PCC 
and expand its reach, Silveira said.  State police services and 
Brazil's Federal Police do not cooperate enough to share information 
on the PCC, and the law enforcement community needs to intervene to 
 
SAO PAULO 00000066  002 OF 004 
 
 
block PCC-linked bank accounts, a key component of the gang's 
growing strength, Silveira stated. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Public defender Carmen Silvia de Moraes Barros noted that 
the PCC claims it was founded to protect prisoners' rights and that 
because of continued abuse within the system, the PCC has adopted 
the same methods of repression against the police - as well as rival 
gangs - as PCC members themselves face within jails.  Repeating 
comments made by Silveira, Barros noted that the PCC has developed 
into a welfare agency for many of the prisoners, providing food and 
services to those who pledge loyalty and support.  Acknowledging 
that many inmates' family members live far from remote state 
prisons, the PCC pays for bus tickets or runs shuttle services to 
bring relatives to visit the imprisoned.  Public Defense Internal 
Affairs Director General Carlos Weis (a former IV), who heads Sao 
Paulo State's unit in charge of attorneys for the incarcerated, 
stated that as human rights violations increase and state support to 
the imprisoned decreases, the PCC has more reason to exist today 
than at any time in its past.  Weis, who is a member of the Ministry 
of Justice's National Council on Criminal and Penitentiary Policy, a 
body responsible for analyzing, monitoring and formulating prison 
regulations throughout Brazil, believes the PCC controls over half 
of the state prisons.  As evidence of the group's strength, he cited 
the recent period of relative calm throughout the system, in 
contrast to the usual pattern of riot and revolt.  Weis said that a 
tacit agreement exists between the PCC and the state government in 
which Sao Paulo does not abuse the gang's leadership as long as the 
PCC does not incite large rebellions.  Weis told us that no 
mass-scale prison uprisings have occurred since May 2006 when the 
PCC waged a murderous battle against police and prison guards that 
shut down large parts of Sao Paulo (Ref A) and violently disrupted 
at least forty penitentiaries. 
 
Violence and other Means to Demonstrate Strength 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Secretary General Joao Alfredo de Oliveira of the Sao 
Paulo State Prison System Employees Union (SIFUSPESP) - made up of 
23,000 internal prison guards, 4,000 prison external perimeter 
guards and approximately 7,000 social workers, drivers, physicians, 
psychologists and administrative staff in the state penitentiary 
network - stated that the PCC was responsible for the deaths of 16 
prison guards, 21 military police and 6 civil police during the May 
2006 wave of violence.  Today, the PCC has changed its tactics to 
maintain a campaign of "gradual killings" in which one agent is 
murdered every few months instead of during a large-scale wave of 
violence, leading to the murders of 15 guards since May 2006. 
Following the 2006 incidents, law enforcement authorities were able 
to divide up the PCC leadership but somehow today the leadership 
still maintains contact, Oliveira said.  The number of cell phones 
PCC members use to coordinate activities has not decreased, nor has 
the number of cell phones seized by authorities, he observed. 
Oliveira believes that a December 24, 2007 incident confirms that 
the PCC still wields much force.  After learning that two PCC 
leaders were being transferred to a prison where opposing gangs were 
housed, inmates at fifty facilities across the state mobilized in 
protest.  Oliveira explained that in a non-violent manner, the 
incarcerated in these fifty units refused to enter their cells after 
being allowed to go outside for their daily allotted time. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) University of Sao Paulo Center for the Study of Violence 
(USP-NEV) Researcher Fernando Salla blames the State of Sao Paulo 
for the growth and continued strength of the PCC.  While the police 
were able to apprehend many cell phones following the 2006 riots, 
the PCC quickly rebounded and got cell phones back into the prisons 
again, Salla said.  Demonstrating its proven ability to communicate 
between jails, Salla noted that the PCC recently initiated a 
campaign in which the incarcerated flooded NGOs with letters to 
complain about prison abuses.  In another effort, the PCC leadership 
instructed hundreds of members to start a hunger strike.  Salla 
believes the PCC will continue to adopt new methods in order to 
 
SAO PAULO 00000066  003 OF 004 
 
 
highlight its strength and message. 
 
State Views on PCC 
------------------ 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Sao Paulo State authorities hold a different view on the 
PCC's power.  Secretary for Prison Administration Antonio Ferreira 
Pinto told Poloff that despite media stories and public fears to the 
contrary, actual PCC strength is significantly limited.  According 
to Pinto, the law enforcement community has exaggerated the PCC's 
power in order to benefit police officers who often own or run 
private bodyguard services and companies that produce and sell 
alarms and tinted car windows.  (Note: Brazil's upper class and many 
middle-class families resort to these means of self-protection, 
generating the equivalent of millions of dollars in annual revenue 
for security-related businesses.  End Note.)  Despite commonly-held 
views, Pinto said the state succeeded in dividing up the PCC's 
leadership after the 2006 wave of violence, making a similar 
outbreak impossible to coordinate.  He added that although PCC 
supporters are becoming more creative in their tactics to bring in 
cell phones or hidden weapons, the state is working on maintaining 
its vigilance, including installing new metal detectors in prison 
facilities. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Following the 2006 attacks, state authorities took several 
steps to break up the PCC's strength, according to State Secretariat 
for Public Security (SSP) Planning and Analysis Coordinator Tulio 
Kahn.  Kahn said that Sao Paulo created a unified prison 
intelligence department to monitor the inmates' telephone 
conversations with individuals outside of the prisons.  He added 
that many of the PCC leaders were killed in May 2006 and that the 
police force was able to sap the gang's strength by isolating some 
of the organization's bosses in a better-operated and maintained 
prison.  Additionally, he believes that the law enforcement 
community, including the Federal Police, Ministry of Public 
Security, SSP, State Penitentiary Administration (SAP) and other 
units cooperate much more effectively since 2006.  Kahn agrees, 
however, with the prevailing view that as long as prisoners face 
overcrowding and poor conditions, the PCC will continue to exert its 
power. 
 
Mission Brazil Public Affairs Outreach on PCC 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (U) Mission Brazil has actively engaged with our contacts in 
order to better understand the PCC and what we can do to help the 
public deal with the criminal organization.  Working with the NGO 
Sou da Paz, the Public Affairs Office invited four U.S. specialists 
to participate in a conference organized by the "Organization on 
Combating Organized Crime" that took place in September 2006.  These 
speakers included the Director of Chicago-based NGO Cease Fire, 
addressing issues related to community response to gang violence, a 
New York federal prosecutor, addressing legal mechanisms used under 
U.S. law to combat organized crime, a DOJ specialist in prison 
administration (who had previously visited Sao Paulo to evaluate 
prison management issues), and a police chief from California, 
addressing issues related to community policing and combating gangs. 
 In addition to participating in the conference, each of those 
speakers had additional meetings with appropriate governmental 
institutions in three consular districts.  Brazil's International 
Visitor Committee selected a single country group IV project on 
prison administration that will travel to the U.S. in April 2008 
consisting of participants from throughout Brazil.  In May 2008, 
Post will send a Voluntary Visitor group to the U.S. on the issue of 
community response to gang violence. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Although it is difficult to measure PCC strength in 
concrete terms (money, manpower, number of crimes committed, etc.), 
 
SAO PAULO 00000066  004 OF 004 
 
 
part of the organization's "power" derives from the public's fear of 
the gang's supposed reach and ability to literally shut down South 
America's largest city.  As long as Sao Paulo's residents worry that 
the PCC will strike again, the gang is still able to wield its 
influence through perceived force.  While the state has taken some 
steps to limit the PCC's growth which septel will address in more 
depth - the nightmarish and chaotic prison conditions continue to 
reinforce the PCC's reach, whether real or imagined.  End Comment. 
 
¶11.  (U) Embassy Brasilia coordinated and cleared this cable. 
 
WHITE