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INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SAN SALVADOR 000238 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/25/2018 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM ES
SUBJECT: ARENA: COENA NAMES THREE PRESIDENTIAL FINALISTS 
 
REF: SAN SALVADOR 147 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: The Ambassador, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: Rodrigo Avila, Luis Mario Rodriguez and Ana 
Vilma de Escobar were named February 26 as the three 
finalists in the race to become ARENA's presidential 
candidate.  There is unhappiness and worry in COENA, ARENA's 
executive board, over President Saca's heavy handed 
management of the process.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) COENA, the Executive Board of the ruling ARENA party, 
reportedly met February 24 to agree on the final list of 
three competitors to be the party's candidate for President 
of El Salvador.  The decision eliminates former Foreign 
Minister Francisco "Pancho" Lainez and ARENA founding member 
Eduardo Barrientos from consideration.  Lainez' exclusion 
from the list of candidates moving forward was floated in the 
press February 25.  COENA announced the unanimous decision 
formally February 26. 
 
¶3. (C) Not surprisingly, given their ties to President Saca, 
former PNC director Rodrigo Avila and former Presidential 
Legal Advisor Luis Mario Rodriguez made the cut.  VP de 
Escobar also made it onto the list of finalists, though few 
observers believe she will become ARENA's candidate.  ARENA 
founding member Eduardo Barrientos' elimination came as no 
surprise (even to him, apparently) given his low level of 
name recognition and lack of a defined base of support inside 
the party.  ARENA still plans to select its candidate on 
March 15. 
 
¶4. (C) Poloff discussed ARENA's candidate selection process 
with Roberto Murray Meza, COENA member, February 26.  Murray 
repeatedly said a significant number of COENA members are 
quite upset at President Saca's handling of the process, a 
sentiment shared by a number of businessmen and a large 
segment of the middle class.  Hours before the decision was 
announced, Murray said the decision to include Rodriguez as a 
third candidate was still up in the air, saying it was 
possible COENA would announce only two finalists. 
 
¶5. (C) Murray said he believed Saca was convinced he had 
sufficient power within ARENA and access to sufficient 
financial resources in order to force the selection of his 
preferred candidate -- Rodrigo Avila -- and fund the 
resulting campaign, even if ARENA's traditional donors 
balked.  Murray described himself and others in COENA as 
disappointed with the process and the result.  Saca, he said, 
hadn't even gone through the motions of genuinely consulting 
with the party.  Salvadoran presidents, he continued, have 
maneuvered to support their preferred candidates in the past, 
but have never been this blatant.  Murray said he was quite 
concerned that Salvadoran business interests that have 
traditionally supported ARENA will be sufficiently angered at 
being expected to fund a candidate without consultation or 
support that they may be strongly tempted to refuse. 
 
¶6. (C) Murray said Saca has told COENA members the U.S. 
Embassy and Washington support Rodrigo Avila as ARENA's 
candidate.  PolCouns noted that while the USG has had a long, 
productive working relationship with Avila, we do not 
"support" his or any other candidacy.  Murray said while most 
on COENA recognized that, some were probably more comfortable 
supporting Avila based on Saca's assertions, even though they 
strongly suspected they were false.  Murray, reflecting on an 
Avila run for President, said "well, we have time to teach 
him to talk, but not to think."  Murray said he hoped the 
time remaining until the presidential vote in March 2009 
would give ARENA time to heal its wounds, win the election, 
and then set out to ensure this never happens again.  Murray 
said there were already some quiet discussions of amending 
ARENA's statutes to prevent a sitting Salvadoran president 
from serving as President of COENA.  In the end, he 
acknowledged, COENA members had no one to blame but 
themselves for allowing this to take place. 
 
¶7. (C) Murray said he understood businessman Ricardo Poma, a 
patron of VP de Escobar, had approached Saca to argue against 
excluding her from the list of ARENA finalists.  Murray said 
that approach appears to have paid off. 
 
¶8. (C) Finally Murray was struck by the irony that when he 
was considering standing as a candidate, he had spoken with 
Arturo Zablah (then and once again a putative presidential 
candidate for an FDR-PDC-CD alliance) who had suggested he 
would throw his support to ARENA to prevent an FMLN victory. 
Murray had reported this to Saca, who dismissed the offer. 
Now, Murray said, it seems Saca has managed to replace a 
likely scenario of everyone against the FMLN with just the 
opposite.  A Zablah run now would likely attract disenchanted 
ARENA supporters. 
 
¶9. (C) Commment: Inside and outside ARENA, most observers 
believe the fix is in and Rodrigo Avila will be selected as 
the party's candidate on March 15.  But ARENA insiders (aside 
from Saca and his inner circle, it seems) are concerned about 
Avila's candidacy and eventual government.  Avila is a well 
known quantity to the USG; our experience suggests he would 
need a strong chief of staff to make his administration 
successful, given the relative weakness of his organizational 
and administrative skills versus his leadership qualities. 
 
¶10. (C) Comment continued: Once ARENA's improvised, cloudy, 
and in many ways flawed candidate selection process, the 
party will have its work cut out for it, not just in the 
upcoming campaign, but in repairing the damage that has been 
done inside the party.  Saca's apparent manipulation of the 
candidate selection process has resulted in broad resentment 
inside the party, and could well diminish financial and other 
support during the campaign.  Under these circumstances, a 
Zablah run could easily force a second round for the 
presidential vote in April 2009 and ARENA might be 
unintentionally incubating a future center-left force in 
Salvadoran politics. 
GLAZER