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Viewing cable 08SANAA318,

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08SANAA318 2008-02-25 12:34 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Sanaa
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHYN #0318/01 0561234
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 251234Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY SANAA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9025
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0856
RHRMDAW/NAVCENTMETOCCEN BAHRAIN
INFO RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 0230
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 0400
RUEHAE/AMEMBASSY ASMARA 0657
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0064
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 0165
UNCLAS SANAA 000318 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
NOFORN 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ARP AND PRM 
CAIRO FOR REFCOORD MARY DOETSCH 
NAVCENT FOR VADM KEVIN COSGRIFF 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREF PHUM PREL PGOV YM
SUBJ: OVERVIEW OF REFUGEES IN YEMEN: A MIXED BAG OF MISERY 
 
REF: 07 SANAA 2300 
 
1. (SBU/NF) SUMMARY: According to the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), there were 117,363 recognized 
refugees in Yemen at the end of December 2007. The number of 
unregistered migrants may equal or exceed this. While their national 
origin largely determines their experiences, the ROYG's lack of 
capacity and concern are a problem for all. Since the influx is 
likely to continue, it may be time for outside assistance to focus 
on economic integration rather than simply relief. END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (SBU/NF) The vast majority (110,616) of the 117,363 recognized 
refugees in Yemen are Somalis. They are followed by Iraqis (3,747), 
Ethiopians (1,988), Palestinians (440), Eritreans (415), and around 
157 others, including Sudanese, Syrians, Vietnamese and other 
Africans and Arabs. While refugees are spread throughout Yemen's 
urban centers, large numbers of Somalis reside in the Kharaz refugee 
camp west of Aden or in Basateen, a majority-Somali suburb of Aden 
city. There is also a small but growing second generation of Somali 
refugees born in Kharaz camp. Many refugees intend to use Yemen as a 
jumping-off point for destinations in the Gulf or Europe. Although 
no statistics are available, Marcus Dolder, the Representative in 
Yemen of the International Committee for the Red Cross/Red Crescent, 
has estimated that as many as half of all arrivals in Yemen move on 
via land routes to Saudi Arabia. 
 
3. (SBU/NF) The high percentage of recognized Somali refugees 
derives from the ROYG's policy of granting automatic refugee status 
to all Somalis who reach Yemen. While the origins of this policy 
remain murky, sources in UNHCR and in the Yemeni parliament have 
said that it is intended to reciprocate past Somali political 
support for President Saleh and the ROYG. The refugee figures above 
do not include many thousands of migrants who have not been granted 
refugee status by the ROYG or UNHCR, the majority of whom are 
Ethiopian. Ethiopian migrants, like Somalis, face enormous risks in 
the dangerous sea crossing to Yemen (see reftel). Although NGO 
figures for shore arrivals along Yemen's Gulf of Aden coast show a 
roughly 40/60 split between Ethiopians and Somalis, most Ethiopian 
migrants scatter to the cities immediately rather than attempt to 
claim asylum. The ROYG generally views Ethiopian arrivals as illegal 
economic migrants. According to Saado Quol, head of UNHCR's Aden 
office, the ROYG has moved since early 2006 from a strategy of 
periodic urban roundups of Ethiopian migrants to capturing 
Ethiopians as they arrive on Yemen's shores. After a period of 
detention, most are deported to Ethiopia in cooperation, according 
to Quol, with the Ethiopian Embassy in Sanaa. 
 
4. (SBU/NF) The ROYG is generally more sympathetic towards Iraqi and 
Palestinian asylum seekers and does not obstruct their applications 
for refugee status with UNHCR. Their situation is further helped by 
their small numbers, good job prospects resulting from their 
relatively high level of education, and their ability to assimilate 
into Yemeni society. Iraqi Christians, however, sometimes face 
low-level social discrimination and, according to UNHCR Protection 
Officer Samer Haddadin, the situation of Iraqi Mandaeans is tenuous. 
A sect that is neither Christian nor Muslim, the Mandaeans face 
strong social pressure to convert to Islam, and are a UNHCR priority 
for resettlement in the United States or Europe. 
 
5. (SBU/NF) Some problems are shared by all refugees in Yemen 
regardless of national origin. Although Yemen is a signatory to both 
the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 
Protocol, the ROYG's obligations have not yet been enshrined in 
national law. Although the ROYG set up the National Committee for 
Refugee Affairs (NACRA) in 2000 to deal with refugee issues, the 
committee is reactive and essentially a forum to give the Interior 
and Foreign Affairs ministries a veto on refugee issues, which are 
primarily the responsibility of the Ministry of Human Rights. 
Although the ROYG claimed that a draft refugee law had been 
submitted to parliament in 2004, it was never approved, and Adel 
Jasmin, the UNHCR Representative in Yemen, says he now believes the 
draft never actually existed. Shaykh Nabil Basha, a ruling party 
parliamentarian on the human rights committee, said in a January 
meeting that no powerful ministries have given their backing to 
refugee legislation. A new draft refugee law, announced in February 
2008 by the Ministry of Human Rights, has yet to be seen by UNHCR 
(septel). Without enforced refugee legislation, even recognized 
refugees have no legal recourse when they are denied their rights 
under the 1951 Convention. Currently, for example, the ROYG refuses 
to approve travel documents for refugees, despite UNHCR offers of 
assistance. Additionally, many non-Somali asylum seekers awaiting 
UNHCR's refugee status determination are denied the right to work or 
attend public schools. 
 
6. (SBU/NF) Several refugees have also complained of corruption 
among Yemeni UNHCR employees. Since it is local staff who schedule 
refugee status determination interviews, arrange for work and 
residence permits, and control access to international staff, asylum 
seekers have alleged that cases have been delayed by a year or more 
until bribes are paid. 
 
7. (SBU/NF) COMMENT: As instability in the Horn of Africa region 
continues, the flow of refugees to Yemen is unlikely to diminish. 
UNHCR's strategy to deal with the crisis is based on three "durable 
solutions:" voluntary repatriation, integration in the country of 
first refuge, and resettlement in a third country. Since only a few 
hundred refugees in Yemen are either repatriated or resettled each 
year, integration is the default option for the vast majority. Until 
now, donor and NGO assistance has mainly focused on immediate 
humanitarian concerns, such as improving living conditions in Kharaz 
camp. However, the USG should now consider focusing funding for 
UNHCR and implementing NGOs toward projects targeting the 
integration of refugees into the Yemeni economy. These could include 
vocational training, legal aid programs, and basic education 
support. The USG should also coordinate with UNHCR to pressure the 
ROYG to complete and enforce legislation that guarantees the rights 
of refugees as outlined in the 1951 Convention. The economic 
opportunities created by more successful integration would be the 
most effective long-term means of alleviating the humanitarian 
crisis faced by refugees in the camps and urban areas. END COMMENT. 
 
SECHE