VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHZP #0126 0421926
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 111926Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY PANAMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1724
INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0309
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE

O N F I D E N T I A L PANAMA 000126 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SCE (SSHIRATORI), WHA/PPC, WHA/CEN 
(ETELLO) AND IO/UNP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2018 
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNMIK UN UNSC YI EU PM
SUBJECT: PANAMA:  KOSOVO INDEPENDENCE DEMARCHE DELIVERED 
 
REF: STATE 13716 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William A. Eaton.  Reason:  1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
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Summary 
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¶1. (C) "I will consult immediately with the Foreign 
Minister," Acting FM Ricardo "Dicky" Duran told POLCOUNS on 
February 11 in response to delivery of reftel demarche. 
Initially viewing the demarche through actions that the might 
be taken on the UNSC, Duran noted that Panama's Ambassador to 
the UN was following this matter closely and that Panama was 
"worried" that Kosovo might declare independence soon.  Duran 
said that he believed that Russia would veto any UNSCR on 
Kosovo.  Steering Duran to the matter at hand -- Kosovo's 
imminent declaration of independence -- POLCOUNS urged Panama 
to recognize Kosovo quickly and publicly.  First VP and FM 
Lewis is presently in New York City where Panama currently 
holds the presidency of the UNSC; he is expected to return to 
Panama on February 12.  Ambassador will attempt to reach 
Lewis by phone, and post recommends that USUN also seek to 
engage Lewis on this matter.  End summary. 
 
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Background 
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¶2. (C) Noting that the Russian Ambassador had visited him 
last week, Acting FM Ricardo "Dicky" Duran said that Panama 
had been following the situation in Kosovo very closely and 
was "worried" that Kosovo might declare independence soon, in 
response to POLCOUNS's presentation of reftel demarche on 
February 11.  Resigned to accepting the difficult political 
realities in the region, Duran accepted that a negotiated 
agreement concerning Kosovo's final status was not 
achievable, that the events of the 1990s had created a 
situation in which Serbia could never once again govern 
Kosovo, and that after nine years of institutional separation 
it would be impossible to reintegrate Serbia and Kosovo. 
 
¶3. (C)  "Russia will veto," Duran said.  "At least that was 
the strong impression that the Russian Ambassador gave me." 
Acknowledging that Russia had other views on this matter, 
POLCOUNS noted that, while it sought negotiated agreement, 
UNSCR 1244 did not require such agreement.  Trying to steer 
Duran away from approaching Kosovo's independence in terms of 
what action might take place in the UNSC, POLCOUNS explained, 
that the matter at hand was the imminent declaration of 
independence by Kosovo, that would be recognized hours 
afterwards by the U.S. and European states.  Urging Panama 
not to adopt a "wait and see attitude," POLCOUNS asked that 
Panama recognize Kosovo as soon as possible, ideally within 
the first day after Kosovo declared independence.  Duran 
welcomed particularly the point made by POLCOUNS that Kosovo 
was a special case that should not be seen as a precedent. 
Duran undertook to consult with First VP and FM Samuel Lewis 
who was in New York City.  Duran expected Lewis to return to 
Panama on February 12. 
 
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Comment 
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¶4. (C) Ambassador will attempt to reach Lewis by phone to 
convey reftel points as well.  Additionally, post recommends 
that USUN reach out to Lewis who is in New York for the first 
half of Panama's UNSC Presidency.  Generally, Panama prefers 
to run always to the center of consensus and does not like to 
be either the odd man out or to be forced to chose sides on 
tough issues.  Conflict averse, Panama may be relieved if 
Kosovo does not return to the UNSC -- particularly during its 
presidency -- as it will not want to take sides in a dispute 
that divides the U.S., UK and France on one side and Russia 
and China on the other side.  At the same time, however, post 
expects that at a minimum Panama will lag in its eventual 
recognition of Kosovo waiting until a sufficient critical 
mass of recognitions by other countries have been made before 
taking its own position on the issue. 
EATON