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DE RUEHOT #0283/01 0561557
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 251557Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7391
INFO RHEHAAA/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC
RUEAHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHDC
RHEBAAA/DOE WASHDC
RUCNCAN/ALL CANADIAN POSTS COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS OTTAWA 000283 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
PASS TO STATE FOR S/CT (Robertson), WHA/CAN (Fox) 
WHITEHOUSE FOR HSC 
DHS for International Affairs 
DHS FOR INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION 
DOE FOR P&I 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC ECON PTER PREL PGOV ETTC EFIN KHLS CA
SUBJ: CI/KR RESPONSE FOR S/CT - CANADA - 
CORRECTED VERSION - FORMAT CORRECTED 
 
REF:  STATE 6461 
 
¶1. (U) Summary: The economies, societies and environments of Canada 
and the United States are inextricably intertwined; the relationship 
is most easily reflected in the staggering volume of bilateral 
trade, over US$1.5 billion a day in goods, and the 300,000 people 
who cross the shared border every day to work or visit.  Moreover, 
Canada is the single largest foreign supplier of fossil fuels to the 
United States (providing 17 percent of U.S. oil imports and over 80 
percent of U.S. natural gas imports).  Our food and agriculture 
markets are almost completely integrated, with Canada accounting for 
about 20 percent of total US agri-food imports.  In addition our two 
countries' financial markets and telecommunications and electrical 
networks are highly interconnected.  As a consequence of this 
exceptional interrelationship a disruption to Canada's critical 
infrastructure (CI) could have an immediate and deleterious impact 
on the United States. Because it would be virtually impossible to 
provide an exhaustive accounting of Canada's CI, this cable gives 
illustrative examples of CI in various sectors. Protection of CI is 
a Canadian national priority, and Canada is a close and trusted 
partner with the United States in working to protect CI in North 
America.  End summary. 
 
CANADA'S APPROACH TO CI 
----------------------- 
 
¶2. (U) Like the United States, Canada's critical infrastructure 
consists of physical and information technology facilities, 
networks, services and assets essential to the health, safety, 
security or economic well-being of its citizens, or to the effective 
functioning of government.  In many respects, the two countries 
should be viewed as sharing the same infrastructure (pipelines, 
bridges, power and phone lines) sprawling across a shared economic 
space.  As in the United States, it is estimated that most (between 
85 and 95 percent)of Canada's critical infrastructure is owned and 
operated by private sector firms, which therefore bear primary 
responsibility for the development and implementation of business 
continuity plans. In addition to the federal government's role, the 
provinces and territories also have a significant jurisdictional 
role in critical infrastructure protection and emergency management. 
 These government entities also own and regulate some critical 
infrastructure. 
 
¶3. (U) Canada has established the National Critical Infrastructure 
Assurance Program (NCIAP) - an ongoing collaboration between private 
sector partners and federal, provincial and territorial governments 
- to provide a national framework for cooperative action and to 
build a resilient national critical infrastructure. The federal 
government classifies critical infrastructure within ten sectors, as 
opposed to the USG classification system of 17 critical 
infrastructure/key resources sectors. 
 
¶4. (U) The 10 Canadian sectors are: 
 
-- Energy and Utilities (e.g., electrical power, natural gas, oil 
production/transmission) 
 
-- Information and Communications Technology (e.g., 
telecommunications, broadcasting systems, software, hardware, and 
networks including the Internet) 
 
-- Finance (e.g., large-value payment, securities clearing and 
settlement systems) 
 
-- Health Care (e.g., hospitals, blood-supply facilities and 
pharmaceutical manufacturers) 
Qpharmaceutical manufacturers) 
 
-- Food (e.g., safety, distribution, agriculture and food industry) 
 
 
 
-- Water (e.g., drinking water and wastewater management) 
 
-- Transportation (e.g., road, rail, marine, and aviation) 
 
-- Safety (e.g., chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear 
safety, dangerous goods, search and rescue, emergency services and 
dams) 
 
-- Government (e.g., services, facilities, information networks and 
key national monuments) 
 
 
-- Manufacturing (e.g., defense industrial base, chemical industry) 
 
 
COOPERATION WITH THE UNITED STATES 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (U) At the federal government level, the Public Safety Canada is 
responsible for national CI policy.  Public Safety Canada works 
primarily with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
(particularly with the Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection) 
on the identification of shared CI, threat analysis and response 
planning; since 2005, under the auspices of the SPP.  We understand 
that Public Safety Canada and DHS have recently collaborated on a 
detailed threat analysis of shared CI. Post would welcome a copy. 
 
EXAMPLES OF CANADIAN CI/KR (USG CATEGORIES) 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶A. (SBU) Banking & Finance - Canada's five main nationwide banks own 
substantial U.S. subsidiaries and do large amounts of business in 
U.S. currency.  Toronto, which is less than an hour's drive from 
Buffalo, hosts the world's seventh largest stock exchange, and 
hundreds of securities are co-listed on both the Toronto and New 
York Stock Exchanges.  A major disruption of financial business in 
Toronto would be felt instantly on U.S. markets. 
 
¶B. (SBU) Chemical & Hazardous Materials - Canada's main 
petrochemical complex is at Sarnia, Ontario, opposite Port Huron, 
Michigan, where major oil and gas pipelines from western Canada 
terminate.  Sarnia and Port Huron are both relatively small towns 
and they share resources, such as chemical spill response teams, in 
emergencies.  Also, Canada is the world's largest single producer of 
uranium, accounting for about one-third of the world's uranium mine 
output.  Cameco's refinery at Blind River, Ontario takes uranium 
oxide concentrate (U3O8) from mines in Canada and abroad and refines 
it to UO3, an intermediate product. The UO3 is trucked to Port Hope, 
Ontario (on the shores of Lake Ontario) where Cameco has about 
one-quarter of the Western world's uranium hexafluoride (UF6) 
conversion capacity - 12,400 metric tons per year.  The uranium 
hexafluoride is then shipped outside Canada for enrichment 
(including in the United States) for use in light water reactors. 
Disruption of uranium mining activities in Saskatchewan or the 
milling and conversion facilities in Ontario could impact fuel 
supply for American nuclear power plants.  Destruction, disruption 
or exploitation of the Port Hope plant could lead to radiological 
contamination of American territory in New York state. 
 
¶C. (SBU) Defense Industrial Base - The "Stryker" armored vehicle for 
the U.S. Army is built by General Dynamics; the  structure, 
fabrication and final assembly of the "Stryker" takes place in 
London, Ontario (and also at Anniston, Alabama). Disruption at the 
Ontario plant would impact acquisition and deployment of the 
"Stryker." 
 
¶D. (SBU) Emergency Services - Response plans exist at the federal, 
state/provincial and local levels to deal with cross-border 
emergency response.  For example, The Joint Inland Pollution 
Contingency Plan is aimed at developing a coordinated and integrated 
response between Canadian and United States governments to pollution 
incidents and Mutual Aid pacts exist at the local level between 
towns in the U.S. and in Canada, as in Port Huron - Sarnia (see B 
above).  Were these cross-border services disrupted, adequate 
Qabove).  Were these cross-border services disrupted, adequate 
emergency response might be otherwise unavailable. 
 
¶E. (SBU) Energy - Canada is the largest source of U.S. imports of 
oil, natural gas, electricity and uranium; the United States exports 
electricity, coal and petroleum products to Canada. This energy 
trade is carried by a shared web of oil and gas pipelines, and our 
interconnected electricity grid.  On the Canadian side of the 
border, the private sector owns over 85 per cent of the energy 
infrastructure. Our interdependent relationship was highlighted 
dramatically in August, 2003, when approximately 50 million people 
in Ontario and seven U.S. states suffered a blackout of more than 48 
hours due to a failure of our shared electricity grid (precipitated 
by a fault at an Ohio power plant). 
 
¶F. (SBU) Food & Agriculture - Canada and the United States are 
engaged in a high volume of trade in agricultural products and 
seafood; the potential impact on the U.S. of agro-terrorism or 
bioterrorism at a Canadian food facility would be correspondingly 
 
high.  The top five agri-food imports into the U.S. from Canada are: 
baked goods (including pasta and breakfast cereals), beef, 
beverages, vegetables and pork. 
 
 
¶G. (SBU) Information Technology - Millions of Americans rely on the 
BlackBerry device produced by Research in Motion (RIM) of Waterloo, 
Ontario; its network operations center in Ontario processes every 
e-mail message to or from a BlackBerry. In early February 2008 more 
than 5 million users were left without BlackBerry connectivity for 
up to 24 hours during a technical upgrade, underscoring the 
cross-border impact of any disruption to RIM's Ontario facilities. 
 
¶H. (SBU) National Monuments & Icons - Niagara Falls is located on 
the Ontario-New York border and ranks high as a "North American" 
icon (the Canadian "Horseshoe falls" is probably the most 
picturesque portion).  Disruption at this locale would likely have 
wide-ranging psycho-social impacts. 
 
¶I. (SBU) Postal & Shipping - The St. Lawrence Seaway, jointly 
managed by the U.S. and Canada, with its system of locks allows 
ocean-going vessels to move between the high seas into the Great 
Lakes, and facilitates ship-borne commerce between American and 
Canadian ports on the Great Lakes. Almost 50 percent of Seaway 
traffic travels to and from overseas ports, especially those in 
Europe, the Middle East and Africa. Disruption on the seaway would 
create a cascade of logistics problems for many shippers in the 
Great Lakes states. 
 
¶J. (SBU) Public Health and Healthcare - Approximately 3,500 Canadian 
health care workers commute to the Detroit region on a daily basis, 
and that number is expected to increase as Michigan health care 
facilities continue recruiting in Canada due to an ongoing nursing 
shortage.  Disruption of this commute (via disinformation, attacks 
on transport or bridges, for example) would directly and immediately 
impact health care for thousands of Michigan residents. 
 
¶K. (SBU) Telecommunications - Canadian telecoms companies carry 
Canadian defense communications into the U.S. where they link up 
with U.S. networks. Canadian financial institutions with large U.S. 
holdings and operations (e.g. Bank of Montreal with Harris Bank; 
Toronto Dominion with TD Banknorth; and Royal Bank of Canada with 
Centura) use Canadian telecom networks to relay critical financial 
data.  Much command and control functionality for cross-border 
electricity grids and pipelines is carried on Canadian telecoms 
networks.  Disruption to telecoms systems in Canada would have 
immediate and deleterious effect on United States interests. 
 
¶L. (SBU) Transportation - The value of goods transported annually 
across a single bridge, the Ambassador bridge, between Detroit, 
Michigan and Windsor, Ontario (valued at approximately US$108 
billion in 2006), is more than the entire annual merchandise trade 
between the United States and the United Kingdom (US$98 billion in 
2006). Destruction or disruption of this bridge would have a 
significant impact on, inter alia, the highly integrated North 
American automotive industry. 
 
¶M. (SBU) Water - The Point Roberts Water District in Washington 
state draws 840,000 gallons of water per day for its residents from 
the Greater Vancouver Water District (GVWD) from a reservoir located 
in Delta, British Columbia. Disruption of this supply would create 
Qin Delta, British Columbia. Disruption of this supply would create 
significant distress for the population of this diminutive United 
States exclave. 
 
¶N. (SBU) Commercial Facilities - NAVCanada (NAVCAN) is the private, 
not-for-profit operator of Canada's civil air navigation system; 
NAVCAN manages all transatlantic air traffic in the airspace 
immediately west of Iceland and North American landfall.  Disruption 
of this service would affect (cancel or postpone) hundreds of 
transatlantic flights per day. 
 
¶O. (SBU) Dams - Three dams in British Columbia regulate the flow of 
the Columbia River into the United States. The Mica, Hugh 
Keenleyside and Duncan dams were built as a result of the Columbia 
River Treaty, signed by Canada and the United States in 1964. The 
Treaty dams provide flood control, and they are essential to the 
maintenance of power generation at hydro-electric plants in the 
United States.  Flooding and/or loss of electricity generation 
capacity in the United States could result if the dams were 
destroyed or otherwise exploited. 
 
¶P. (SBU) Government Facilities - NORAD, the North American Aerospace 
Defense Command, is an integrated bi-national United States and 
Canadian organization charged with the missions of aerospace warning 
and aerospace control for North America.  One of three subordinate 
regional HQs is located in Canada, at Winnipeg, Manitoba (the other 
two regional HQs are in Alaska and Florida). 
 
¶Q. (SBU) Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs)- In Ontario ten operating 
nuclear reactor units are situated at Pickering and Darlington on 
Lake Ontario facing New York State (roughly 60 miles north-east of 
Buffalo).  Another six operating nuclear reactor units are situated 
on the shores of Lake Huron, adjacent to Lake Superior.  One nuclear 
reactor is located in New Brunswick adjacent to the Bay of Fundy, 
about 45 miles from the New Brunswick-Maine border, and one is 
situated in Quebec on the south shore of the St. Lawrence River 
about 100 miles north of the Quebec-Vermont border. If an NPP 
containment facility was breached and radiological materials were 
released some contamination of U.S. territory (land or water) might 
be expected. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Comment:  The inventory of critical infrastructure and key 
resources that we have compiled here is illustrative, not 
exhaustive.  Post believes that a more comprehensive listing might 
be obtained from the Department of Homeland Security. 
 
¶7. (U) This message was cleared with DHS Attach at Mission Canada. 
Wilkins