VZCZCXRO9574
PP RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLN
RUEHLZ RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHNC #0114/01 0461400
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 151400Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8571
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1070
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NICOSIA 000114 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL CY
SUBJECT: ROUND TWO DEALS TO DETERMINE ULTIMATE VICTOR 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary:  The February 17 first round of Cypriot elections 
will narrow to two the list of contenders but simultaneously make 
the third-place party a potential kingmaker.  Current polling on 
second round scenarios is next to worthless, since the final result 
will depend more on party leaders' negotiations than on 
rank-and-file voters' decisions.  Once results are announced late 
February 17, the winners immediately will launch a campaign to 
recruit the third-place finisher's supporters into their respective 
camps.  The third-place candidate and his collaborators must take a 
stance that both serves their and their parties' longer-term 
interests, but also resonates with their supporters, who could 
easily spurn the higher-ups to vote with their conscience.  For the 
first time ever, there is an (albeit slim) prospect that two 
ideological enemies, right-wing DISY and Communist AKEL, will join 
forces to battle incumbent Tassos Papadopoulos in the February 24 
second-round, should DISY-supported candidate Ioannis Kasoulides 
fail to advance.  Papadopoulos already is taking action to foil such 
negotiations.  End Summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
Losers Turn Into Kingmakers But Choices Are Hard 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶2.  (U) The first round of the presidential elections on February 17 
will send home one of the three principal presidential contenders. 
As soon as results emerge, however, an entirely new campaign will 
commence, its outcome decided both inside smoke-filled rooms and in 
the public domain.  The excluded candidate and the party or parties 
nominating him ultimately may decide the victor of this race, 
provided they can persuade their supporters to follow their lead. 
In all previous Cypriot presidential elections, the choice was 
fairly simple:  support was given to the highest bidder -- i.e., the 
candidate who offered the biggest share of ministerial posts in the 
new government, and other similar benefits in the wider public 
sector.  In this election, the leaders' priorities will be to ensure 
their parties' and their own political futures. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) The 2008 race is different in another way.  For the first 
time, there is a prospect of cooperation between right-wing DISY and 
left-wing AKEL, driven by their common desire to prevent Tassos 
Papadopoulos' reelection.  Both parties emerged from Papadopoulos' 
five-year reign weaker and fear that his renewed mandate would push 
them further downhill.  Moreover, the two parties share the view 
that the current administration's policies are leading the country 
to partition.  Both parties face difficulties in convincing their 
respective memberships to abandon decades of indoctrination about 
the other's evilness, however. And preempting their collaboration is 
Papadopoulos's most-urgent second-round priority. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Party leaders and the candidates themselves are loathe to 
discuss deal specifics, and speculation over how each camp might 
move is rife.  DIKO chief Marios Karoyian told the Ambassador 
February 14 "it is not appropriate to start discussions now," but 
admitted the party already had plans developed to recruit 
second-round allies.  Kasoulides had focused on the prospect of DISY 
not advancing in his day-earlier meeting with us, calling the 
subsequent decision to back Papadopoulos or Christofias "a party 
nightmare." 
 
----------------------------------------- 
Scenario 1:  Papadopoulos vs. Christofias 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (SBU) This is the most debated scenario, since most polls put 
the incumbent and Communist challenger 1 - 2, respectively.  What 
will DISY do in this scenario?  Various Embassy contacts revealed 
that party leader Nikos Anastassiades and most of the top ranks are 
determined to support Christofias.  They are considering two 
options, both involving convocation of an extraordinary party 
congress.  In Option 1, Anastassiades would lobby for a formal 
congress decision backing the AKEL candidate.  If the party 
leadership considered such a move detrimental to its long-term 
interests, they instead would pass a "vote your conscience" motion, 
but work for Christofias behind the scenes.  Anastassiades allegedly 
would receive Christofias's then-vacant House Speaker seat as 
payback, plus other unspecified spoils.  A formal AKEL-DISY joint 
government is inconceivable, since its establishment would produce 
large defections from both parties.  Of late, however, many in DISY 
are discussing the possibility of a "national unity" government, 
complete with figures across the political spectrum, as a way of 
disguising AKEL-DISY cooperation. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Papadopoulos has already put in motion a plan to preempt 
either an overt or undercover collaboration of the two parties.  To 
do so, he is resorting to an oft-used "weapon," his 2004 rejection 
of the Annan Plan reunification effort.  After a right-wing trade 
union federation criticized possible AKEL-DISY collaboration, 
Papadopoulos and lieutenants let loose a misinformation barrage, 
alleging that the parties were conspiring to get rid of Papadopoulos 
in order to revive the UN plan.  Close Papadopoulos confidants also 
claim that certain DISY officials will seek to undercut 
 
NICOSIA 00000114  002 OF 002 
 
 
Anastassiades by announcing, immediately upon word that Kasoulides 
had failed to advance, their support for the President. 
 
--------------------------- 
Papadopoulos vs. Kasoulides 
--------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (SBU) This is Papadopoulos's favorite scenario, as most experts 
believe AKEL could never support a right-wing candidate.  AKEL 
adamantly refuses to discuss what the party would do if faced with 
this dilemma, other than follow the prescribed procedure of calling 
a meeting of party leaders to consider options.  An AKEL insider 
confessed, however, that AKEL could never back Kasoulides. 
Papadopoulos's camp believes that, even without official AKEL 
support, the majority of leftist voters will opt for a centrist 
candidate or not vote at all. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Despite the apparent difficulties, DISY leaders remain 
optimistic that AKEL cannot accept an invitation to return to the 
same government it abandoned in July 2007.  One insider further 
argued that AKEL faced difficulties convincing its rank-and-file to 
join forces with nationalist EUROKO, another member of 
Papadopoulos's coalition.  More importantly, the reasons that forced 
AKEL to dissolve the partnership, namely the party's declining 
electoral fortunes and the current stalemate in the Cyprus issue, 
remain valid.  Yet the likelihood of AKEL openly supporting a DISY 
candidate seems a bridge too far, even under the guise of a national 
unity government. 
 
-------------------------- 
Christofias vs. Kasoulides 
-------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (SBU) This would be the most straightforward race, with both 
winners offering the loser power-sharing arrangements.  DIKO 
considers Papadopoulos's exclusion inconceivable, however, as nearly 
every poll has put him in first place; party contacts therefore have 
refused to discuss this eventuality with us.  Opinions within AKEL 
and DISY vary as to what DIKO will do.  AKEL believes the long 
history of cooperation between two parties bodes well for future 
cooperation.  It envisages a power-sharing arrangement not unlike 
that which existed before July, with AKEL, DIKO, and EDEK dividing 
the ministries.  "Only the name of the president will change," 
revealed one AKEL official. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) DISY officials consider AKEL's assumptions incorrect. 
Both DIKO and EDEK will support Kasoulides if Papadopoulos fails to 
advance, they argue, attributing this outcome to the current DIKO 
leadership's strong anti-AKEL and anti-Communist sentiments. 
Moreover, DISY believes that the prospect of an AKEL-dominated 
government, which is bound to absorb most of the leftist vote, 
represents EDEK's worst nightmare. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶11.  (SBU) If excluded from the runoff, AKEL and DISY will be faced 
with two bad choices:  supporting the incumbent after several months 
of disparaging his Cyprus problem policy as a recipe for partition, 
or lending support to their respective ideological enemy and risk 
splitting their own parties.  Finding a middle-way solution such as 
an agreement to form a government of national unity that will make a 
Cyprus solution its top priority might prove a win-win situation for 
the two.  Cooperating with AKEL is no longer inconceivable for many 
in DISY, and some loyalists argue that cooperation is imperative 
both for electoral success and to improve chances of an eventual 
CyProb settlement.  AKEL seems unprepared to dance to DISY's lead at 
this juncture, however. 
 
SCHLICHER