VZCZCXRO0930
RR RUEHAST RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHNE #0641/01 0600956
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 290956Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0675
INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHCG/AMCONSUL CHENNAI 2540
RUEHCI/AMCONSUL KOLKATA 1849
RUEHBI/AMCONSUL MUMBAI 1644
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEIDN/DNI WASHINGTON DC
RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 000641 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA, DS/DSS/ITA, S/CT/ALLAN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER PGOV ASEC CASC PREL KTFN KCRM IN
SUBJECT: THINK-TANKERS MULL WAYS TO CURB NAXALITE INSURGENCY 
 
REF: A. KOLKATA 65/9 
     ¶B. 07 KOLKATA 386/327/325/324/218/196/191/144 
     ¶C. 07 CHENNAI 569/559/500/385/83 
 
NEW DELHI 00000641  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Summary 
-------- 
 
¶1.  (U) The challenges for India in confronting the 
Naxalite/Maoist threat were highlighted in a seminar at the 
Indian think-tank Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies 
(IPCS), an independent well-respected Delhi-based 
institution.  The discusants agreed: the primary driver of 
the Naxalite/Maoist insurgency is the poor socio-economic 
environment; the insurgency is strongest in remote and 
isolated areas; the modus operandi of the insurgency is to 
inflict small, localized attacks on personnel and facilities 
of state government; the response of state governments has 
been largely ineffective; the response of the central 
government has been mostly absent; and the approach needed is 
to "plan centrally and act locally."  We forward the views 
presented by the seminar participants as part of an overall 
reporting campaign on the Naxalites/Maoists.  These views 
track closely with those presented in previous mission 
reporting (reftels).  End Summary. 
 
The Driving Force Behind the Naxalite/Maoist Insurgency 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
¶2.  (U) D.M. Mitra, an official in the Ministry of Home 
Affairs and a leading expert on Indian left-wing extremism, 
was the featured speaker at a February 22 IPCS seminar that 
lasted for approximately three hours and was attended by 
former Indian governors, government secretaries, generals and 
several Delhi-based diplomats.  Mitra set the stage by 
describing the socio-economic factors behind the 
Naxalite/Maoist movement and how these factors drive ideology 
and recruitment.  Naxalites and their supporters come from 
remote villages and usually represent the poorest members of 
society, those who are not represented in the official state 
structure.  Modern economic activity does not reach these 
remote villages and the populations remain isolated.  There 
is significant fragmentation within these villages, based on 
class and wealth with no common unifying force to bring the 
village together.  The lack of a unifying force results from 
the absence of government or institutions of state and civil 
society such as schools.  The Naxalite/Maoists enter such 
villages, promise political representation and are soon given 
tacit support by the villagers.  The Naxalite/Maoists are the 
only force that is able to unify the village and its people. 
While some of the support is based on fear, much of it is 
inspired by the promise of political change brought by the 
Naxalite/Maoists.  Villagers have tried to seek the help of 
government officials before, but their attempts mostly end in 
vain and are left helpless.  The only time government 
officials attempt to help these remote areas is during 
elections, but this interest quickly fades.  The villagers 
are left with few options but to throw their allegiance to 
the insurgents. 
 
Goals, Modus Operandi and Strategic Positioning 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶3.  (U) According to the Mitra, the Naxalite/Maoists believe 
that elections in the current environment support a 
bourgeoisie structure instead of representing the poor. 
Government programs for the benefit of the remote rural 
populations are rare and those that are implemented generally 
fail.  The Naxalite/Maoists ride the villagers' natural 
impulse for a better life for themselves and their children. 
They preach to the villagers that the most effective way of 
achieving their objective is through violence directed at the 
state.  The violence is targeted narrowly -- a majority of 
Naxalite/Maoist attacks are directed at police stations. 
Such attacks on police stations are systematic and highly 
visible to the villagers.  All in all these attacks have been 
extremely successful.  The Naxalite/Maoists have decided to 
stick with what works -- isolated incidents on smaller 
targets instead of high profile targets that generate 
national and international responses.  This strategy limits 
 
NEW DELHI 00000641  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
central and state government response to a minimum and keeps 
negative public opinion at bay. 
 
¶4.  (U) The areas which the Naxalite/Maoists control coincide 
with the major forested and mountainous areas of India. 
These highly inaccessible areas are usually remote border 
areas.  The remoteness of these regions creates a natural 
advantage for the Naxalite/Maoists as it provides a ripe 
recruiting ground as well as ready-made forest-based defense. 
 These forested areas also contain some of India's most 
important natural resources.  Some Naxalite/Maoist 
strongholds are near coal and iron ore mines in Jharkhand and 
Chhattisgarh. 
 
Government Response 
------------------- 
 
¶5.  (U) The participants concluded that the current central 
and state government response to the insurgency has been 
wholly inadequate.  Although Prime Minister Singh has 
publicly called it the most serious internal security threat 
to the nation, the central government has yet to devise a 
comprehensive plan.  The response is limited to the state 
governments, which have neither the expertise nor the 
resources to mount an effective effort.  Since the attacks 
occur in remote areas, the police stations which are attacked 
are ill-prepared and ill-equipped to counter any threat. 
These remote police stations are not properly fortified, 
their power supplies are intermittent, vehicles to patrol or 
seek help in the case of an attack are insufficient, and 
telephone connections are either spotty or non-existent. 
These remote police stations are an easy target for 
Naxalite/Maoists, whose forest-based attacks are perfect 
considering most of these stations border the woods.  Local 
and state governments have not addressed many of the problems 
which have left these police stations vulnerable to attacks. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) The only major success stories have come from 
Andhra Pradesh and the establishment of elite 
anti-Naxalite/Maoist police units, known as "greyhounds". 
These greyhound units are very small, comprised of locals who 
speak the local dialect, are familiar with the terrain, carry 
minimal supplies and can stay out for five days at a time. 
These highly-mobile units have become very effective in 
countering the Naxalite/Maoist threat, or at least in pushing 
the Naxalites into neighboring states.  Many other state 
governments have been using a traditional military approach 
of large and cumbersome units which are slow and ineffective 
in these particular circumstances. 
 
What is Required 
---------------- 
 
¶7.  (U) The general consensus at the seminar was that to 
counter the Naxalite/Maoist threat the state needs to "plan 
centrally and act locally."  Because of the growing 
insurgency, the central government needs to create a 
strategic, long-term plan to counter the Naxalite/Maoist 
threat and empower the state and local authorities to counter 
specific threats within their regions.  The participants also 
generally agreed that both security and development plans are 
needed to address the strength and growth of the insurgency. 
They disagree on whether or not security should be first 
followed by development or whether they should be implemented 
together.  One retired military general commented on the use 
of military construction units that should be used to open up 
accessibility to the region through road construction.  Once 
these areas are been made more accessible, development and 
security operations can be conducted together. 
 
¶8.  (U) Several guests highlighted other areas which need to 
be addressed as well, including staffing gaps at police 
stations.  Infrastructure at the police stattions also needs 
to be upgraded.  Even minor fixes for some police stations 
will create a better security environment.  The stations that 
have increased defensive measures have been successful in 
thwarting attacks.  More groups like the Andhra Pradesh-based 
greyhound units need to be created.  These units have shown 
remarkable skill in countering the Naxalite/Maoist threat, 
 
NEW DELHI 00000641  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
while traditional large military units have been largely 
ineffective.  Other areas that were stressed were the need 
for an increase in local ground intelligence and the quick 
dissemination to indigenous units who can react on a moments 
notice. 
 
Comment:  Naxalites in the Forefront 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Naxalite/Maoist activity has received increased 
media attention in the past year.  There are several reasons 
for this new-found media interest in the long-running 
Naxalite/Maoist insurgency: although still local and 
small-scale in its ambition, it is increasing in breadth and 
intensity resulting in lurid press coverage of massacres; PM 
Singh has drawn attention to it by calling it the most 
serious internal security threat to India; and the Bharatiya 
Janata Party (BJP) has made terrorism an important part of 
its election campaign and loudly faulted the Indian National 
Congress for its failure to address the Naxalite/Maoist 
threat.  End Comment. 
MULFORD