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Viewing cable 08MOSCOW553, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL ON MEDVEDEV'S LEGITIMACY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MOSCOW553 2008-02-28 14:58 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Moscow
VZCZCXRO9874
PP RUEHLN RUEHPOD RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHMO #0553/01 0591458
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 281458Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6859
INFO RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 000553 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PHUM KDEM PGOV RS
SUBJECT: TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL ON MEDVEDEV'S LEGITIMACY 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: Dismissing the March 2 presidential elections as 
preordained, Transparency International Director Yelena Panfilova 
nonetheless argued that the process accurately reflected Russia's 
political maturity and conferred the necessary legitimacy on First 
Deputy Prime Minister Medvedev.  Panfilova painted a bleak picture 
of Russian civil society, hobbled by ambitions and in-fighting, 
which contributed to Russia's democratic immaturity.  Placing 50/50 
odds on Medvedev's performance as a liberal, Panfilova argued that 
anti-corruption efforts could be an early litmus test of the new 
president.  End Summary 
 
Presidential Elections Predetermined, but Prettier 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
2. (SBU) In a February 27 meeting, Transparency International 
Director Yelena Panfilova previewed her organization's press 
conference today, in which TI would highlight the loopholes in 
Russian legislation that facilitate the legal manipulation of 
elections.  Panfilova said the "beauty" of the process was that 
there were very few machinations required by the Kremlin during the 
presidential campaign period, since the electoral legislation 
remained weighted in favor of the ruling party's candidate and the 
race had been shaped months before the actual polling.  One of the 
most significant lacunae, she argued, was the provision allowing 
senior officials to remain in office while campaigning, which 
translated into their domination of the media and administrative 
resources. 
 
3. (SBU) Technically, Panfilova predicted an "absolutely normal" 
presidential election on March 2, which would look legitimate and be 
seen as legitimate by the Russian electorate.  She predicted up to 
68 percent voter turnout, and said there would be less of the 
obvious voter intimidation or excesses that marked the December 2, 
2007 Duma elections, with the caveat being in the North Caucasus 
republics.  "The authorities learned from the parliamentary 
campaigns -- it was too obvious."   Panfilova argued the OSCE was 
right to boycott the elections: "how do you report on a campaign 
that is not a campaign?" 
 
Medvedev Passes Legitimacy Test 
------------------------------- 
 
4. (SBU) Despite the choreography, Panfilova concluded that Medvedev 
would enjoy real legitimacy, conferred in a process that accurately 
reflected Russia's level of political maturity.  Imagine Russia as a 
17-year old teenager, she urged, who has grown bigger and taller 
(thanks to oil and gas wealth), but still wants to be liked by 
everyone, and has a hard time understanding why others get angry 
when its picks on the little kids (e.g. Estonia, Georgia) in the 
schoolyard.  While a couple of thousand Russians followed TI's work 
closely, contributed to its campaigns, and embraced its principles, 
she noted that 140 million Russians remain largely indifferent.  For 
the overwhelming majority of Russians, Panfilova argued, the 
presidential campaign was exactly what they wanted: the presentation 
of an acceptable replacement for Putin, packaged with the promise of 
stability.  Russian society would evolve over time, she maintained, 
but it made no sense to measure it against the standards of a mature 
democracy. 
 
Civil Society Self-Defeating 
---------------------------- 
 
5. (SBU) Panfilova argued that Medvedev's managed election should be 
viewed in the broader context of Russian civil society, which she 
judged was "disappointing" and as immature as Russia's electoral 
politics.  When she helped found the All Russian Civic Congress in 
2004, Panfilova said that she could not have predicted its demise in 
2008 on the basis of political jealousy and in-fighting -- with 
Moscow Helsinki Group Director Lyudmila Alekseeva and Indem 
President Georgiy Satarov resigning over the continued presence of 
Other Russia's Garry Kasparov.  Rather than fulfilling its mandate 
of providing alternatives to Putinism, the forum had degenerated 
into competing camps of NGO elites, more interested in attracting 
international grants and Russian media attention than in building 
grass-roots initiatives.  "We did this to ourselves -- it wasn't the 
result of the security services or the Kremlin." 
 
6.  (SBU)  There wasn't enough professionalism among NGO activists, 
Panfilova argued, with fewer members ready to undertake the hard 
work of mobilizing citizens at the grassroots, particularly around 
unglamorous but necessary themes, such as parking, housing, and 
municipal inattention.  It's easy to go to conferences or "to the 
barricades," Panfilova argued, but it didn't help Russian citizens 
who are marginalized.  The creation of yet another NGO front 
organization, as promised by Alekseeva and Saratov, would be greeted 
cynically, Panfilova argued, as just another platform for outsized 
egos and a launching pad for acquiring international grants. 
Panfilova said she planned to go public with her critique of civil 
society, if only to underscore to a broader audience that Russia's 
democratic growing pains could not solely be laid at the 
government's door. 
 
MOSCOW 00000553  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
Anti-Corruption as Liberal Litmus Test 
-------------------------------------- 
 
7. (SBU) Panfilova gave 50/50 odds on whether Medvedev would take 
Russia in a fundamentally more liberal direction, commenting that it 
was hard to predict "what will happen in the mind of a 42-year old 
man," but noted that anti-corruption could become a key litmus test. 
 Medvedev could prove that he is a "real political leader" in the 
field of fighting corruption, playing off of widespread discontent 
over the levels of corruption and Putin's own admonishment that more 
needs to be done.  Nobody needs more conferences, she noted, but 
rather a "war" should be declared.  Panfilova said that she would 
look to see whether Medvedev backed up his campaign rhetoric on rule 
of law with real efforts to attack corruption.  A possible first 
test would be the quality and scope of the implementing legislation 
for Russia's adoption of Council of Europe and UN conventions 
against corruption, which has been under review for the last year. 
Making anti-corruption efforts systematic and permanent would 
require Medvedev to break ranks with some in the political 
establishment and be a test of political self-confidence.  As to 
Medvedev's own vulnerability, Panfilova noted only that "everyone 
with a career in the public sector in the 1990's has a skeleton in 
the closet," but that Medvedev's transgressions appeared minor. 
 
BURNS