VZCZCXYZ0002
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #0502/01 0531632
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 221632Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6786

UNCLAS MOSCOW 000502 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
S/CT FOR S. GAIL ROBERTSON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL ASEC ECON PTER PGOV ETTC EAID EFIN RS
SUBJECT: CI/KR RESPONSE FOR S/CT 
 
REF: A. STATE 6461 
     ¶B. ROBERTSON-HAWTHORNE 2/13 E-MAIL 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Embassy Moscow has proposed the following 
information on critical infrastructure and key resources 
(CI/KR) in Russia which, "if destroyed, disrupted, or 
exploited, might have an immediate and deleterious effect on 
the United States"  (ref A).  As requested, this message also 
provides information on host government efforts to secure and 
protect these sites/resources.  Some of these items may not 
have an immediate physical impact on the U.S., but would have 
significant consequences for U.S. security and/or policy, 
including significant impact on U.S. allies in Europe and/or 
Asia. 
 
Nuclear Arsenal and Infrastructure 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) The Russian Federation has the world's 
second-largest nuclear arsenal, and a well-developed nuclear 
industry, both military and civilian, with hundreds of sites 
holding radioactive materials.  Russia has a large military, 
capable intelligence and security forces, and extensive 
security infrastructure to protect its nuclear sites. 
Russia, under the START Treaty, has no more than 1600 
delivery vehicles (Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, 
Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles, and long-range heavy 
bombers), and, under the Moscow Treaty is in the process of 
meeting its  requirements to reduce the number of 
operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 
1700-2200 by 2012. 
 
¶3. (SBU)  The 37th Air Army, Pacific and Northern Fleets, 
Strategic Rocket Forces, and 12th Main Directorate of the 
Russian Ministry of Defense all exercise direct control over 
Russia's nuclear arsenal.  An attack or exploitation of any 
one of these could leave elements of the arsenal vulnerable. 
While the impact on the U.S. might not be immediate, the 
danger of such elements falling into terrorists' or 
extremists' hands could pose a serious threat to the national 
security of the United States. 
 
¶4. (SBU) To counter this threat, the U.S. Department of 
Defense is assisting the Russian Ministry of Defense with 
upgrading the security at sites where nuclear weapons are 
stored and enhancing the security of nuclear weapons during 
shipment.  Under the Nuclear Weapons Storage Security 
program, DOD is installing state-of-the-art fencing and 
intrusion detection systems at 24 MOD nuclear weapons storage 
sites, and is also providing an Automated Inventory Control 
and Management System which allows the MOD to effectively 
track nuclear warheads as they are removed from the Russian 
arsenal and shipped for dismantlement.  Under the Nuclear 
Weapons Transportation Security program, DOD provides the MOD 
with armored transport vehicles and modern railcars to ensure 
a secure means of transporting nuclear warheads between 
national stockpiles and elimination facilities. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Russia has recently embarked on a massive 
restructuring and reorganization of the entire nuclear 
industry.  A serious attack or incident at one of Russia's 
Nuclear Power Plants or Plutonium Production Reactors 
(NPP/PPR) could cause significant radiation release, 
immediately affecting adjacent populations.  Depending on 
weather and wind conditions, radiation could be carried 
significant distances, impacting neighboring countries, 
including EU members and NATO Allies such as Latvia, 
Lithuania, Estonia and Poland.  Only Biblinskaia Nuclear 
Power Plant, located in Bilibino, Chukotka, the Far Eastern 
Russian region that borders Alaska, would be close enough to 
have an immediate physical impact on the U.S.  The capacity 
of the plant, however, is low (100 times less than Chernobyl). 
 
¶6. (SBU) List of major NPP/PPR's: 
Kola NPP - 4 units VVER 440 - Murmansk region 
Leningrad NPP - 4 units RBMK 1000 - Leningrad region 
Kalininskaia NPP - 3 units VVER 1000 - Tver region 
Smolenskaia NPP - 3 units RBMK 1000 - Smolensk region 
Kurskaia NPP - 4 units RBMK 1000 - Kursk region 
Nononoronej NPP - 2 units VVER 440, 1 unit VVER 1000, 2 units 
in decommissioning stage - Voroneg region 
Volgodonskaia NPP - 1 unit VVER 1000 - Rostov region 
Balakovskaia NPP - 4 units VVER 1000 - Saratov region 
Beloiarskaia NPP - 1 unit BN 600, 2 units in decommissioning 
stage - Sverdlovsk region 
Bilibinskaia NPP - 4 units EGP 6 - Chukotka region (the 
capacity of each unit is 12 Mvt) 
There are three PPR's located in Siberia.  Two near Tomsk, 
and one near Krasnoyarsk. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Since the early 1990's, the National Nuclear 
Security Administration, under the Department of Energy, has 
worked in cooperation with Russia to secure and protect sites 
containing nuclear materials, as well as to assist in the 
training of personnel.  Among the achievements are: 
 
-- securing hundreds of nuclear warheads at more than 75 
percent of the Russian warhead sites of concern, and 160 
buildings containing hundreds of metric tons of 
weapons-usable nuclear material with work underway at the 
balance of sites to be completed by 2008; 
-- providing nearly 600 security-enhanced trucks, railcars, 
and "over pack" cases for nuclear material shipments; 
-- adopting a Joint Sustainability Plan with Rosatom 
outlining specific requirements (e.g., regulatory, training, 
maintenance, inspections) to ensure the long-term viability 
of nuclear security upgrades; 
-- equipping over 100 sites with radiation detection 
equipment at Russian borders, airports and seaports, and 
reaching an agreement to share the cost and work load for the 
balance of the 350 official international border crossings; 
-- training over 2,000 individuals at 40 workshops for 
state-controlled and private enterprises and institutes on 
export control compliance of nuclear dual-use technologies; 
-- assisting Rosatom in the establishment of two laboratories 
designed to provide export control technical support, 
including training and commodities identification; 
-- engaging over 16,000 weapons scientists and engineers and 
helping to create over 5,000 sustainable civilian jobs for 
former weapons personnel; 
helping to create or expand 60 businesses in closed Russian 
cities, and commercializing over 32 technologies that 
generated over USD 52 million in commercial sales; 
-- transferring all highly-enriched uranium from the Krylov 
Shipbuilding Research Institute in St. Petersburg to the 
Research Institute of Advanced Reactors in Dimitrovgrad for 
secure storage and downblending; 
-- converting hundreds of tons of highly-enriched uranium to 
low-enriched uranium, thereby eliminating it as a 
proliferation threat.  This includes 10 metric tons (roughly 
400 nuclear weapons) for use in Russian nuclear power 
reactors, and monitoring the conversion of over 300 metric 
tons (roughly 12,000 nuclear weapons) of Russian 
weapons-origin highly-enriched uranium for use in U.S. 
nuclear power reactors; 
-- removing, returning, and securing Russian-origin nuclear 
material from nine countries in 13 shipments of "fresh" fuel 
and four shipments of "spent" fuel, and 130 radioisotopic 
thermoelectric generators that contain large quantities of 
dirty bomb materials, totaling more than 500 kilograms (over 
1,000 pounds) of highly-enriched uranium, enough to make 
approximately 20 nuclear weapons; 
-- refurbishing and building heat and electricity plants in 
closed nuclear cities to ensure the shutdown of the last 
three weapons-grade PPR's, which produce approximately 1.2 
metric tons of plutonium annually; 
-- recovering approximately 400,000 Curies of radiological 
sources at 12 Russian storage facilities (enough material for 
over 6,000 dirty bombs). 
 
Energy Resources 
---------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) Russia is the world's largest producer of 
hydrocarbons with an expansive network of oil and gas 
production, processing, and transportation facilities. 
Russia has the world's second largest number of individual 
oil wells after the U.S., so the impact of loss of individual 
wells or oilfields is quite low.  Oil pipelines and oil 
product pipelines are under the control of the monopoly oil 
pipeline company, Transneft, and are thus vulnerable to 
attacks on control facilities operated by Transneft. 
Transneft has a very large security force that it has claimed 
in the past is very well prepared to prevent and respond to 
accidents or sabotage.  Gas production facilities are largely 
controlled by de-facto gas monopoly Gazprom, and more 
vulnerable than oil production facilities because they are 
more concentrated.  Gas pipelines are almost completely 
controlled by Gazprom and pass through a number of 
concentrated hubs. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Information on how energy infrastructure is 
protected is not easily available.  However, given the 
centrality of the oil and gas sector to Russia's economy, 
Russia's capable and active security and intelligence 
services, and Russia's experience with terrorist threats, we 
believe Russia is likely able to manage the security threats 
posed to its energy infrastructure.  For more routine damage, 
Transneft and Gazprom have proven very capable of rapid 
repair.  A massive attack against, for example, a main gas or 
oil pipeline critical for exports to Europe would cause a 
significant spike in commodity prices and would have a direct 
effect on the European economy and cascading effects on the 
U.S. economy. 
 
Financial Systems and Cyberstructure 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶10. (SBU) The U.S.-Russia economic relationship is growing. 
Russian investors are, and have been, active participants in 
U.S. equity and debt trading markets.  Likewise, U.S. 
institutional and individual investors are becoming more 
active in Russian markets.  Despite the upward trend in 
bilateral trade and investment flows, the overall volume of 
financial transactions remains modest when compared to either 
country's economic ties to (the rest of) Europe.  In view of 
this, an attack disabling Russia's financial infrastructure 
could pose significant and lasting concerns for the U.S., 
such as general unrest, bank runs, and defaulted loans. 
These potential effects, however, would be unlikely to 
present a direct or debilitating threat to our national 
security. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Russia's financial architecture is considered a 
 
subset of the country's overall cyberstructure.  The Finance 
Ministry and the Central Bank have established Federal 
Treasury offices and Regional Central Bank offices in most of 
Russia's sub-federal territories.  This network provides 
redundancy to minimize disruptions in the disbursement of 
budget funds or in supplying liquidity to banks.  Russia's 
major securities exchanges have also told us that they 
maintain redundant systems so that trading, and the various 
accounting transactions associated with market activity, can 
continue in the event of a disruption.  Maintaining the 
integrity and functionality of the computer systems of the 
various participants in Russia's economy -- banks, merchants, 
service providers, manufacturers, etc. -- is a basic 
preoccupation for regulators at all levels.  However, we do 
not know what action plans the GOR or various industry 
associations have implemented to meet this goal. 
 
NASA 
---- 
 
¶12. (SBU) NASA will be reliant upon Russia for crew and cargo 
launch services to the International Space Station (ISS) 
after the Space Shuttle retires in 2010 and before the new 
U.S. crew vehicle in on-line in 2015.  NASA has an IT 
infrastructure in place to enable and support communications 
in support of space operations, including from Mission 
Control Center-Moscow (MCC-M) to Mission Control 
Center-Houston, as well as ground-to-space operations from 
MCC-M to ISS.  An attack on Russia's space launch capability 
would be unlikely to have a major immediate physcial impact 
on the U.S., but would affect the U.S.'s abilities to use the 
ISS between 2010 and 2015. 
BURNS