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Viewing cable 08MANAGUA153, ORTEGA TIGHTENS CONTROL OVER ELECTORAL ENVIRONMENT

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MANAGUA153 2008-02-08 16:51 2011-06-01 08:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Managua
Appears in these articles:
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758456.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758467.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758468.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758464.aspx
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4103/la-embusa-y-el-gabinete-de-ortega
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4104/d-rsquo-escoto-en-onu-ldquo-un-desafio-de-ortega-a-ee-uu-rdquo
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4102/estrada-y-la-ldquo-doble-cara-rdquo-ante-ee-uu
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3966/la-ldquo-injerencia-rdquo-de-ee-uu-en-el-2006
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-23/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2758764.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-23/Mundo/NotaPrincipal/Mundo2758753.aspx
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4041/millones-de-dolares-sin-control-y-a-discrecion
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4040/la-ldquo-injerencia-rdquo-de-venezuela-en-2006
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4047/rodrigo-barreto-enviado-de-ldquo-vacaciones-rdquo
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2757239.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/NotaPrincipal/Mundo2746658.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2757244.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2746673.aspx
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3991/dra-yadira-centeno-desmiente-cable-diplomatico-eeuu
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3968/pellas-pronostico-a-eeuu-victoria-de-ortega-en-2006
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3967/barreto-era-ldquo-fuente-confiable-rdquo-para-eeuu
VZCZCXYZ0004
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMU #0153/01 0391651
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 081651Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2058
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUMIAAA/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 000153 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR WHA/CEN 
USAID FOR BONICELLI 
NSC FOR FISK AND ALVARADO 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/2018 
TAGS: KDEM NU PGOV PHUM
SUBJECT: ORTEGA TIGHTENS CONTROL OVER ELECTORAL ENVIRONMENT 
 
REF: MANAGUA 0105 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Paul Trivelli, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1.(C) The Ortega administration is tightening control over 
the electoral environment in the run up to the November 
municipal elections.  Beginning in late December 2007, the 
Supreme Electoral Council (CSE) began firing technical staff 
with ties to Liberal parties.  Of particular concern were the 
removal of the Liberal heads of four departmental-level CSE 
offices and those responsible for cedulas (voter registration 
cards).  In addition, CSE magistrates told NGO leaders that 
they are considering postponing elections in the Departments 
of Chinandega, Matagalpa and the North Atlantic Autonomous 
Region (RAAN).  The CSE magistrates also threatened to deny 
Etica y Transparencia, the most prominent domestic election 
observer group, permission to observe the municipal elections 
due to alleged violations of electoral laws in previous 
elections.  We can expect similar efforts in the months ahead 
as the Ortega administration seeks to minimize the risk of 
electoral defeat in the municipal elections.  End Summary. 
 
 
PURGING THE SUPREME ELECTORAL COUNCIL 
------------------------------------- 
 
2. (C) Beginning in late December 2007, the Supreme Electoral 
Council (CSE) began firing technical staff with ties to 
Liberal parties or "unreliable" FSLN members.  The firings 
began with the Liberal heads of the Departmental Electoral 
Councils (CEDs) in Managua, Chinandega, Nuevo Segovia and 
Rivas (key departments where the FSLN is likely to lose 
municipalities in the November elections).  According to 
press accounts, these individuals were all replaced by FSLN 
administrative staff.  Elvis Armengol, the recently fired 
Director for Cedulation in Managua, told us that by 
mid-January 84 technical staff (reportedly all Liberals) had 
been fired and that at least another 80-90 would be fired in 
the coming weeks.  The firings involved all levels of the CSE 
(municipal, departmental and national) and covered all 
regions of the country.  By January 24, two NGO contacts 
reported that as many as 300 technical staff may have been 
fired in total, though some reportedly were re-hired. 
According to two other CSE contacts, the CSE employed over 
600 staff nationally as of December 2007 and confirmed that 
at least 95 people have been fired to date. 
 
3. (C) Armengol told us that the only office where no firings 
occurred was the office responsible for production of the new 
modernized cedulas.  That office, consisting of approximately 
forty-five people, remains entirely composed of FSLN 
loyalists.  According to Armengol and our NGO contacts, the 
CSE claims the firings were for "incompetence" and/or 
"negligence" and have created an "environment of fear" among 
all CSE staff.  As of late January, CSE officials were 
claiming publicly that some offices had to be shut down due 
to absence of an approved budget for 2008, and that the 
firings were part of their normal practice and not 
partisan-based. 
 
4. (C) Armengol told us there was no "triggering event" for 
the firings but that it was part of an early effort to 
control the mechanics of the electoral process.  Armengol 
noted that the FSLN had taken control of the cedulation 
effort in June 2006, by-passing the municipal CSE structures 
and going straight to FSLN local party officials 
to distribute cedulas.  For the November municipal elections, 
Armengol reported the CSE is planning to implement a 
cedulation campaign through secondary schools to directly 
distribute cedulas via the FSLN-aligned teachers union.  This 
strategy would again cut out municipal structures and ensure 
a higher percentage of FSLN loyalists get cedulas.  Armengol 
and our NGO contacts stated that CSE Magistrate Emmett Lang, 
a close confidant of Ortega, was personally directing the 
effort to purge the CSE and to tighten FSLN party control 
over the electoral process. 
 
CSE LOOKING TO POSTPONE ELECTIONS AND BLOCK OBSERVATION 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
5. (C) In a January 21 meeting with the Nicaraguan NGO Etica 
y Transparencia (Ethics and Transparency), CSE Magistrates 
Roberto Rivas and Emmet Lang confirmed the CSE is "seriously 
considering" a proposal by local authorities to postpone 
municipal elections in the RAAN (reftel).  Rivas reported 
that the damage to infrastructure was so severe and lasting 
that the request by local authorities had merit and that the 
CSE, with other government offices, would be traveling again 
to the region in the coming weeks to make a final decision. 
 
6. (C) Surprisingly, Rivas also revealed that the CSE is 
considering delaying elections in the departments of 
Matagalpa and Chinandega.  In Matagalpa, severe flooding in 
September and October had damaged key infrastructure and 
sixteen thousand cedulas for the department were "lost."  In 
Chinandega, Rivas cited "migration" as the reason for 
considering a postponement, but did not elaborate on what 
kind of migration or how it impacted CSE's ability to conduct 
the local elections.  Chinandega lies in the heartland of 
FSLN support but public opinion polls show that support 
eroding. 
 
7. (C) In the same meeting and a subsequent January 24 
meeting with Etica y Tranparencia (EyT), Rivas and Lang 
suggested that EyT was unlikely to be registered to observe 
the municipal elections because of violations of electoral 
law in previous election cycles, e.g., EyT published quick 
count results prior to the CSE's publication of official 
results, a supposed violation of electoral regulations.  EyT 
board members report they have also come under increasing 
individual pressure to scale back their criticism of the 
Ortega administration or risk losing their ability to conduct 
election observation or even face investigations into their 
personal finances. 
 
OPPOSITION CONCERNED ABOUT CEDULATION 
------------------------------------- 
 
8. (C) Kitty Monterrey, a senior advisor for the Nicaraguan 
Liberal Alliance (ALN), told us that the firings, potential 
election delays, and the continued problems with likely 
voters getting cedulas seriously threaten the democratic 
opposition's ability to compete in the local elections.  In 
particular, Monterrey believes that the firing of some key 
technical staff would negatively affect the ability of 
Liberal and independent voters, especially in Managua, to 
obtain cedulas thereby suppressing the pro-democratic vote 
and raising the FSLN proportion of the voting population. 
Enrique Saenz, head of the Sandinista Renewal Movement (MRS) 
party in the National Assembly, echoed this sentiment in a 
January 31 meeting with the Ambassador.  He noted that ALN 
and MRS potential voters are much less likely to have cedulas 
than FSLN voters.  He cited a recent poll that showed 17 
percent of potential ALN voters and 28 percent of potential 
MRS voters simply do not have the ID cards.  With these 
ongoing cedulation problems and lack of transparency in the 
CSE's actions, Saenz suggested that civil society and the 
political parties will have to take on an even greater, more 
aggressive, role in electoral observation to hold officials 
accountable. 
 
CSE DOWNPLAYS REPORTS OF PARTISANSHIP 
------------------------------------- 
 
9. (C) In meetings with a US NGO providing election support 
to the CSE, Rodrigo Barreto, Rivas' chief of staff, 
discounted the reports of widescale firing and election 
delays.  He confirmed that "about 80 people" were fired, but 
that none of them were from "critical" positions.  He claimed 
those fired included mechanics, drivers, operators, "the 
lover of one magistrate" and the daughter of another and was 
unaware of the political affiliation of any of those fired. 
The lack of funding and the need to modernize CSE operations 
was cited as the reason for the majority of the firings. 
Barreto asserted that the CSE magistrates are interested in 
transparent elections and would not engage in partisan 
actions, such as the firing of Liberal staff or the 
postponement of elections where one party could lose. 
Barreto also claimed that three of the Liberal CED presidents 
removed in December will be replaced by ALN representatives. 
(Note - ALN President Eduardo Montealegre has publicly and 
privately said this is not true, and press reports indicate 
these officials were replaced with FSLN staff.  End note.) 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
10. (C) The Ortega administration, with the clear support of 
the Arnoldo Aleman loyalist magistrates on the CSE, is 
seeking to establish early control over the electoral 
mechanisms in order to minimize the risk of an electoral 
defeat in the November municipal elections by tilting the 
playing field in the "Pacto's" favor.  In the RAAN and the 
Departments of Chinandega and Matagalpa, the FSLN stands a 
serious risk of losing a majority of the municipalities to a 
united PLC-ALN party ticket.  Delaying the elections would 
give the FSLN a greater opportunity to minimize the potential 
damage and divide the pro-democratic forces.  In addition, as 
the opposition seeks to turn the elections into a referendum 
on the Ortega administration, turnout of the electorate will 
become key.  The FSLN, as evidenced by the apparent purges of 
technical staff in the CSE, is looking to control the 
mechanics of who votes in order to manipulate turnout to its 
own advantage.  In this effort they have a willing partner in 
Aleman's loyalists on the CSE.  Aleman clearly does not want 
a strong turnout either - as much of the PLC base is 
increasingly vocal in opposition to the Almena-Ortega 
powersharing "Pacto" and his personal efforts to disrupt 
Liberal unity.  A strong turnout could undermine his ability 
to select candidates and control the municipal party 
structures. 
 
11. (C) We can probably expect more efforts like these, 
especially restricting the ability of NGOs to observe the 
elections, in the coming months.  Ortega gambled once on open 
elections and lost.  Now that he is in power, he is unlikely 
to make the same gamble twice.  In this opaque electoral 
environment, we also believe it will be all the more 
imperative that civil society has the training, resources and 
capacity to mobilize voters and oversee the elections. 
TRIVELLI